Allen, Use, Benefit Middlesboro v. Hollingsworth

Decision Date17 January 1933
Citation246 Ky. 812
PartiesAllen et al., for Use and Benefit of City of Middlesboro, Ky., v. Hollingsworth et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

2. Municipal Corporations. — Apart from restraints of organic law, Legislature has plenary powers respecting establishment and regulation of municipal government.

3. Municipal Corporations. — Municipal corporations possess only powers that state, through Legislature, has conferred upon them expressly or impliedly (Ky. Stats., sec. 3480b-1 et seq.).

4. Municipal Corporations. — Power granted to municipal corporation may be enlarged or diminished in discretion of Legislature, since municipalities are derivative creations (Ky. Stats., sec. 3480b-1 et seq.).

5. Municipal Corporations. — Doubt concerning existence of particular power of municipal corporation is resolved against existence (Ky. Stats., sec. 3480b-1 et seq.).

6. Municipal Corporations. — In absence of constitutional provision to contrary, Legislature may confer power of referendum on municipality and prescribe terms on which it may be exercised (Ky. Stats., sec. 3480b-1 et seq.).

7. Municipal Corporations. — Laws permitting alternative choice of city charters are valid (Ky. Stats., sec. 3480b-1 et seq.).

8. Municipal Corporations. — Legislative body of municipal corporation is controlled by charter (Ky. Stats., sec. 3480b-1 et seq.).

9. Municipal Corporations. — In construing municipal charters, where particular mode of exercising power is granted by statute, other modes as by implication are deemed to have been excluded (Ky. Stats., sec. 3480b-1 et seq.).

10. Municipal Corporations. — Municipality can enact no ordinance which violates its charter.

11. Municipal Corporations. — Under commission form of municipal government, ordinance or amendment thereto by vote of electorate can be repealed or amended only in same manner.

12. Municipal Corporations. — Where people, in adopting commission form of government in third-class city, fixed salaries of commissioners at $900 per year, commissioners could not increase their compensation (Ky. Stats., secs. 3480b-3, 3480b-11).

Appeal from Bell Circuit Court.

MARTIN T. KELLY and CHAS. E. HERD for appellants.

WM. LOW and J.E. SAMPSON for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY STANLEY, COMMISSIONER.

Reversing.

This is a taxpayers' suit to recover into the city treasury money alleged to have been illegally collected by the members of the board of commissioners of the city of Middlesboro. It presents a novel and important question with respect to the limitations on the power of the board of commissioners of cities of the third class, by reason of the referendum under which that method of government was adopted.

By a plebiscite held under the authority of the General Assembly, expressed in section 3480b-1, et seq., of the Statutes, the citizens of Middlesboro in 1922 chose to become organized and to be governed under the charter of the commission plan of government. The form of the question submitted on the referendum to the electorate was that set out in section 3480b-3 of the Statutes, the material portion of which is as follows:

"Are you in favor of the organization and government of the City of Middlesboro under the provisions of (the statute identified) and under which the members of the Board of Commissioners shall receive a salary of Nine Hundred Dollars ($900.00) per year?"

This was in accordance with the petition calling for the submission as provided in section 3480b-11. The point is presented whether thereafter the salary of the members of the board of commissioners could be increased by an ordinance of that body.

The mayor is one of the three members of the board of commissioners. Section 3480b-12. On November 4, 1929, the board enacted an ordinance raising the salary of the mayor from $900 to $2,400 a year. However, in view of the limitations of section 3480b-11 of the Statutes, of a maximum salary of $2,200, the mayor was paid only that sum instead of the amount fixed by the ordinance. On November 24, 1929, it was ordained by the board of commissioners that the other two members "shall be allowed the sum of $25 each per month for clerical assistance to promote the work of their respective departments, said sum to be paid to said commissioners monthly as the salaries of said commissioners are paid." The amount stipulated in the ordinance was thereafter paid to them, and it is alleged that it was as compensation for their own services. The amounts received by each in excess of $900 per annum were set out, and judgment asked against them therefor, as well as an injunction restraining further payment by the city treasurer. The court sustained a demurrer to the petition, and the taxpayers appeal.

The initiative and referendum scheme of government does not obtain in this state to the same extent it does in some others. This power of direct legislation by the people, however, has been given, or shall we say restored, in relation to several subjects other than that which allows a choice by the electorate of the respective classes of cities as between the councilmanic and the commission forms of government. The same choice is given counties as between the fiscal court and the commission plan. Section 1847, Statutes. Other things which must be or may be submitted to the vote of the people for adoption or rejection are: An act of the Legislature classifying property for taxation (section 171, Constitution); bond issues and taxes for their liquidation (section 157 Constitution, sections 1872, 1881a-1, 4307, etc., Statutes); the establishment of consolidated school districts and levying of a special tax (section 4426a, et seq., Statutes); removal of county seats (section 63, Constitution, and section 915, Statutes); special road tax levies (section 157a, Constitution, and section 4645m-1, Statutes); changing of county boundaries (section 63, Constitution, and section 919, Statutes); the purchase of public utilities (section 3480d-1, Statutes); the sale thereof (section 27411-21, Statutes); and for the establishment of municipal bands in certain cities (section 2741j-1, Statutes). There are some other questions of a special nature which may be submitted under current law, and our memories go back to the days of local option and the freeing of turnpikes.

When the will of the electorate has been expressed on these things, it must be given full force and effect. Most of the statutes referred to require action on the part of some official body to put them into effect, after an affirmative vote in favor of the proposition has been received, which is generally regarded as of a ministerial character. In recognition of the supremacy of the voice of the people, it has been held that those officers may be compelled to put the schemes or laws thus adopted into effect where they are not automatically operative. Thus it was held in Houston v. Boltz, 196 Ky. 640, 185 S.W. 76, that mandamus will lie to compel members of a fiscal court to perform their duty to issue bonds authorized at an election. But in the matter of changing the form of municipal or county government by local plebiscite, the General Assembly has already set up the machinery, and when the result has been established the law or charter becomes self-operating according to its terms, and such government is automatically established. Bryan v. Voss, 143 Ky. 422, 136 S.W. 884; Jones v. Cassidy, Mayor, 154 Ky. 748, 159 S.W. 562.

Apart from restraints of the organic law, the Legislature has plenary powers in respect to the establishment and regulation of the government of municipalities, and such divisions of government possess only those powers that the state, through the Legislature, has conferred upon them, expressly or impliedly, and those granted powers may be enlarged or diminished in the discretion of the superior body, for the municipalities are derivative creations. Walker v. City of Richmond, 173 Ky. 26, 189 S.W. 1122, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1084; City of Morganfield v. Wathen, 202 Ky. 641, 261 S.W. 12; Barrow v. Bradley, Mayor, 190 Ky. 480, 227 S.W. 1016. Doubt concerning the existence of a particular power will be resolved against its existence. Board of Education v. Scott, 189 Ky. 225, 224 S.W. 680. The systems of government conferred upon municipalities in this state has been through the enactment of charters for the six classes of municipalities into which cities and towns have been placed. In these charters, powers in respect to many things have been delegated to the legislative bodies of the cities. Bryan v. Voss, supra; Barrow v. Bradley, Mayor, supra; Jones v. Russell, 224 Ky. 390, 6 S.W. (2d) 460. But those charters are subject to the will of the Legislature. Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140; City of Owensboro v. Board of Trustees, 210 Ky. 482, 276 S.W. 143. In the absence of any constitutional provision to the contrary, the state Legislature may confer the power of referendum on a municipality and prescribe the terms on which it may be exercised. 43 C.J. 584. The validity of the laws permitting the alternative choice of charters has been sustained by this court. Clarke v. Rogers & Company, 81 Ky. 43, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 929; Burnside v. Lincoln County Court, 86 Ky. 423, 6 S.W. 276, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 635; Bryan v. Voss, supra.

In the charters of cities operating under this form, broad powers are delegated to the boards of commissioners, but even as the Legislature of the state is controlled by the Constitution, so too is the legislative body of a subdivision of government controlled by its charter. In these several charters we note different provisions in respect to the salaries of the commissioners. We turn first to others than that with which we are...

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  • City of Audubon Park v. Louisville Reg'l Airport Auth. & Its Exec. Dir.
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 20 Octubre 2017
    ...the legislature prescribes a particular mode of exercising a power, it implicitly excludes unenumerated modes. Allen v. Hollingsworth, 246 Ky. 812, 6 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1933).III. DISCUSSION On appeal, Audubon Park defends its ordinance and counters that the LRAA is the party that exceeded it......

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