Alexander v. Nanticoke Light Company
| Decision Date | 10 October 1904 |
| Docket Number | 93 |
| Citation | 58 A. 1068,209 Pa. 571 |
| Parties | Alexander, Appellant, v. Nanticoke Light Company |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued April 15, 1903
Reargued April 11, 1904
Appeal, No. 93, Jan. T., 1903, by plaintiff, from order of C.P. Luzerne Co., Jan. T., 1900, No. 12, refusing to strike off nonsuit, in case of Eugene N. Alexander v. The Nanticoke Light Company. Reversed.
Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before FERRIS, J.
The circumstances of the accident are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The court entered a compulsory nonsuit which it subsequently refused to take off.
Error assigned was the order of the court.
Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.
Edmund G. Butler, with him H. A. Fuller, for appellant. -- The circumstances of the accident raised the presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant: Fitzgerald v Edison Co., 200 Pa. 540; Devlin v. Beacon Light Co., 198 Pa. 583.
A higher degree of care and diligence is required in dealing with a dangerous agency than in ordinary affairs of life or business: Heh v. Gas Co., 201 Pa. 443; Com. v Light & Power Co., 145 Pa. 105; Stoughton v. Nat. Gas Co., 159 Pa. 64; Mooney v. Luzerne Boro., 186 Pa. 161; Alton Ry. & Illum. Co. v. Foulds, 81 Ill.App. 322; Oil Co. v. Torpedo Co., 190 Pa. 350.
James L. Morris, with him Woodward, Darling & Woodward, for appellee. -- This is a case in which there did not exist between the defendant company and the injured person a relation imposing upon it an absolute duty, an obligation amounting to that of an insurer: Smith v. East End Electric Light Co., 198 Pa. 19; Fitzgerald v. Edison Co., 200 Pa. 540.
Plaintiff must prove by affirmative and direct evidence the particular negligence that caused the accident claimed to have occasioned the injuries and that the cause of the accident was one for which the defendant was liable: Whitaker v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 87 Pa. 34; Goshorn v. Smith, 92 Pa. 435; Huey v. Gahlenbeck, 121 Pa. 238; Reese v. Clark, 146 Pa. 465; Mixter v. Imperial Coal Co., 152 Pa. 395; Reese v. Hershey, 163 Pa. 253; Bruner v. Blaisdell, 170 Pa. 25; Wojciechowski v. Spreckels' Sugar Refining Co., 177 Pa. 57; Davidson v. Humes, 188 Pa. 335; Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa. 274.
The existence of a contractual relation between the plaintiff and the defendant company did not change the status of the parties, nor do away with the necessity of proving defendant's negligence by direct and affirmative evidence: Leidy v. Quaker City Cold Storage Co., 180 Pa. 323; Davidson v. Humes, 188 Pa. 335.
The doctrine of res ipso loquitur applies where under the circumstances shown the accident presumably would not have happened if due care had been exercised: Todd v. Traction Co., 192 Pa. 587; Stearns v. Ontario Spinning Co., 184 Pa. 519; Oil Co. v. Torpedo Co., 190 Pa. 350.
Before MITCHELL, C.J., DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER and THOMPSON, JJ.
The premises of the appellant, the proprietor of a china store, in the borough of Nanticoke, were lighted by electricity. The electric light was furnished by the appellee, an electric light company. It had wired the store and cellar of the plaintiff, furnished the electric lamps and made and maintained the connections. On the evening of August 19, 1898, he went into his cellar to show goods to a customer, and, while handling, in the usual way, an ordinary incandescent light bulb, suspended from the ceiling by a flexible extension cord, was severely shocked and seriously injured. From the facts submitted, it appeared that when he was shocked the electric wires on his premises were charged with a higher voltage than they should have carried, but the cause of this was not shown to have been any specific negligence of the defendant. Four theories were advanced as to what the negligence was and four possible causes assigned for the accident. The learned trial judge, having been of opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply, and that the burden of showing affirmatively the cause of the accident was upon the plaintiff, directed the entry of a nonsuit and refused to take it off, for the reason that, as plaintiff had not shown the cause of the accident, the jury would have had to guess at it, if the case had been submitted to them.
Though electricity is the most powerful and dangerous element known to science, it has become part of the commercial, industrial, business and domestic life of the world, working the wonders of the age. It can neither be seen nor heard and is as deadly as it is invisible and silent; but, though such are its qualities, the same science that discovered it can control it in the endless variety of uses to which it has been put; and neither death nor danger need be encountered from it, if properly guarded against by those whose duty it is to have it safely conducted to the points at which it becomes only a useful and harmless agency.
The appellee was incorporated for the purpose of furnishing light by electricity to the public and individuals in the borough of Nanticoke. It entered into a contract with the appellant to furnish him with such light, and part of its contract -- the implied part -- was that it would do so safely. Apart from any representation by the superintendent, who assured him, according to his testimony, that the electric light would be perfectly harmless, as there "was not power enough in it to kill a mosquito," it was the implied contract between the appellant and the company that it would supply his premises with a safe electric current for lighting them by lamps which it furnished. By this it is not to be understood that the company became an insurer to its patron against all danger in the use of its electrical appliances on his premises, but simply that it had contracted with him to protect him from injury by exercising the highest degree of care, skill and diligence in the construction and maintenance of its plant and appliances. In Fitzgerald v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 200 Pa. 540, in which a painter who went upon the roof of a house in the lawful exercise of his business, and was killed by coming into contact with a defectively insulated wire, we said, through the present chief justice: That it is the imperative duty of an electric light company to perfectly insulate its wires at all points where persons have a right to be, on business or pleasure, and to use the utmost care to keep the insulation perfect, has been repeatedly held in other jurisdictions. Among the cases announcing this rule are, Schweitzer v. Citizens' Electric Co., 52 S.W. Repr. 830; McLaughlin v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 100 Ky. 173; [*] Geismann v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 173 Mo. 654; + Lexington Railway Co. v. Fain, 71 S.W. Repr. 628, Court of Appeals of Kentucky. But when, as here, one on his own premises handles an electric lamp furnished to him by an electric light company for the very purpose of being handled as a means of getting light, the high standard of duty required of the company is that it must, in the operation of its plant, protect its patrons from the perilous current which is the basis of its business by doing all that human care, skill and vigilance can suggest.
When the foregoing rule is observed by an electric light company, the presumption is that no such injury will befall its patrons as was sustained by the present appellant; but, on the other hand, when such injury does occur, the presumption is that the rule had been disregarded. This is manifestly reasonable, for it is within the common knowledge of mankind, and, therefore, a matter of judicial notice, that electricity can be safely conducted and used as an agent for the production of light, heat or power. The rule on this subject is nowhere more clearly stated than in Scott v. London, etc., Dock Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596: "Where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanations by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care."
To say that one injured as the appellant was cannot recover unless he affirmatively proves, in the first instance, the specific act of negligence of the company which caused the injury would, in many cases, be a denial of a right to recover at all, no matter how negligent the company might be. Against patent dangers, or against those as to which he may have been warned, the user of electricity must of course guard himself, and, if he dallies with them,...
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