Allen v. Craig

• Decision Date: 06 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 48249,48249
• Citation: 564 P.2d 552,1 Kan.App.2d 301
• Parties: Lewis G. ALLEN, Appellant, v. Edna C. CRAIG, County Treasurer of Johnson County, Kansas, William B. Springer, Robert R. Davis, and John J. Franke, Jr., County Commissioners of Johnson County, Kansas, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 552

564 P.2d 552

1 Kan.App.2d 301

Lewis G. ALLEN, Appellant, v. Edna C. CRAIG, County Treasurer of Johnson County, Kansas William B. Springer, Robert R. Davis, and John J Franke, Jr., County Commissioners of Johnson County, Kansas, et al., Appellees.

No. 48249.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

May 6, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The definition of jurisdiction stated in In re Estate of Johnson, 180 Kan. 740, 308 P.2d 100, is stated and applied.

2. Federal questions as defined by reference to 28 U.S.C., sec. 1331, are within state court subject matter jurisdiction unless such jurisdiction is excluded by federal statutory law or binding federal decisions.

3. The power to declare what shall be money and to regulate its value is vested in Congress.

4. Congress has the constitutional power to make paper money legal tender in payment of debts.

5. Whether Congress has acted wisely or expediently in the exercise of its powers to declare what shall be money, to regulate the value of money, and to declare what shall be legal tender, is a political question that is not subject to judicial review.

Lewis G. Allen, pro se.

Bruce F. Landeck, Lowe, Terry & Roberts, Olathe, and Lyndus A. Henry, County Counselor, Overland Park, for appellees.

Before HARMAN, C. J., and REES and SPENCER, JJ.

REES, Judge:

The nature of this action is stated by plaintiff in his brief to be as follows:

'This is an action for a Declaratory Judgment that the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Kansas commands that State officers accept gold and silver coin or paper which is equivalent thereof, and Constitutionally the State is forbidden from accepting any other Thing as Tender in Payment of Debt and,

'Plaintiff-Appellant also is requesting Injunctive relief requiring State or County officials to accept to Thing other than gold and silver Coin or Paper which is equivalent.'

The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and plaintiff has appealed.

The salient facts may be briefly stated. Plaintiff is a resident and owner of real and personal property situated in Johnson County. He duly received 1974 personal property and real estate tax statements in a total amount of $7,663.24. On February 14, 1975, after an exchange of correspondence with the county treasurer and the county counselor concerning payment of his taxes, he wrote to the county treasurer. In his letter he set forth his computation of his tax obligation for payment of first-half taxes. (The fact that he was then delinquent as to payment of first-half taxes and payment in full was due is not material to the issues raised in this action.) According to his computation, his tax liability, including penalty and automobile license fees, was $3,954.95 ($4,000.00 for the purpose of our consideration). Enclosed with his letter was a personal check drawn by him on a local bank in the amount of $800.00, on which was typed 'NOTICE: PAY SILVER DOLLARS ONLY.' In his letter he stated:

'. . . I am submitting payment for my taxes in statutory dollars and in accordance with the United States Constitution.

'As I have stated before, I am quite ready to pay lawful taxes with lawful money.

'My research indicates that the fair market value of a Federal Reserve Note is at a ratio of 5:1 or 5 FRN's to 1 Silver Dollar.

'My check is payable in silver dollars. I have tendered honest and lawful payment. I will consider my taxes duly paid.'

The presentation of the check had the effect of a tender of 800 silver dollars. The treasurer declined to accept plaintiff's tender in satisfaction of the $4,000 tax obligation. The check was returned and this litigation began. In addition to the county treasurer and county commissioners, the governor, the state attorney general and the state treasurer were made defendants. The action was dismissed as to the last three defendants; they were made parties to an action in Shawnee County, and they are not parties to this appeal.

Plaintiff contends as matters of fact that present day federal reserve notes have no intrinsic value and essentially are worthless, and that silver dollars have a value to some persons, e. g., collectors, at a multiple of their face value.

No issue is raised as to the lawfulness and amount of tax imposed upon plaintiff. The questions at issue arise out of plaintiff's contentions that he is constitutionally prohibited from making payment of taxes in federal reserve notes; that the county treasurer has required him to violate the United States Constitution by refusing to accept silver dollars other than on a dollar for dollar basis; that to the extent the county treasurer has required him to pay by the use of federal reserve notes he has been required to violate the United States Constitution; and that the county treasurer's actions, taken as an officer of a subdivision of the state, constitute violations of Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution, and Article 2, Section 7, of the Kansas Constitution. Also, at the heart of plaintiff's arguments is the delegation of powers to the Congress expressed in Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution.

In order that they may be before us, the particular constitutional provisions material to plaintiff's arguments are as follows:

'The Congress shall have Power . . . To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, . . .' U.S.Const. art. I, sec. 8.

'No State shall . . . emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver a Tender in Payment of Debts; . . .' U.S.Const. art. I, sec. 10.

'All state officers before entering upon their respective duties shall take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States . . .' Kan.Const. art. 2, sec. 7.

Plaintiff's argument is multi-faceted and includes a plethora of references. As will be indicated elsewhere in this opinion, others sharing plaintiff's beliefs and convictions have raised the same fundamental questions in recent years. Their theses have been universally rejected.

The trial court's journal entry includes a finding that plaintiff's petition raises federal questions which are not subject to determination by state courts. However, we are uncertain as to what federal questions were deemed by the trial court to be outside its jurisdiction. Defendants have furnished us little assistance in that they seemingly argue that without limitation there is no state court jurisdiction over federal questions.

We turn first to an examination of what constitutes jurisdiction and then to an examination of whether this litigation meets the requirements imposed for the exercise of jurisdiction by our state courts.

Jurisdiction is defined as the power of a court to hear and decide a matter. The test of jurisdiction is not a correct decision but a right to enter upon inquiry and make a decision. Jurisdiction is not limited to the power to decide a case rightly, but includes the power to decide it wrongly. In re Estate of Johnson, 180 Kan. 740, 308 P.2d 100; Fincher v. Fincher, 182 Kan. 724, 324 P.2d 159; McFadden v. McFadden, 187 Kan. 398, 357 P.2d 751.

The term 'federal question' is usually defined by reference to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, one of the statutes prescribing original jurisdiction of the federal district courts. By that definition, a federal question is involved in a civil action wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.

We are satisfied that the courts of this state have subject matter jurisdiction of federal questions, as that term is defined above, absent exclusion of jurisdiction. Representative of federal question litigation in the courts of our state is the virtual flood of cases seeking enforcement of rights asserted under the United States Constitution and the vast number of cases relying upon enforcement of federal statutory law.

Whitmer v. House, 198 Kan. 629, 426 P.2d 100, and Ritchie v. Johnson, 158 Kan. 103, 144 P.2d 925, are cases in which our supreme court has held that subject matter jurisdiction of the state courts is excluded.

In Whitmer, one of plaintiffs' claims was that defendants' conduct was in conflict with the federal Uniform Time Act of 1966. The opinion noted that the act contains a provision that specifically designates the federal district courts as the proper forum for enforcement of the act and expressly declares the governing procedure in such proceedings. Although there is authority to the contrary (Mich. Farm Bureau v. Secy. of State, 379 Mich. 387, 151 N.W.2d 797 (1967)), it was stated that it appeared that state courts are excluded from jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the act. The holding of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter was based upon a determination that the provisions of the federal law excluded state court jurisdiction.

In Ritchie, the federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was before the court. In regard to a challenge of the administration of that law, it was said:

'. . . By section 204(d) it is provided that the Emergency Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court upon review of its judgments and orders shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued . . . and--

"Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation (or) order . . . or to restrain or enjoin . . . enforcement . . .." (158 Kan. p. 109, 144 P.2d 930.)

'. . . Under (the Act's) terms our jurisdiction is limited, and we may not consider the validity of any regulation or order issued by the administrator of the Act, nor enjoin the enforcement thereof. If the appellant believes that such regulations or orders are unduly restrictive or arbitrary, his remedy is to follow the procedure for administrative review leading up to a hearing before the Emergency Court of Appeals . . ..' (p. 118, 144...