Allen v. State

• Decision Date: 04 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. S90A0614,S90A0614
• Citation: 260 Ga. 147,390 S.E.2d 848
• Parties: ALLEN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 848

390 S.E.2d 848

260 Ga. 147

ALLEN v. The STATE.

No. S90A0614.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 4, 1990.

John W. Timmons, Jr., Athens, for Allen.

Lindsay A. Tise, Jr., Dist. Atty., Hartwell, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, C.A. Benjamin Woolf, for the State.

WELTNER, Justice.

Anthony Wayne Allen stabbed to death his wife, Wanda Keener Allen. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. ¹

The record contains evidence of frequent quarrels between Allen and his wife. The fatal weapon was a kitchen knife with a rounded tip, which penetrated 2 1/2 inches into the victim's neck. Allen stated that while he was holding the knife to the victim's throat, she stepped against it, whereupon by accident it pierced her throat. After the stabbing, Allen notified neither law enforcement nor medical personnel, but with the assistance of a friend, threw the body into a well. Allen showed no remorse, and laughed when he told his friend about his wife's death. He removed the valuables from his wife's purse before disposing of it, and later denied knowledge of her whereabouts.

1. The evidence is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find Allen guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. (a) Allen contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury sua sponte concerning misfortune or accident, thereby depriving him of his sole defense. No objection was made to the charge as given.

(b) In Pruitt v. State, 258 Ga. 583, 590(14), 373 S.E.2d 192 (1988), we held:

If the trial court asks whether or not there are any objections to the charge, counsel must either state his objections or reserve the right to object on motion for new trial or on appeal. Jackson v. State, 246 Ga. 459 (271 S.E.2d 855) (1980).

This enumeration of error has not been preserved for appellate review. Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 303(7), 298 S.E.2d 1 (1982).

3. (a) Allen asserts that it was error for the trial court to give an "Allen charge" (see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)) after the jury had been deliberating for only one hour.

(b) In Cameron v. State, 256 Ga. 225, 226(2), 345 S.E.2d 575 (1986), we held:

By not excepting to the alleged [erroneous charge] in response to the trial court's inquiry, and by failing to reserve the right later to object, [the defendant] waived his right to assert such errors on appeal. [Cits.]

Furthermore, "[t]he decision as to the giving of such a charge does not depend upon a finding that the jury is deadlocked. [Cit.]" Sanders v. State, 257 Ga. 239, 243(7), 357 S.E.2d 66 (1987). The charge given was a portion of the one approved in Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521(1), 350 S.E.2d 446 (1986). That it was not coercive may be inferred from the fact that, after it was given, the jury deliberated for another day and a half.

4. (a) Allen assigns as error the overruling of his motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He lists as counsel's shortcomings: (1) failure to request a charge on misfortune or accident, (2) failure to inquire into the voluntariness of Allen's incriminating statement, and (3) failure to object to claimed "irrelevant, misleading and prejudicial" evidence as to Allen's pickup truck. This last, he contends, made it appear that he killed his wife in order to prevent her from taking the vehicle.

(b) In Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783(1), 325 S.E.2d 362 (1985), employing the standards for determining the issue of ineffective assistance as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we held that the

inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances, and ... every effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.

5. (a) Trial counsel stated that his decision not to request a charge on misfortune or accident was based upon the evidence that Allen held the knife at the victim's throat and admonished her: "I could kill you;" and upon his recognition that the only evidence of misfortune or accident was Allen's own testimony. Upon an appropriate request, Allen would have been entitled to a charge on accident. However, in view of the strong evidence against him, and of the improbability that the victim would thrust herself upon a blunt-tipped knife with such force as to...