Alger v. Special Justice of Dist. Court of Brockton

• Decision Date: 31 July 1933
• Citation: 283 Mass. 596,186 N.E. 838
• Parties: ALGER v. SPECIAL JUSTICE OF DISTRICT COURT OF BROCKTON. BAGGE v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

283 Mass. 596

186 N.E. 838

ALGER

v.SPECIAL JUSTICE OF DISTRICT COURT OF BROCKTON.

BAGGE

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

July 31, 1933.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Plymouth County.

Petitions by Sanford Alger and Arthur J. Bagge for certiorari to review orders of a special justice of the district court dismissing petitions to review the action of the council of the city of Brockton in adopting an ordinance refusing petitioners compensation for services as a policeman and fireman. On report to the full court by a single justice thereof.

Orders affirmed.

E. J. Campbell, of Brockton, and T. C. Crowther, of Fall River, for petitioners.

T. W. Prince, City Sol., of Brockton, for respondent.

WAIT, Justice.

These are petitions for certiorari filed by a policeman and a fireman, both in the classified civil service of the city of Brockton, whose compensation has been reduced by an ordinance passed by the city council, which reduced by fifteen per cent. all salaries throughout the police and fire departments of the city as fixed by previous ordinances. Petitions for review, pursuant to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 31, §§ 42B, and 45, of the action reducing their compensation, filed in the district court of Brockton, were dismissed by the defendant, a special justice of that court. The single justice of this court before whom the petitions for certiorari came, ruled that the adoption of the ordinance was a legislative act of the city government of Brockton which was not subject to the provisions of the civil service laws. He ordered both petitions to be dismissed and reported the cases, consolidated for hearing, to the full court upon the pleadings and his rulings for consideration and determination.

The returns show that certain requirements of the civil service laws with regard to notices and hearings, if they are applicable, were not complied with, and were incompatible with action such as was taken in dealing with these wholesale reductions of compensation by ordinance. The trial judge in both cases found that the action of the mayor and city council in amending the existing ordinance was made in good faith, was not for the purpose of discriminating against any single member of the police or fire departments, and was not a device to prevent the operation of the Civil Service Law. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 31. He ruled that the question presented was the validity of the ordinance, and that neither petitioner had a right to such review on an appeal to the district court.

The charter of the city of Brockton, St. 1881, c. 192, § 12, provided that the mayor and aldermen ‘have full and exclusive power to appoint * * * a city marshal and assistants * * * and all other police officers, any of whom the mayor may remove. * * * The compensation of the police and other subordinate officers shall be fixed by concurrent vote of the city council.’ Section 20 provided that: ‘The city council may establish a fire department for said city, to consist of * * * [such persons] as the city council by ordinance shall from time to time prescribe. * * * The appointment of all the officers and members of such department shall be vested in the mayor and aldermen exclusively, who shall also have authority to remove from office any officer or member, for cause, in their discretion. * * * The compensation of the department shall be fixed by concurrent vote of the city council.’ These provisions clearly convey legislative power and contemplate legislative action. Hibbard v. County of Suffolk, 163 Mass. 34, 39 N. E. 285.

Subsequently, by laws relating to the civil and labor service of the commonwealth, its cities and towns, designed to secure a service of persons freed from partisan political control, reasonably secure against arbitrary discharge, transfer, abolition of office and reduction of rank or compensation, the Legislature established checks upon action in appointment, discharge, transfer, abolition of office, reduction in rank and compensation, and gave rights in office and compensation with remedies to enforce them, now embodied in G. L. c. 31, the Civil Service Law. These laws, among other things, provide for notices of proposed action, for rights to hearings, for statements of charges or of reasons for contemplated action, for appeals, and for reviews by courts which are made conditions of valid changes in position or compensation of individuals in the civil or labor service. In many respects they modify the broad authority implied in earlier grants of power conferred by charter provisions. Logan v. Mayor & Aldermen of Lawrence, 201 Mass. 506, 88 N. E. 9;Cassidy v. Transit Department of City of Boston, 251 Mass. 71, 146 N. E. 357;Peckham v. Mayor of Fall River, 253 Mass. 590, 149 N. E. 622;Bois v. Mayor of Fall River, 257 Mass. 471, 154 N. E. 270. Nowhere among them, however, will be found limitation by the action of executive, administrative or judicial officers upon legislative powers vested in city councils. The division of powers prescribed by article 30 of our Bill of Rights has been observed. Compare Faulkner v. Sisson, 183 Mass. 524, 67 N. E. 669.

The petitioners rely upon certain provisions of the civil service laws. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 31, § 42A, secures to ‘every police officer holding an office classified under the civil service rules, in any city except Boston’ that he shall not ‘be lowered in rank or compensation * * * except after a full hearing of which he shall have at least seventy-two hours' written notice, with a statement of...