Alkow, In re
| Decision Date | 11 July 1966 |
| Citation | 51 Cal.Rptr. 912,64 Cal.2d 838,415 P.2d 800 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 415 P.2d 800, 21 A.L.R.3d 882 In re Harry ALKOW on Suspension of License. L.A. 28808. In Bank |
Harry Alkow, in pro. per.
F. LaMar Froshee, San Francisco, for respondent.
Harry Alkow, a 60-year-old attorney admitted to practice in 1927, was convicted in 1964 of manslaughter in the driving of a vehicle. (Pen.Code, § 192, subd. 3(b).) 1 He was placed on probation for three years upon specified conditions including, among others, that he serve 11 months in jail subject to the provisions of Penal Code, section 1208, then known as the Work Furlough Rehabilitation Law, and that during the 11 months he practice law only at the office of a named attorney and make only 'routine court appearances, no trials, no motions.' He did not appeal.
We referred the matter to the State Bar for a report as to whether the circumstances surrounding the offense involved moral turpitude and, if so found, for a recommendation as to discipline. The Board of Governors determined that moral turpitude was involved and recommends that Alkow be suspended for six months. 2 The local committee was of the view that Alkow's conduct was extremely reprehensible and not of the standards required of members of the State Bar but that his conduct did not involve moral turpitude.
The findings of the board may be summarized as follows:
After his driver's license expired in 1961 Alkow made one attempt to secure another license, but it was refused on the ground that he had defective vision.
From the time his license expired until he committed the manslaughter he was convicted of more than 20 traffic violations, at least 11 of which were for driving without a license. On December 5, 1963, he pleaded guilty to a violation of right of way and driving without a license, and on December 6, 1963, he pleaded guilty to driving without a license and without evidence of registration. He was placed on probation for one year in each action upon the condition that he not violate any laws. On January 16, 1964, he pleaded guilty to a failure to observe a boulevard stop and driving without a license and was placed on probation for one year upon the condition that he not violate any laws and upon the further specific condition that he not drive without a license.
About 6 p.m. on February 15, 1964, while driving without a license in violation of the terms of his probation and the law, he struck and killed a woman pedestrian in Santa Ana. His defective vision was one proximate cause of the accident. Although he did not intend the accident, he knew his vision was defective and reasonably must have known that injury to others was a possible if not a probable result of his driving.
The pedestrian's death led to Alkow's conviction for the offense here involved. (He was also found to be in violation of the terms of his probation and was sentenced to 30 days in jail in each action, the sentences to run concurrently with that imposed for the manslaughter.)
As we have seen, the board further found that the circumstances surrounding the manslaughter involved moral turpitude.
It is well established that the findings of the board must be given great weight, although they are not binding upon this court (Grove v. State Bar, 63 Cal.2d 312, 315, 46 Cal.Rptr. 513, 405 P.2d 553; Werner v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 611, 623, 150 P.2d 892) and that the burden is upon the petitioner seeking a review of the board's recommendation to show that the findings are not supported by the evidence or that the recommendation is erroneous (In re Clark, 63 Cal.2d 610, 612, 47 Cal.Rptr. 681, 407 P.2d 993; In re Hallinan, 48 Cal.2d 52, 53, 307 P.2d 1).
Alkow states that he 'makes his objections to every one of the findings * * * as they are not supported by convincing evidence,' but a general allegation of this type is insufficient to sustain his burden (Hyland v. State Bar, 59 Cal.2d 765, 767, 31 Cal.Rptr. 329, 382 P.2d 369). Moreover, the record contains ample evidence supporting the board's findings.
It is clear that the circumstances surrounding the manslaughter involved moral turpitude. Moral turpitude has been defined as 'everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals' (In re McAllister, 14 Cal.2d 602, 603, 95 P.2d 932, 933; In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147,...
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Krogh, In re
...under rules similar to ours, however, have frequently found disbarment unwarranted in such cases. See, e.g., In re Alkow, 64 Cal.2d 838, 51 Cal.Rptr. 912, 415 P.2d 800 (1966) (manslaughter); In re Rothrock, 16 Cal.2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940) (assault with a deadly weapon); In re Morris, 74 ......
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Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar
...the State Bar or of a committee such as respondent, while given great weight, are not binding upon this court. (In re Alkow, 64 A.C. 905, 907, 51 Cal.Rptr. 912, 415 P.2d 800; Grove v. State Bar, 63 Cal.2d 312, 315, 46 Cal.Rptr. 513, 405 P.2d 553; Linnick v. State Bar, 62 Cal.2d 17, 19, 41 C......
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Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran, Matter of
...sets such a poor example for the community at large that it may merit discipline under this rule. See, e.g., In re Alkow, 64 Cal.2d 838, 51 Cal.Rptr. 912, 415 P.2d 800 (1966) (suspending an attorney who committed vehicular homicide who had a history of traffic offenses). Curran does not hav......
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In re Discipline of Janklow
...of felony and misdemeanor drug offenses warranted three year suspension from the practice of law). 3. See In re Alkow, 64 Cal.2d 838, 51 Cal.Rptr. 912, 415 P.2d 800 (1966) (imposing a six month suspension for a manslaughter conviction which occurred after twenty traffic violations, at least......