Allen v. Butterworth
Decision Date | 14 April 2000 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-154, No. SC00-410., No. SC00-113 |
Parties | Lloyd Chase ALLEN, et al., Petitioners, v. Robert A. BUTTERWORTH, et al., Respondents. Mark James Asay, et al., Petitioners, v. Robert A. Butterworth, et al., Respondents. Jeffrey Allen Farina, et al., Petitioners, v. State of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, and Todd G. Scher, Litigation Director, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Eugene Zenobi and Terence Lenamon, Coral Gables, Florida; John W. Moser, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, and Michael P. Reiter, Chief Assistant CCRC, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida; and J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami, Florida; Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Counsel, Northern Region, and Andrew Thomas, Chief Assistant CCRC, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida; Timothy P. Schardl, Special Assistant CCRC, Northern Region, and Mark E. Olive of the Law Offices of Mark E. Olive, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; Hilliard E. Moldof, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Larry B. Henderson, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida; Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Christina A. Spaulding, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida; and Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and W.C. McLain, Michael J. Minerva and Chet Kaufman, Assistant Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioners.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals, and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Division Director, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondents.
The petitioners, all inmates under sentence of death, have filed petitions asking this Court to stay the application of the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000 (DPRA), chapter 2000-3, Laws of Florida (Committee Substitute for House Bill 1A (2000)), to toll the DPRA deadlines, and to declare the DPRA unconstitutional facially or as applied. For the reasons expressed below, we find that the DPRA is an unconstitutional encroachment on this Court's exclusive power to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts." Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. Further, although our holding is based on the separation of powers claim, we find that some sections of the DPRA also violate due process and equal protection. The successive motion standard of the DPRA prohibits otherwise meritorious claims from being raised in violation of due process. Additionally, the successive motion standard applies only to capital prisoners in violation of the principles of equal protection. However, as explained in this opinion, we intend to adopt two new rules governing postconviction procedures that are consistent with the Legislature's intent that the postconviction process begin immediately upon imposition of the death sentence. The rules which we propose are intended to substantially reduce the time required for substantive adjudication of these cases.
Each of the petitioners in Farina v. State, No. SC00-410, has a direct appeal pending before this Court, while the petitioners in Allen v. Butterworth, No. SC00-113, and Asay v. Butterworth, No. SC00-154, have completed the direct appeal process and are represented by collateral counsel from the offices of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC)-South and CCRC-North. The petitioners contend that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter based on its exclusive appellate jurisdiction in death cases and its original jurisdiction to hear ancillary petitions in cases where the death sentence has been imposed. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. ( ); id. § 3(b)(7) ( ); id. § 3(b)(8) (mandamus); id. § 3(b)(9) (habeas corpus). The parties also note that this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain petitions dealing with the regulation of the practice of law in Florida and petitions involving the rules for practice and procedure in the courts of Florida. See art. V, §§ 2(a), 15, Fla. Const.
The State contends that these actions are unauthorized and the petitioners' attorneys lack standing to maintain them. The State further contends that the facts asserted by the petitioners relate to speculative factual circumstances which may never occur, that no named client has been adversely impacted by the DPRA, and that no basis has been demonstrated for the extraordinary relief sought.
This Court has previously addressed the constitutionality of legislative acts through its mandamus authority. See Division of Bond Finance v. Smathers, 337 So.2d 805 (Fla.1976)
. Accordingly, we treat all of the petitions filed here as petitions for writs of mandamus. While this Court has entertained mandamus petitions involving constitutional challenges, "[o]rdinarily the initial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute should be made before a trial court." Id. at 807. However, mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for addressing claims of unconstitutionality "where the functions of government will be adversely affected without an immediate determination." Id.; see also Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla.1971).
In the instant case, the DPRA drastically changes Florida's postconviction death penalty proceedings, thereby affecting a large number of cases pending in this Court and at various stages in the trial courts throughout the state. The responsibilities of a large number of state-employed attorneys will also be affected by the DPRA. Until the constitutionality challenge is resolved, the status of these proceedings is in limbo. Thus, we conclude that the functions of government will be adversely affected without an immediate determination of the constitutionality of the DPRA and accept jurisdiction pursuant to our mandamus authority under article V, section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution.
The Florida Legislature passed the DPRA during a special legislative session in January 2000. Governor Jeb Bush signed the DPRA on January 14, 2000, and it became effective that day. The DPRA significantly changes Florida's capital postconviction procedures. Most notable among these changes is the creation of a "dual-track" capital postconviction process, in which a death-sentenced inmate files postconviction claims almost contemporaneously with his or her direct appeal. The preamble to the DPRA states:
The following is a brief synopsis of the substance of each section of the DPRA:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Briggs v. Brown
... ... Petitioner relies on Allen v. Butterworth (Fla. 2000) 756 So.2d 52, in which the Florida Supreme Court commented that a statute imposing deadlines on capital postconviction ... ...
-
Delisle v. Crane Co.
... ... Generally, the Legislature has the power to enact substantive law while this Court has the power to enact procedural law. See Allen v. Butterworth , 756 So.2d 52, 59 (Fla. 2000). Substantive law has been described as that which defines, creates, or regulates rights"those existing ... ...
-
Looney v. State
...and most of the States have, in recent years, enacted similar legislation...." Id. at 821, 111 S.Ct. 2597. 25. In Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2000), upon which Looney relies, this Court found that the legislatively-enacted Death Penalty Reform Act (DPRA) was procedural and, unl......
-
Asay v. State
... ... Flint River Steam Boat Co. v. Roberts, Allen & Co. , 2 Fla. 102, 115 (1848). Johnson , 904 So.2d at 42728. Turning to the extent of reliance on the old rule, which the majority states is the ... Allen v. Butterworth , 756 So.2d 52, 67 (Fla. 2000). 7 These issues were (1) judicial bias during the trial and postconviction proceedings denied Asay "a fair and ... ...
-
Common law writs - from the practical to the extraordinary.
...if circuit court refuses to exercise jurisdiction over a controversy, unless a remedy is available by appeal). (35) Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. (36) Ex parte Smith, 96 Fla. 512, 118 So. 306 (1928). (37) State ex rel. Bruce v. Kiesling, 632 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 1994) (recogniz......