Allen v. Sconyers
| Decision Date | 22 September 1995 |
| Citation | 669 So.2d 113 |
| Parties | Martin ALLEN v. Bama SCONYERS, et al. 1940817. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Barbour Circuit Court (CV-94-035); William H. Robertson, Judge.
Roy F. King of Willoughby & King, P.C., Birmingham, for Appellant.
Lynn W. Jinks III, L. Bernard Smithart, Lynn Robertson Jackson and G. Thomas Jackson of Jinks, Smithart & Jackson, Clayton, and Robert L. Bowden, Clayton, for Appellees.
Martin Allen, the contestant in regard to a document purported to be the last will and testament of his stepmother, Nell Allen, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the will's proponent, Bama Sconyers. Martin contended that that will was a product of undue influence by Sconyers, Nell's sister. Martin also argued that Nell lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will.
The dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred in determining that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Sconyers's influence over Nell's execution of the will or as to Nell's testamentary capacity.
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is initially on the movant to make a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact (i.e., that there is no dispute as to any material fact) and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P.; McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc., 601 So.2d 957 (Ala.1992); Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 (Ala.1992). "The burden does not shift to the opposing party to establish a genuine issue of material fact until the moving party has made a prima facie showing that there is no such issue of material fact." McClendon, at 958; Elgin, at 810-11.
Rule 56 is read in conjunction with the "substantial evidence rule," § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975, for actions filed after June 11, 1987. See Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). In order to defeat a defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence, i.e., "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). When reviewing a summary judgment, this Court considers the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolves all reasonable doubts against the movant. Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So.2d 1174 (Ala.1995).
The record, viewed in a light most favorable to Martin, suggests the following facts:
In 1958 Nell married Joe Allen, who was already the father of two sons, Martin and Doug Allen, who were 10 and 11 years of age at the time. No children were born of Nell and Joe's marriage, but the record indicates an intimate familial relationship between Nell, Joe, and Joe's sons. According to a friend of the couple, Nell "treated those children as if they were hers and she called them their sons"; many of the couple's friends and acquaintances were unaware that Martin and Doug were not Nell's natural children. In 1971, Nell executed a will, devising her estate to Joe, but, in the event he predeceased her, then devising 40 percent of the estate to Martin and Doug; 10 percent each to Nell's sister-in-law Dorothy Allen and Nell's mother-in-law; 10 percent to Sconyers; and the remaining 30 percent to be divided among members of Nell's family.
Nell and Joe later retired and moved to Tyler, Texas. During the mid- to late 1980s, Nell's mental condition began to decline, and she began to exhibit symptoms of disorientation, confusion, and forgetfulness. During this same period, Joe was battling cancer. In 1990, Nell executed a new will. Among other bequests, Nell directed that Martin be given one half of the proceeds from the sale of her home if it was sold, various personal belongings, and approximately 20 percent of the residual estate. Doug was to receive approximately 18 percent of the residual estate, and Dorothy Allen was to receive approximately 25 percent. Sconyers and other persons on Nell's side of the family were to receive a combined total of approximately 38 percent of the residual estate. Nell's medical records from this period noted that tests indicated the following:
Evidence in the record indicates that by 1991 Nell's mental condition had severely degenerated. Martin testified:
On November 5, 1991, Joe died. A friend of Joe and Nell remembered the following:
"The most dramatic [incident] was, I guess after Joe died, when her sister--and I assume that her other sister came to visit also at that time--they were at the funeral, and I walked in the door ... and Nell met me and took me back to introduce me, you know, to the ladies, and when she got to her sister, Bama, she didn't know her name, and [Sconyers] just looked at me and ... said, 'I'm her sister.' "
Less than two weeks later, Sconyers packed Nell's personal belongings and moved her to Sconyers's home in Clio, Alabama. Soon thereafter, Sconyers obtained a document purporting to give her power of attorney over Nell's business affairs. Sconyers cared for Nell in her home, including writing and signing correspondence, such as Christmas cards, in Nell's name. According to Sconyers, within two to three weeks after Nell arrived in Alabama she told Sconyers that she had signed the 1990 will against her wishes and asked her to get an attorney to change the will. Sconyers stated the following in regard to their visit to Boyd Whigham, a local attorney:
Sconyers also testified that Martin and Dorothy Allen had "tried to frame [Nell] every way they could, and make her look crazy."
Nell executed the will now at issue on January 6, 1992. The will provided that Sconyers was to receive all of Nell's jewelry, furniture, and other personal items, as well as 50 percent of the residual estate. The other portions of the residual estate were devised to members of Nell's family. Nothing was devised to Martin, Doug, or Nell's sister-in-law Dorothy, although, as noted above, those three would have received a large percentage of the estate by the provisions of the 1971 and 1990 wills.
On January 14, 1992, Dr. Robert Zumstein examined Nell; he testified that she "impressed [him] as having Alzheimer's." He further testified that Nell "had some difficulty with the questions that were given to her, and a lot of the history was filled in by her sister too." Dr. Zumstein described Nell's condition as "variable, worse on some days than others." Nell lived with Sconyers until she entered a nursing home, where she died in December 1993 of a heart attack. Dr. Zumstein indicated on Nell's death certificate that the underlying cause of death was "advanced Alzheimer's disease"; the death certificate indicated that the disease had existed for three years.
In support of her motion for summary judgment, Sconyers produced an affidavit from Whigham, who stated:
Undue influence
To establish a prima facie case of undue influence, the contestant must show that a confidential relationship existed between a favored beneficiary and the testator; that the beneficiary's influence was dominant and controlling in the relationship; and that there was undue activity on the part of the dominant party in procuring the execution of the will. Pruitt v. Pruitt, 343 So.2d 495 (Ala.1976). A confidential relationship arises when one comes to rely upon and trust another in one's important affairs. Raney v. Raney, 216 Ala. 30, 112 So. 313 (1927). The term "favored beneficiary" has been defined as:
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