City of Audubon Park v. Louisville Reg'l Airport Auth. & Its Exec. Dir.
| Decision Date | 20 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2016-CA-000059-DG,2016-CA-000059-DG |
| Parties | CITY OF AUDUBON PARK APPELLANT v. LOUISVILLE REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY AND ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CHARLES T. MILLER APPELLEES |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
Audubon Park is a city located near the airport in Jefferson County, Kentucky.1 The Louisville Regional Airport Authority ("LRAA") oversees the airport's operations. Backed by a federal program, the LRAA began seeking noise-abatement easements from several Audubon Park residents in August 2011. In exchange for the easements, the LRAA offered to install certain sound-insulating improvements, such as windows and doors, in the residents' homes.
In December 2013, Audubon Park passed an ordinance proscribing any attempt to solicit or otherwise acquire an easement within the city limits without first obtaining a permit from the Mayor's office. The full text of the ordinance provided as follows:
In response, the LRAA and 13 property owners jointly applied to Dorn Crawford, the Audubon Park Mayor, for easement permits. All applications were denied. A month later, Audubon Park also issued the LRAA a citation for violating the ordinance. The citation carried with it a $13,000 fine. According to the citation, assisting the property owners during the application process without prior approval from the Mayor's office constituted an unauthorized solicitation of an easement.
The LRAA subsequently challenged the citation before the Audubon Park Code Enforcement Board. The LRAA first claimed that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus shielded from any penalty imposed by Audubon Park. The LRAA then attacked the validity of the ordinance itself. In support of this position, the LRAA argued that Audubon Park, as a city of the fifth class, improperly enacted a land use regulation contrary to KRS 100.173(3).2 The LRAA further characterized the ordinance as an unconstitutional prior restraint on the right of free speech and an unconstitutional ex post facto regulation. Regardless, the Board upheld the citation.
Although unsuccessful in its administrative appeal, the LRAA prevailed in both lower courts. The Jefferson District Court and Jefferson Circuit Court both accepted the LRAA's First Amendment argument. The Circuit Court also held that sovereign immunity applied. We granted discretionary review.
Whether public entities enjoy immunity is a legal question reviewed de novo. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government v. Cowan, 508 S.W.3d 107, 109 (Ky. App. 2016). Statutory interpretation is likewise reviewed under the de novo standard. City of Bowling Green v. Helbig, 399 S.W.3d 445, 447 (Ky. App. 2012). Appellate courts construe the statutory text according to its "normal, ordinary, everyday meaning." Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Ky. 2005). Moreover, when the legislature prescribes a particular mode of exercising a power, it implicitly excludes unenumerated modes. Allen v. Hollingsworth, 246 Ky. 812, 6 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1933).
On appeal, Audubon Park defends its ordinance and counters that the LRAA is the party that exceeded its lawful authority. Audubon Park further argues that the ordinance passes constitutional muster because it prevented the LRAA from deceiving the public and because it only penalized the LRAA prospectively. For the following reasons, Kentucky law compels this Court to invalidate the ordinance as applied to the LRAA.
Although Audubon Park concedes that the LRAA is a "local air board" established by Louisville Metro under KRS 183.132, it disputes that the LRAA is an agent of the state. Instead, Audubon Park argues that the LRAA, as merely a "body established by local government," enjoys only limited immunityfrom tort claims. Audubon Park also disputes the extent of an air board's statutory authority to acquire easements from residents. We will address these positions in turn.
First, the LRAA is an agent of the state entitled to the same immunity as the Commonwealth. See Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 104 (Ky. 2009) (); see also Jewish Hosp. Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, 270 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Ky. App. 2008) ().
Second, this immunity is not limited to tort actions, but applies equally when a municipal ordinance attempts to limit an air board's ability to perform an integral government function within its statutory authority. See Boyle v. Campbell, 450 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Ky. 1970) (). A conflict exists between a statutory grant of authority and a municipal ordinance if:
(1)[t]he subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.
Commonwealth v. Do, Inc., 674 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Ky. 1984).
Third, KRS 183.133(4) provides a local air board with the authority to acquire any property, or rights therein, necessary for operating airports through the following means: "contract, lease, purchase, gift, condemnation or otherwise." This statute has been interpreted to give an air board limited eminent domain power. See City of Bowling Green v. Cooksey, 858 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Ky. App. 1992). In Cooksey, this Court narrowly construed the Kentucky Eminent Domain Act, KRS Chapter 416, et seq., to hold that air boards cannot always acquire fee simple title to condemned property. Rather, it was decided that if the target property could be utilized through non-possessory means such as a privilege or easement—the ownership interest sought must reflect that limited utility.
Here, the LRAA did not have to obtain a permit from the mayor before attempting to acquire the easements. The specific grant of eminent domain power in KRS 183.133(4) established a ceiling, rather than a floor, which precluded a municipal ordinance from restricting an air board's effort to acquire proportional, non-possessory interests in land through mutual contract. Holding otherwise would allow the ordinance to "prohibit[] what the statute expressly permits." Kentucky Restaurant Association v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro...
To continue reading
Request your trial