Allen v. State
Citation | 406 N.E.2d 976 |
Decision Date | 23 June 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 1-1279A341,1-1279A341 |
Parties | Samuel D. ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Thomas Lockyear, Evansville, for defendant-appellant.
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant-appellant Samuel D. Allen appeals his conviction and sentencing in the Posey Circuit Court for attempted theft.
We affirm.
At approximately 12:30 or 12:45 P.M. on October 9, 1978, a man entered a branch of the Cynthiana State Bank at St. Wendel, Indiana. He was wearing bib overalls and a light-colored shirt, with some kind of padding stuffed under his shirt. Ruby Bernice Fleener, cashier and manager of the bank branch, asked whether she could help him. He touched his lips as if to indicate he could not speak and then proceeded to move his finger on the counter top as if he were writing. Mrs. Fleener gave him a piece of paper and a pencil, and he began to write. A woman customer entered the bank at that time, and the man moved to another teller's window and continued writing.
Diane Angermeier, another bank employee, went to the teller's window where the man was standing, and he handed her the note. She read the note and stepped back. Mrs. Fleener walked over to her and read the note, which said,
Mrs. Fleener asked where the guns were, and the man responded by pointing to a vacant house across the road. She then asked how many guns there were. He held up three fingers. When she inquired where his car was, he pointed down the road. Mrs. Fleener then said, "I don't have any money for you." The man shrugged his shoulders and walked out of the bank and then went across the road, up a driveway, and through a plowed field. At trial, both Ruby Fleener and Diane Angermeier identified the defendant as the man who had handed the note to Mrs. Angermeier.
At 12:50 P.M. on October 9, 1978, Indiana State Trooper Larry Rudolph apprehended Samuel D. Allen on eastbound Interstate 64 for speeding. Trooper Rudolph had just heard over the radio that another trooper had been dispatched to the bank. So after issuing a citation to Allen, he drove to the bank to lend assistance, travelling the eight miles to the bank in nine minutes. At trial, Trooper Rudolph identified Allen as the man he had stopped for speeding.
Allen was charged with attempted robbery 1 and was convicted in a jury trial of the included offense of attempted theft, 2 a class D Felony. He was sentenced to four years' confinement with all but two years suspended on the condition that he maintain good behavior.
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in overruling Allen's motions for judgment on the evidence at the conclusion of the State's case and at the conclusion of all of the evidence.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to give Allen's tendered instruction concerning an inference arising when the State fails to call certain witnesses.
3. Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence at the sentencing hearing a report made in connection with a polygraph test administered to Allen.
We note at the outset that the State's appellee's brief was filed after the expiration of the thirty-day period provided in Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.1(A). Consequently, Allen need only make a prima facie showing of error in order to win a reversal. See: Morris v. City of Evansville, (1979) Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 184; Colley v. Carpenter, (1977) Ind.App., 362 N.E.2d 163.
Allen urges us to review the evidence favorable to the State to determine whether or not it is sufficient to support his conviction of attempted theft. Although he acknowledges that two of the State's witnesses identified him at trial, he points out that Judy Ann Will, another bank employee, could not identify him and that the State did not call any of the customers in the bank as witnesses. Allen asserts that neither the latent fingerprint examiner nor the handwriting examiner who gave expert testimony was able to connect Allen with the crime. He also emphasizes that the fingerprints of Mrs. Fleener, Mrs. Angermeier, and Miss Will were not compared with the fingerprints which appeared on State's Exhibit No. 6, the note which Allen allegedly wrote in the bank.
However, the applicable rule is that "(a) directed verdict of acquittal is given only if there is a complete lack of evidence on some essential element or if the evidence supports only one inference and that inference is in favor of the defendant." Estep v. State, (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 111, at 114-115. Furthermore, as Allen apparently realizes, when the issue of sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is raised on appeal, we will neither weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses. Instead, we will consider only the probative evidence which is most favorable to the State, together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and if from that evidence and those inferences a reasonable trier of fact could find the existence of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction. Thompson v. State, (1979) Ind., 386 N.E.2d 682; Perkins v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 392 N.E.2d 490.
Both Mrs. Fleener and Mrs. Angermeier testified unequivocally that Allen was the man who had given them the note demanding money. It has been held that "the testimony of a single eye witness can be sufficient to sustain a conviction. . . ." Hill v. State, (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 132, 135; accord, Lewis v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.E.2d 859. Identification is apparently the only aspect of the evidence which Allen is challenging. Were we to be influenced by Miss Will's inability to identify Allen or by the State's failure to call other witnesses or to connect Allen to the crime by expert testimony, we would most assuredly be weighing the evidence, in light of the testimony of Mrs. Fleener and Mrs. Angermeier. We find that there was sufficient probative evidence that Allen committed the crime to sustain the trial court's overruling of Allen's motions for directed verdict and the jury's determination of Allen's guilt.
Allen next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury Defendant's Instruction No. 1, which reads as follows:
Allen maintains that Oda Cooper and Lenora Boyd were shown to have been present in the bank branch at the time of the incident in question, and yet the State did not call them to testify at trial. He further contends that the record does not indicate any attempt by the State to show that these witnesses were equally available to the State and to him. He believes that Defendant's Instruction No. 1 correctly stated the law, was supported by the evidence, and was not covered by other instructions, and, hence, should have been given to the jury because it met the requirements of Davis v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 476, 355 N.E.2d 836. Allen does not cite any authority, however, to support his assertion that his tendered instruction correctly stated the law.
Our examination of the record reveals that on January 3, 1979, Allen filed a pre-trial discovery motion which requested, inter alia, the names and addresses of all witnesses upon whom the State intended to rely, a list of witnesses upon whom the State intended to rely at trial and who had given any statements, copies of any such statements, and any criminal records of the State's prospective witnesses. An order book entry of the same date indicates that the court sustained the motion and ordered the State to make its file available to the defendant that day.
Smith v. State, (1979) Ind., 388 N.E.2d 484, 487; accord Armstrong v. State, (1967) 248 Ind. 396, 229 N.E.2d 631. Furthermore, with regard to an instruction similar to Defendant's Instruction No. 1, the Supreme Court has said:
Gordy v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 275, 279, 315 N.E.2d 362, 365. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has said that such an "absent witness" instruction is unwarranted unless the defendant shows that the government alone has the ability to produce the absent witness. United States v. Anders, (8th Cir. 1979) 602 F.2d 823; United States v. Kirk, (8th Cir. 1976) 534 F.2d 1262; Walker v. United...
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