Allen v. District Court of Washington County

• Decision Date: 20 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 0-90-0825,0-90-0825
• Citation: 1990 OK CR 83,803 P.2d 1164
• Parties: Steven Lee ALLEN, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, State of Oklahoma, and the Honorable Myrna Lansdown, Special Judge, Respondents.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 1164

803 P.2d 1164

Steven Lee ALLEN, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, State of Oklahoma, and the Honorable Myrna Lansdown, Special Judge, Respondents.

No. 0-90-0825.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Dec. 20, 1990.

As Corrected Jan. 9, 1991.

ORDER DENYING WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND LIFTING STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

The Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus requesting that this Court direct the District Court of Washington County to grant Petitioner's discovery requests in Case No. CRF-90-239. Petitioner appeals from an order by the District Court denying in part and granting in part discovery requested by the Petitioner prior to the preliminary examination. The District Court cited Stafford v. State, 595 P.2d 797 (Okl.Cr.1979), as authority for denying Petitioner's discovery requests as being premature; and State v. Benson, 661 P.2d 908 (Okl.Cr.1983), as support for the examining magistrate's lack of authority to order production of discovery material. The District Court denied two requests for evidence. However, the requests at that time were found to be for exculpatory evidence and subject to a continuing obligation on the part of the prosecution to provide as that evidence becomes known.

The issues presented on appeal require an analysis of the historical development of our court system since statehood to ensure the proper application of our current statutes and caselaw. An examination of the caselaw in this area tracks the development of the interpretation of the procedural statutes which have existed since 1910 and legal fictions which have evolved in the attempt to adapt to changes in the courts' reorganization and jurisdiction. This anomaly, which failed to interpret and apply the existing statutory provisions as we transitioned into a unified court system, has rendered our jurisprudence confusing and bent the statutory procedure to the present breaking point.

In order to properly apply the statutory provisions which were not amended during court reorganization, it is necessary to understand the pre-1969 dichotomy of jurisdiction and examine the fictions relating to the power of the courts and judges created subsequent to 1969.

Prior to the adoption of State Question No. 448, Legislative Referendum No. 164 on July 11, 1967, the Oklahoma trial court system was comprised of a combination of constitutional and statutory courts of both limited and general jurisdiction. The trial courts established by the Oklahoma Constitution, article 7, § 1, were the District Courts, County Courts, Courts of the Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts. A provision of article 7, § 17, specifically provided "County Courts shall also have and exercise the jurisdiction of examining and committing magistrates in all criminal cases". This same specific power was granted the Justices of the Peace in article 7, § 18.

The Court of Common Pleas and Superior Court were created by statute. See 20 O.S.1961, § 651 et seq. and § 141 et seq. An examination of the statutes creating the Court of Common Pleas reveals the formation of a limited jurisdiction court with the assigned judges having general jurisdiction powers. See e.g. 20 O.S.1961, §§ 651, 654, 655 (the Court of Common Pleas had limited jurisdiction but statutes separately vested the judges of the Court of Common Pleas with the general jurisdiction powers of the judges of the District Courts.) In addition, under the provisions of 20 O.S.1961 § 651 the constitutional power of the county courts was incorporated by reference to the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas. The power of the judges of the County Court and the Justices of the Peace was the same as the jurisdiction of the courts to which they were assigned.

Upon the passage of State Question No. 448 each of the constitutional and statutory courts were consolidated into the District Courts under our current unified court system. District Judges and Associate District Judges became general jurisdiction judges of the District Courts. We ceased to have limited jurisdiction courts; and, except for the Special Judges appointed pursuant to Oklahoma Constitution, article 7, § 8(h), the judges of the District Courts were no longer limited in the scope of their jurisdiction. These constitutional amendments became effective January 13, 1969.

Our statutory scheme is based on the premise that a "complaint" or "preliminary information" will be presented to an "examining magistrate" who will conduct the preliminary examination to determine if the defendant should be held to answer the charge and if the State should be granted permission to file a formal information in the District Court. See e.g., Christian v. State, 49 Okl.Cr. 16, 292 P. 876 (1930).

The term "magistrate" is defined in 22 O.S.1981, § 161 as "an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense". The constitutional references to "examining and committing magistrates" were repealed upon the passage of judicial reorganization. However, the definition in Section 161 has remained the same since its passage in 1910. The caselaw does not distinguish between the Section 161 definition and the constitutional "examining and committing magistrate" when the role of the magistrate at preliminary examination is discussed.

The statutes on preliminary examination and commitment have also remained unaltered since 1910, except for a 1961 amendment to Section 258. The preliminary examination required pursuant to 22 O.S.1981, §§ 251 through 276 is an examination which occurs contemporaneous with the initial appearance and without any unreasonable continuance. See Walters v. Williams, 474 P.2d 661, 665 (Okl.Cr.1970), Jennings v. Raines, 353 P.2d 147 (Okl.Cr.1960), In Re Kittrell, 318 P.2d 470, 472 (Okl.Cr.1957). The preliminary examination is limited by the provisions of Section 264 which imposes jurisdictional limitations on the courts and judges where the complaint was filed and restricts the scope of the examining magistrate to findings that "any public offense has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof". This limited scope of inquiry has been recognized by this Court as recently as 1986 in Matricia v. State, 726 P.2d 900, 903 (Okl.Cr.1986).

In Wyatt v. State, 69 Okl.Cr. 93, 100 P.2d 283, 285 (1940), this Court determined that the district court did not acquire jurisdiction unless the defendant actually had a preliminary hearing or waived same. This was due to the jurisdictional limitations of the courts and the requirement that the magistrate make the Section 264 findings before an information could be filed in the district court. Therefore, the concept of preliminary examination and bindover to stand trial in a felony case must be interpreted within the context of the court organization and statutory scheme at the time of enactment.

Chapter 4 of Title 22 is entitled Proceedings After Commitment and must be read as applying after a defendant is boundover on felony charges by an "examining magistrate". Section 301 begins the chapter by stating "[e]very felony must be prosecuted by indictment or information in the district court or superior court". Therefore, the formal information charging a defendant with a felony offense is not filed under our statutory framework until after the "examining magistrate" authorizes it to be filed by endorsing the complaint in accordance with Section 264. This charging instrument, whether styled complaint, preliminary information or information, is in substance nothing more than a preliminary complaint which allows the examining magistrate to conduct an examination to determine if the person charged should be held to answer.

The Justice of the Peace was very limited in authority and jurisdiction. This limitation was pointed out in West v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 225, 231, 217 P. 1067 (1923), when this Court stated "[i]n felony cases the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is either to discharge the accused or else hold him to answer the felony charged or some other felony (which the evidence may disclose the accused to have committed) within the territorial limits of the county". The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Collier v. Territory, 2 Okl. 444, 37 P. 819 (1894), after reviewing our constitution, statutes and Organic Act, stated, "[c]onstruing all of the statutes together, we hold that justices of the peace have no power to try and determine any criminal action excepting such as they are by specific enactment given power to try and determine". While we recognize that judges of the District Court are not under the same basic jurisdictional infirmity, we continue to apply this limited jurisdiction, pursuant to our present statutory scheme set forth in 22 O.S.1981, § 251 et seq., to the judge of the District Court who acts as examining magistrate at the preliminary examination. See State v. Gorelick, 746 P.2d 677 (Okl.Cr.1987); Moss v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 155 (Okl.Cr.1987); State v. Benson, 661 P.2d 908 (Okl.Cr.1983); State v. Kile, 250 P.2d 233 (Okl.Cr.1952). It is within this context that we now must address the issue of the right of pre-trial discovery in a felony criminal case.

This Court is continually confronted with issues on appeal relating to compliance with pre-trial discovery within the framework of our criminal procedure. This case presents the pressing need to fill the gaps that currently exist within our statutory framework. As we held in Inverarity v. Zumwalt, 97 Okl.Cr. 294, 262 P.2d 725, 730 (1953) "[i]t is fundamental that every court has inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction". See also Layman v. State, 355 P.2d 444, 447 (Okl.Cr.1960).

With regard to pre-trial discovery, Justice Marshall, writing for the court in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212, 37 L.Ed.2d 82, 88 (1973)...