Allen v. Mauro, 08-85-00342-CV

• Decision Date: 19 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 08-85-00342-CV,08-85-00342-CV
• Citation: 733 S.W.2d 228
• Parties: Jacqueline W. ALLEN and C. Ray Allen, Appellants, v. Garry MAURO, Commissioner of the General Land Office, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 228

733 S.W.2d 228

Jacqueline W. ALLEN and C. Ray Allen, Appellants, v. Garry MAURO, Commissioner of the General Land Office, Appellee.

No. 08-85-00342-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

El Paso.

Nov. 19, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1986.

Jimmie D. Oglesby, Mike R. Borland, Borland & Borland, Midland, for appellants.

Jose Manuel Rangel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellee.

Before PRESLAR, C.J. (Retired), OSBORN, C.J., and SCHULTE, J.

OPINION

SCHULTE, Justice.

This is a declaratory judgment suit. The case concerns the denial of applications for prospecting permits filed by Appellants with the General Land Office under the Natural Resources Code (NRC). The matter was heard by the court without a jury and involved substantial acreage of University of Texas land and public school lands. We reverse the conclusions of the trial court that certain portions of the NRC were unconstitutional and otherwise repealed as well as its other findings, but affirm its judgment declaring that Appellants are not entitled to the permits.

Appellants applied to Appellee for the permits just prior to the repeal on February 1, 1983, of the sections of the NRC upon which Appellants relied. Appellee refused the permits asserting invalidity of those particular code provisions prior to the repeal.

The trial court declared unconstitutional "Sections 52.221 et seq., [sic] Subchapter G, Chapter 52, of the Natural Resources Code...." We can only assume the trial court intended to include all thirty-two sections of Subchapter G since it did not specify the sections except by the words "et seq." In any event, the subchapter and the condemned sections were part of the code and law of the state since September 1, 1977. The trial court's holding declared the sections null and void and unconstitutional as written and applied, and as being vague and indefinite. The trial court also declared that all pending applications filed thereunder were abolished including those filed prior to repeal of Subchapter G. The court further found that if its prior pronouncements were incorrect that nevertheless the sections in question were repealed by implication [although not expressly] on September 1, 1979, by "Senate Bill 526 Tex.Gen.Laws, Ch. 616, p. 1377," as far as University of Texas permanent fund lands were affected. Finally, the court found alternatively, that if not unconstitutional and not repealed, that in that event the commissioner of the General Land Office together with the School Land Board and the Board for Lease of University Lands had discretion to determine the method of leasing for oil and gas on lands under the jurisdiction of the respective boards. Appellants' six points of error contend the trial court erred in the findings and conclusions just recited.

It is basic that a court of appeals does not reach constitutional issues if the matter can be resolved on another basis. Horton v. Horton, 625 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.App--Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, where, as here, the trial court "reaches" those constitutional issues, we are obliged to confront them. When a law duly enacted is attacked as unconstitutional, the law is presumed to be valid, and doubts as to its constitutionality should always be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Smith v. Decker, 158 Tex. 416, 312 S.W.2d 632 (1958). It is the policy of the courts not to reach constitutional questions when adequate and independent grounds exist for disposing of the case. Horton, supra. We are persuaded that there existed adequate and independent grounds for the trial court to arrive at its judgment without employing the findings relied on.

If it is possible to state simply our reaction to the difficult case facing the trial court, it is this: We disagree with the court's findings, including those that declare Subchapter G of Chapter 52 of the Natural Resources Code unconstitutional. Nor do we believe it necessary to have taken that direction to reach its ultimate decision. With the result of its judgment, we do agree as we likewise determine that Appellants were not entitled to the permits. Appellants' avenue as to university land lies most appropriately through the Education Code provisions infra which specifically deal with those lands. The avenue to public school land is directly found in the more definitive provisions of the Natural Resources Code infra labeled "School Land Board." Appellants' reliance on the general provisions was misplaced. The special provisions, as we view them, are exceptions to the general law provided for at that time in the permit leasing provisions. We will, nevertheless, respond to each of Appellants' points of error and rule on them at one time at the conclusion of our discussion.

In Point of Error No. One, Appellant asserts the court below erred in holding that Tex.Nat.Res.Code Ann., ch. 52, subch. G, sec. "52.221 et seq." [sic], were not valid and operable statutes for obtaining oil and gas prospector's permits, and oil and gas leases in conjunction therewith, on Texas public free school lands and on University of Texas land, and that these statutes were null and void. Appellants argue that this conclusion is not supported by the provisions of the Natural Resources Code and other relevant statutes.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.1986). Effect must be given if possible to every word, clause and sentence of a statute being construed, and a construction should not be adopted, if it can be avoided, that will render any part of the act inoperative, nugatory or superfluous. Orsinger v. Schoenfeld, 269 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As a general rule, an unambiguous statute is to be applied according to its literal terms; however, a statute will not be given literal effect if the result would be entirely unreasonable and out of accord with justice, nor will a statute be interpreted literally if such interpretation would lead to an absurd result. Young v. Young, 545 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd). Language, although plain, but inconsistent with material parts of the law dealing with the real object in hand so that its literal construction and application would lead to the very absurdities and contradictions and consequent injustices that all authority asserts, should be avoided. Sparks v. Kaufman County, 194 S.W. 605 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1917, writ ref'd). A court cannot adopt a construction that will defeat the intent of the legislature, no matter how plainly a statute is worded. Moorman v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 173, 202 S.W. 727 (1918). Where one section of an act prescribes a general rule, which without qualification would embrace an entire class of subjects, and another section prescribes a different rule for individual subjects of the same class, the latter will be construed as an exception to the general rule. Walker v. Meyers, 114 Tex. 225, 266 S.W. 499 (1924).

In the cause before this Court, Tex.Nat.Res.Code Ann. sec. 52.225 (Vernon 1978) seemingly placed a mandatory duty on the land commissioner to issue an oil and gas permit if the application and field notes were correct. Freels v. Walker, 120 Tex. 291, 26 S.W.2d 627, 630 (1930), rehearing overruled, 35 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.Comm'n App.1931). The permit section applied to surveyed land and unsurveyed land, which would include public school and university fund land. Section 52.221, supra. However, to give the statutes their literal meaning would ignore the legislative intent as to the leasing of public school and university land. The legislature through statutes has shown an intent to specifically provide for the lease of public school and university fund land through the bid method. When reenacting the permit leasing statutes into the NRC, the legislature omitted Article 5338 (of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas of 1925), which had provided a specific list of land the permit statutes applied to, and this list included university and school land. The Texas Education Code provides that the university board will lease and control university land. Tex.Educ.Code Ann. secs. 66.61-66.80 (Vernon 1972). The School Land Board sets the prices and dates of sale for school fund land. Tex.Nat.Res.Code Ann. secs. 32.061 and 32.001 (Vernon 1978). These statutes are considered to be in pari materia because they are statutes which deal with the same general subject--the lease of state land for oil and gas purposes. Texas State Board of Pharmacy v. Kittman, 550 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1977, no writ).

Concerning those statutes in pari materia, it is necessary to construe them further so as to give effect to the statutes without rendering any part of the act inoperative, nugatory or superfluous. This is done by construction of the permit leasing statutes as covering a general subject matter (oil and gas development of state land), while the bid statutes under the Education Code and the school board section of the Natural Resources Code are specific statutes relating to the development of oil and gas on university and school lands, respectively. Here, as in American Indemnity Co. v. City of Austin, 112 Tex. 239, 246 S.W. 1019, 1021 (1922), the court is looking to legislative history only to show the background of the statutes. The intent of the legislature that permit leasing is a general provision, while the bid method is specific, is gleaned from the actual statutes relating to the lease of state land construed as a whole. Thus, we find no merit in the trial court's finding that the sections under attack were null and void, invalid and inoperable.

In Point of Error No. Two, Appellants claim error in the holding that Tex.Nat.Res.Code Ann., ch. 52, subch. G, sec. "52.221 et seq." [sic], were void and unconstitutional and in violation of Tex.Const. art. III, sec. 51; art. VII, sec. 4; and...