Cameron v. State
| Decision Date | 11 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | 43242,Nos. 43241,s. 43241 |
| Citation | 345 S.E.2d 575,256 Ga. 225 |
| Parties | CAMERON v. The STATE (Two Cases). |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Larry A. Roberts, Allen R. Hirons, Marietta, for William Melvin cameron, jr.
Thomas J. Charron, Dist. Atty., Debra H. Bernes, Nicolette S. Templar, Asst. Dist. Attys., Marietta, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Eddie Snelling, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
William Melvin Cameron, Jr. was convicted of malice murder by shooting and killing John Keith Edwards with a handgun, of armed robbery, and of motor vehicle theft. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus a term of years. 1
1. Cameron contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdicts, specifically that there was no evidence that he intended to steal from the victim and no evidence of premeditation for murder or motor vehicle theft. The evidence showed that Cameron shared Edwards' apartment with him for several weeks prior to Edwards' death; that Cameron shot Edwards in the head and back at Kennesaw National Battlefield Park; that the gun used had been stolen from a security guard's car that day and that Cameron's keys were found in the guard's car several days after Edwards' death. A park ranger questioned Cameron as he was leaving Kennesaw Park and Cameron deceived him about his use of the gun; the ranger saw Cameron wearing the security guard's holster. When Cameron was arrested several days after Edwards' death for driving under the influence, he was wearing Edwards' watch and ring, driving Edwards' car, presented Edwards' driver's license, identified himself as Edwards, and had personal belongings of Edwards in the car, including television sets and clothing. He admitted forging Edwards' name on checks and using Edwards' credit cards after Edwards' death. The circumstances surrounding Edwards' murder are sufficient for a jury to find the necessary intent to steal from Edwards before his death to convict Cameron of armed robbery. Young v. State, 251 Ga. 153, 157, 303 S.E.2d 431 (1983). The evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for murder, armed robbery, and motor vehicle theft. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.E.2d 560 (1979).
2. Cameron alleges that the trial court erred in giving three improper charges on malice and intent to kill in violation of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.E.2d 344 (1985). The third charge read, "If you find that a homicide is proved to have been committed in this case by defendant with a weapon that you find was in the manner in which it was used upon the occasion in question a weapon likely to produce death, the law would presume malice and the intent to kill, but that presumption may be rebutted." This charge would be error under Francis v. Franklin, supra, for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant improperly, even though the Cameron case was tried in 1983, before the Franklin decision. See William v. Kemp, 255 Ga. 380, 338 S.E.2d 669 (1986). Ordinarily we would then determine whether the charge error was harmless under White v. State, 255 Ga. 731, 342 S.E.2d 304 (1986), and Parker v. Pace, 254 Ga. 634, 331 S.E.2d 546 (1985). (Although Cameron asserted in various pre-trial statements that the killing was attributable to self-defense or to provocation, he also asserted that he intended to kill Edwards when he fired the second shot.)
However, in this case it is not necessary to reach the issue of harmless error, as the transcript discloses the following colloquy after the charges were read to the jury:
By not excepting to the alleged burden-shifting charges in response to the trial court's inquiry, and by failing to reserve the right later to object, Cameron waived his right to assert such errors on appeal. Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 335 S.E.2d 567 (1985), Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 303, 309, 298 S.E.2d 1 (1982).
3. Cameron contends that the admission of a photograph into evidence constituted error because of its gruesomeness, and because no foundation had been laid. The photograph depicts the victim at the crime scene. It was relevant and does not violate the rule in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862, 866, 302 S.E.2d 347 (1983). See also Brown v. State, 253 Ga. 363(1), 320 S.E.2d 539 (1984). Cameron failed to challenge the foundation laid by the state during the trial. There is no error.
4. Cameron asserts that the admission of the medical examiner's testimony relative to the crime scene was error, because he did not visit the crime scene, and because he testified from photographs not properly in evidence. The medical examiner was qualified as an expert, and his opinion was based on two photographs of the crime scene properly admitted into evidence and a third, which, while not admitted into evidence, was similar to one properly admitted. An expert may give an opinion based on photographs, without having visited the crime scene. See King v. Browning, 246 Ga. 46, 47-8, 268 S.E.2d 653 (1980). We find no error.
5. Cameron claims error in the following question propounded to a forensic chemist, qualified as an expert: "So the fact that a person might have died and had been some days before he was found, that would not in any way, circumstances that you are aware of, decrease the alcohol content?" The victim's body was found several days after the murder and it contained traces of alcohol. The question was proper under OCGA § 24-9-67.
6. Cameron contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence one shell casing and one live round which were found by the park ranger several weeks after Edwards' death, in the same area where the ranger first encountered Cameron. The ranger...
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...and as the state is free to use circumstantial evidence of flight to argue the defendant's guilt." Cameron v. State, 256 Ga. 225, 345 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1986) (Bell, J. Concurring). More importantly, however, evidence that a person left the scene of an alleged crime proves only that he or she......
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...is a matter which has been debated by the members of this court on more than one occasion. Cameron v. State, 256 Ga. 225, 227, 345 S.E.2d 575 (1986) (Bell, J., with Weltner and Hunt, JJ., concurring). Griffin v. State, 257 Ga. 148, 150, 356 S.E.2d 209 (1987) (Bell, J., dissenting); Duke v. ......
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...and abstruse and argued that the courts should eliminate instructions that, while technically correct, are unnecessary. Cameron v. State, 256 Ga. 225, 228, 345 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1986) (Bell, J., concurring). 53. Murray v. State, 253 Ga. 90, 93, 317 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1984); Wendlandt v. Shephe......