Furrow v. Helton
Decision Date | 24 October 2008 |
Docket Number | 1070667. |
Parties | Etole C. FURROW v. Gregory HELTON. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Robert M. Galloway and J. Willis Garrett III of Galloway, Wettermark, Everest, Rutens & Gaillard, LLP, Mobile, for appellant.
Thomas R. Boller, Mobile, for appellee.
Etole C. Furrow is the proponent of a will her mother, Jewell B. Malone, executed in 2003. Gregory Helton is a grandson of Malone who contested the 2003 will. After a trial before the Mobile County Probate Court, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Gregory, and Furrow appeals from a judgment entered on that verdict. We reverse and remand.
Malone, a resident of Mobile County, had three daughters: Furrow; Sarah C. Lott; and Dorothy June C. Helton, who was Gregory's mother. Malone had grandchildren by each daughter.
Malone executed a will in 1995 devising her estate to her three daughters in equal shares. If a daughter predeceased Malone, that daughter's share under the 1995 will would pass to the daughter's children per stirpes. The 1995 will named Furrow as the executrix of Malone's estate; in the event Furrow could not serve, Lott and Helton were to be co-executrixes.
After a protracted illness, Malone's daughter Helton died on November 30, 2003. Malone executed a new will on December 16, 2003, devising her estate equally between Furrow and Lott, Malone's two remaining living daughters. The 2003 will made no provision for any of Malone's grandchildren; instead, it provided that if either Furrow or Lott preceded Malone in death, the surviving daughter would receive Malone's entire estate. The 2003 will named Furrow as the executrix or, alternatively, Lott, if Furrow could not serve.
Malone died on June 20, 2006. Furrow sought to have the 2003 will probated in the Mobile County Probate Court, and Gregory filed a will contest alleging, among other things, that the 2003 will was the result of Furrow's undue influence.
The will contest was tried before a jury. Before the matter was submitted to the jury at the conclusion of the trial, the probate court entered a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") against Gregory on all claims except the claim alleging that Furrow had exercised undue influence over Malone regarding the 2003 will. The jury returned a verdict in Gregory's favor on his claim of undue influence, and the probate court entered a judgment on the verdict in favor of Gregory and against the 2003 will. Furrow filed a renewed motion for a JML under Rule 50(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which the trial court later denied. Furrow appealed to this Court. See § 12-22-21, Ala.Code 1975 ( ).
Furrow contends she was entitled to a JML as to Gregory's claim that the 2003 will was the result of Furrow's allegedly exercising undue influence over Malone.
""
City of Birmingham v. Brown, 969 So.2d 910, 915 (Ala.2007) (quoting Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875 So.2d 1143, 1152 (Ala.2003)).
Gregory, as the contestant, had the burden at trial of proving the elements of undue influence. Clifton v. Clifton, 529 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.1988) . As the proponent of the will, Furrow opposed Gregory's claim of undue influence; therefore, the following is relevant to our review of the trial court's denial of Furrow's motion for a JML:
Ex parte Helms, 873 So.2d 1139, 1143-44 (Ala.2003).
Furrow contends that the second scenario described in Helms applies in the present case, i.e., "that one or more contested essential elements of the claim or affirmative defenses is unsupported by substantial evidence." 873 So.2d at 1143. Furrow argues that the burden of proof never shifted to her and that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a JML on the undue-influence claim. We agree.
Clifton, 529 So.2d at 983 (citing Penn v. Jarrett, 447 So.2d 723, 724 (Ala.1984); Reed v. Walters, 396 So.2d 83, 86 (Ala. 1981)). See also Hubbard v. Moseley, 261 Ala. 683, 686-87, 75 So.2d 658, 661 (1954).
In the present case, Gregory failed to offer substantial evidence suggesting that Furrow exercised a dominant or controlling influence over Malone or that Furrow engaged in undue activity in procuring the execution of the will. Thus, Gregory failed to meet his burden of proof on at least two of the three elements of his undue-influence claim.1
The presumption is that the parent (Malone) was dominant over the child (Furrow). Clifton, 529 So.2d at 984 ( ). Thus, Gregory had the burden of offering substantial evidence to the contrary. Wilson v. Wehunt, 631 So.2d 991, 993-94 (Ala. 1994). See also Clifton, 529 So.2d at 983-84.
Gregory correctly notes that the issue of dominance may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See Ex parte Helms, 873 So.2d at 1148; Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So.2d 113, 118 (Ala.1995). However, the circumstantial evidence offered to show dominance must nevertheless be substantial evidence. See, e.g., Wilson, 631 So.2d at 993-94. "Substantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). See also § 12-21-12(d), Ala.Code 1975.
Gregory contends that "the jury accepted the testimony of [Gregory], [Gregory's father, Winfred Helton, Sr.], and [Gregory's brother, Winfred Helton, Jr. (`Bubba') ], that [Malone] was feeble, hallucinating, and vulnerable" around the time she executed the 2003 will.2 Bubba testified that Malone "probably took over 10 pills a day" in the two- to three-year period before June Helton died in November 2003. He testified that "on a few occasions" he saw her take the medication Haldol, which he testified his ex-wife thought was for the treatment of Alzheimer's disease.3
Gregory also argues that the jury rejected most of or all Furrow's testimony because, he says, the jury found it lacking in credibility. He contends that the jury's rejection of Furrow's testimony and the jury's acceptance of his testimony and the testimony of Winfred, Sr., and Bubba "was in and of itself [substantial evidence from which] the jury could have inferred [Furrow] was dominant in her exercise of a confidential relationship at the time the contested will was procured." Gregory contends, therefore, that the facts in the present case present a jury question on the issue of undue influence as did the facts in Ex parte Helms, supra, in which this Court held that a summary judgment was improper on an undue-influence claim. 873 So.2d at 1148-49.
In Ex parte Helms, this Court found that the contestants had presented substantial evidence of dominance and control and undue activity in procuring the execution of the will being contested. The testator in Ex parte Helms executed a second will in 1997, approximately 12 days after her doctor...
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