Alexander v. State

Decision Date23 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. 28A01-0403-CR-141.,28A01-0403-CR-141.
Citation819 N.E.2d 533
PartiesJames S. ALEXANDER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Katharine C. Liell, Russell C. Menyhart, Liell & McNeil Attorneys PC, Bloomington, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Stephen Tesmer, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

Appellant-Defendant James S. Alexander ("Alexander") appeals his conviction for the murder1 of his wife, Mary Bland ("Wife"). We reverse and remand for possible retrial.2

Issues

Alexander raises four issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness; and
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury.
Facts and Procedural History

During the early morning hours of September 13, 2002, Alexander admitted to the police and his stepson that he shot and killed Wife. Alexander had spent most of the day prior to Wife's death drinking beer. At one point, he drove to the home of Bonnie Talley ("Talley"), his ex-wife, to visit his son. Wife followed Alexander to Talley's home, informed Talley that Alexander had been drinking, took Alexander's truck keys, and left Talley's home with Alexander's keys. Because Talley was afraid of Alexander when he was drinking, she asked him to leave her residence, which he did. Alexander, carrying a paper bag of beer, walked into the bean field across the street from Talley's house, where he remained for approximately two hours. When he returned from the field, Alexander retrieved a spare truck key from his wallet and drove away from Talley's residence at approximately 9:00 p.m. or 9:30 p.m.

Later that evening, at approximately midnight, Alexander went to Alan Vest's ("Vest") house and asked Vest if he "wanted to go drink some beer." Tr. at 529. Alexander and Vest then went to the Palace Bar to drink alcohol. At approximately 1:00 a.m., Wife arrived at the Palace Bar and Alexander met her in the parking lot. Wife and Alexander talked for "5 or 10 minutes" and then Alexander returned to the Palace Bar and continued drinking until the bar closed at approximately 3:00 a.m. According to Vest, Alexander seemed to be in "a pretty good mood." Id. at 536. When the two men left the bar, they drove to Vest's house, drank one beer, and Vest drove Alexander home.

Alexander's memory of the events surrounding Wife's death reportedly comes in "flashes." Id. at 836. While at home, Alexander remembers that he went into the house that he shared with Wife and retrieved a shotgun. Next, Alexander believes — and the physical evidence demonstrates3 — that he took the shotgun and sat outside on the front porch, while drinking beer and contemplating suicide. At the time, Alexander apparently wanted to kill himself and "kill the demons." Id. at 837. At some point, Wife came outside and asked Alexander to come back inside the house. Subsequently, Alexander remembers talking with Wife in the living room and bedroom. The next memory or flash that Alexander has is of Wife "laying on her back" on the bed and "something told [him that] she was dead."4 Id. at 837. Alexander, while still holding the shotgun, knocked on the bedroom door of his stepson, Shane Bland ("Bland"), informed Bland that he had shot Bland's mother, and asked Bland to call the police. Bland immediately dialed 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher that his mother was unconscious. Alexander also contacted the police and, twice, told the dispatcher that he was the killer. Thereafter, Alexander telephoned his mother and told her that he had killed Wife.

When police officers arrived at Alexander's home, they found him sitting in a chair with a shotgun in one hand and a telephone in the other. Linton Police Officer Gary Tannehill ("Officer Tannehill") retrieved the shotgun, which was a single shot shotgun, opened the chamber, and found that a "live round" was still in the shotgun." Id. at 315. Later it was determined that Wife died of a single gunshot wound to the head.

In September of 2002, the State charged Alexander with murder. On September 16, 2002, the trial court ordered Alexander to disclose the names and addresses of all persons whom he might call as witnesses on or before October 31, 2002. On January 3, 2003, Alexander, who suffers from depression for which he takes medication, filed his notice of mental disease or defect and a motion for leave to file a belated notice of insanity defense, which the trial court granted.

Pursuant to Alexander's insanity defense, the trial court appointed Susan Pauley, Ph.D ("Doctor Pauley"), Raymond Horn, Ph.D ("Doctor Horn"), and Dinesh B. Mehta, M.D. ("Doctor Mehta") to examine Alexander and testify as to his sanity at the time of the offense. On October 2, 2003, Doctor Pauley reported to the trial court that, after her interview with Alexander, she concluded that he was "highly intoxicated at the time of the offense" and that the incident was "not likely due to a severe mental illness such as Schizophrenia or Bipolar Disorder." Appellant's App. at 223. At trial, Doctor Pauley testified that Alexander was sane at the time of the offense. Doctor Horn, likewise, examined Alexander and determined that there was no evidence of insanity. On October 7, 2003, Doctor Mehta reported to the trial court that, after interviewing Alexander, he found "no clinical evidence of insanity." Appellant's App. at 142.

That same day, Alexander filed his intent to call Doctor Philip M. Coons ("Doctor Coons") as a witness in support of the defense of insanity. In response to Alexander's belated disclosure of Doctor Coons, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude Doctor Coons's testimony. After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion to exclude Doctor Coons as a witness because his testimony "would cause a substantial and irreparable prejudice to the [State.]" Appellant's App. at 203.

On October 21, 2003, the trial court conducted a jury trial. During closing arguments, the State contended as follows:

[I]f you think that you can find him guilty of Murder, but Mentally Ill and that means he will get special treatment at the Department of Correction[ ], he still gets convicted of Murder and punished, but his punishment will be somewhat, it would be that the Department of Correction[ ] will create a treatment plan those type of things for him if you find him guilty but Mentally Ill. And then you can apply that Mentally Ill tag to the next or to the lesser included as well, the same effect. And, then there are 2 there is a verdict of course of not guilty, he didn't do it, and then there is a one that he was Insane, he was insane and not ... responsible at all and that is essentially a not guilty verdict, he doesn't go to jail for that and he doesn't go to the Department of Correction[ ].

Tr. at 975 (emphasis added). At the conclusion of trial, the trial court refused to give the jury the following instruction ("Instruction Nine"), which was proffered by Alexander:

[Instruction Number 9]
Consequences of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Verdict
A verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" does not mean that the accused will be released from custody. Instead, he will remain in confinement while the courts determine whether he has fully recovered his sanity. If he has not, he will be placed in a hospital for the mentally disordered [sic] or other facility, or in inpatient treatment, depending upon the seriousness or his present mental illness.
Moreover, he cannot be removed from that placement unless and until the court determines and finds the accused is no longer dangerous or gravely disabled, in accordance with the law of Indiana.
So that you will have no misunderstandings relating to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, you have been informed as to the general scheme of our mental health laws relating to an accused, insane at the time of his crimes. What happens to the accused under these laws is not to be considered by you in determining whether the accused was sane or not at the time he committed his crime. Do not speculate as to if, or when, the accused will be found sane.
You are not to decide if the accused is currently sane or not sane. You are to decide only whether the accused was sane at the time he committed his crime. If upon consideration of all of the evidence, you believe the accused was insane at the time he committed his crime, and therefore that he is not responsible by reason of insanity, you must assume that those officials charged with the operation of our mental health system will perform their duty in a correct and responsible manner, and that they will not release the accused unless he can be safely returned into society.
It is a violation of your duty as jurors if you find the accused sane at the time he committed his offense merely because of a doubt that the Department of Mental Health or the courts will probably carry out their responsibilities.

Appellant's App. at 302A (emphasis in original). In addition, over Alexander's objection, the trial court gave the following instruction ("State's Instruction Two"):

Intent, for the purposes of a murder conviction, may be inferred from the severity, duration, or brutality of the attack. The crime of murder is established by proof that [Alexander] knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. The intent to commit murder can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury.

Supp. Tr. at 11-12.

On October 24, 2003, the jury found Alexander guilty of murder. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction on the jury's verdict and sentenced Alexander to the Indiana Department of Correction for a period of sixty years. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision
I. Exclusion of a Witness

Alexander first...

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8 cases
  • Gaby v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • June 7, 2011
    ...question now becomes whether Gaby may be retried. This depends upon a review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Alexander v. State, 819 N.E.2d 533, 539 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). When deciding whether retrial is permissible, we consider all of the admitted evidence, including any erroneously admit......
  • Buckner v. State
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    ...is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Alexander v. State, 819 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). A mere reasonable inference from the evidence supporting a verdict is enough for us to find evidence to be sufficient......
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    ...conviction for criminal recklessness. We must now determine whether sufficient evidence exists to retry Bowlds. See Alexander v. State, 819 N.E.2d 533, 539 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). When deciding whether retrial is permissible, we will consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court, incl......
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    ...is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Alexander v. State, 819 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). A mere reasonable inference from the evidence supporting a verdict is enough for us to find evidence to be sufficient.......
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