Taylor v. Hanks

• Decision Date: 26 February 2021
• Docket Number: 1190203
• Citation: 333 So.3d 132
• Parties: Lawrence Stephen TAYLOR v. Charles R. HANKS
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

333 So.3d 132

Lawrence Stephen TAYLOR

v.Charles R. HANKS

1190203

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 26, 2021

Grant Blackburn of Blackburn & Conner, P.C., Bay Minette, for appellant.

Ralph G. Holberg III and Michael R. Holberg of Holberg & Holberg, P.C., Mobile, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Lawrence Stephen Taylor appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Charles R. Hanks in Taylor's will contest. Taylor challenged the will of his father, Billy Lee Hite, alleging, among other things, that Hite had lacked testamentary capacity when he made the will, which did not mention Taylor. Because we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Hite had testamentary capacity, we reverse and remand.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Taylor, the summary-judgment nonmovant, see Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1993), reveals the following facts. Taylor's mother and Hite dated in the 1950s, but they never married. Taylor was born in 1959. At some point, Hite married another woman, and they had a son who predeceased Hite. In the early 1990s, Taylor's mother told him that Hite was his father. In 1996, Hite acknowledged that Taylor was his son. However, Taylor testified that he did not communicate with Hite between 1998 and his death in 2018.

On August 25, 2018, Hite suffered a stroke

and was admitted to a hospital, from which he was later discharged. On September 14, 2018, Hite suffered another stroke. On that date, Hite was again admitted to the hospital, where he stayed for 12 days. As will be discussed in more detail below, Hite was prescribed many medications during his hospital stay, including narcotic pain medications.

On September 18, 2018, four days after his second stroke

, Hite met with an attorney in Hite's hospital room to discuss the preparation of his will. At that time, Hite told his attorney that he had no children. Two days later, the attorney returned to Hite's hospital room with a will for Hite to execute. Hite, whose dominant hand had been weakened by the stroke, signed the will by marking his name with an "X." The will named Hanks, Hite's neighbor and friend, as the executor of Hite's estate. The will made various bequests and left nearly half the estate to Hanks. Taylor was not mentioned in the will. Instead, Hite stated in the will: "I have no children." Hite died about a month later, on October 18, 2018, at the age of 88.

Hanks filed a petition to probate Hite's will in the Mobile Probate Court. Taylor subsequently contested the will in the probate court, alleging, in pertinent part, that Hite had lacked the capacity to make the will. In the alternative, Taylor filed a claim seeking to be treated as a pretermitted child under § 43-8-91(b), Ala. Code 1975, alleging that Hite had omitted Taylor from the will because Hite believed Taylor was dead. Hanks moved for a summary judgment on the will-contest claim, submitting, among other things, testimony from Hite's attorney and Hanks indicating that Hite had testamentary capacity at the time he executed his will. Hanks responded to the summary-judgment motion, arguing, among other things, that the misstatement in the will that Hite had no children and Hite's medical records created a factual issue regarding Hite's testamentary capacity. The probate court subsequently entered a summary judgment in favor of Hanks on the will-contest claim, and Taylor appealed to this Court. However, Taylor's alternative claim seeking to be treated as a pretermitted child remained pending in the probate court. Therefore, this Court issued an order to the probate court, noting that the appeal appeared to be taken from a nonfinal, nonappealable order and asking the probate court to address that issue. The probate court subsequently certified the summary judgment as final, and thus appealable, under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. See Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 54.

"In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, ‘we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,’ Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988), and whether the movant was ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Wright v. Wright, 654 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1995) ; Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989). Evidence is ‘substantial’ if it is of ‘such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ Wright, 654 So. 2d at 543 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989) ). Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1993) ; Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala. 1990)."

Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1997). Further, in a summary-judgment case, a court " ‘ "will accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence." ’ " Ex parte Blunt, 303 So. 3d 125, 131 (Ala. 2019) (quoting Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000) ).

Taylor argues that the record on appeal contains substantial evidence demonstrating that Hite lacked the capacity to make his will. Thus, Taylor argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Hite had testamentary capacity and, therefore, that the probate court erred in entering a summary judgment on Taylor's will-contest claim. Conversely, Hanks argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence demonstrating that Hite lacked testamentary capacity.

To make a valid will, a testator must have testamentary capacity. Fletcher v. DeLoach, 360 So. 2d 316, 318 (Ala. 1978). That is, a testator must possess

" ‘mind and memory sufficient to recall and remember the property she was about to bequeath, and the objects of her bounty [(, i.e., to whom she is bequeathing the property)], and the disposition which she wished to make -- to know and understand the nature and consequences of the business to be performed, and to discern the simple and obvious relation of its elements to each other....’ "

Id. (quoting Knox v. Knox, 95 Ala. 495, 503, 11 So. 125, 128 (1892) ). " ‘Simply stated, if the testator knows his estate and to whom he wishes to give his property and understands that he is executing a will, he has testamentary capacity.’ " Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d 1139, 1147 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Vice, 641 So. 2d 785, 786 (Ala. 1994) ).

There is a presumption that every person has the capacity to make a will, and a contestant has the burden to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. Pirtle v. Tucker, 960 So. 2d 620, 633 (Ala. 2006). Determining whether a testator had testamentary capacity requires a "broad evidentiary inquiry." Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So. 2d 113, 117 (Ala. 1995). Evidence relevant to that inquiry includes evidence of " ‘the mental and physical condition of the testat[or], either before or immediately after execution of the will’ " and evidence of the testator's " ‘ "conversations, deportment, acts, and appearance." ’ " Allen, 669 So. 2d at 118 (quoting Fletcher, 360 So. 2d at 318 ).

Taylor argues that he presented substantial evidence indicating that Hite lacked testamentary capacity when he made his will. Taylor primarily relies on Hite's statement made in the will itself that he had no children. In fact, Taylor is Hite's son, Hite acknowledged Taylor as his son in 1996, and there is no evidence indicating that, before preparing his will, Hite ever repudiated that acknowledgment. Taylor argues that Hite's incorrect statement in his will that he had no children is substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding Hite's testamentary capacity. In making that argument, Taylor relies on Horton v. Rasberry, 852 So. 2d 155 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).

In Horton, contestants challenged a testator's will, arguing that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when she made her will. The contestants argued that the testator did not know the objects of her bounty, and the contestants supported their argument solely by noting that the testator had incorrectly stated in her will that she had five children when she actually had six children. The trial court entered a summary judgment against the contestants, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment. The court in Horton explained:

"The question presented is whether the record contains ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgement [could] reasonably infer’ ( West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989) ) that at the time she executed her will, [the testator] did not have ‘mind and memory sufficient to recall ... the objects of her bounty.’ Fletcher [v. DeLoach], 360 So. 2d [316,] 318 [(Ala. 1978) ]. [The personal representative of the testator's estate] contends that the contestants, in fact, introduced no evidence indicating that [the testator] was unaware of the objects of her bounty. We disagree. In this case, the terms of the will itself provide such evidence.

" ‘....’

"...[T]he instrument itself may express the delusion that prevents the testator from having testamentary capacity. ... [The testator's] erroneous declaration as to the number of children she had and who they are goes directly to the issue whether [she] knew the objects of her bounty at the time she

...