Allen v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 10 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:04-cr-25-FtM-29SPC.,No. 2:07-cv-107-FtM-29SPC.,2:07-cv-107-FtM-29SPC.,2:04-cr-25-FtM-29SPC. |
| Citation | 563 F.Supp.2d 1335 |
| Parties | Orental J. ALLEN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Orental J. Allen, Coleman, FL, pro se.
Jesus M. Casas, U.S. Attorney's Office, Ft. Myers, FL, for Respondent.
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Orental J. Allen's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. # 1; Cr. Doc. # 53)1 and Memorandum of Facts and Law (Doc. # 2), both filed on February 22, 2007. The United States filed its Response in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on April 5, 2007 (Doc. # 7). Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply (Doc. # 9) on May 16, 2007. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
On March 31, 2004, a federal grand jury in Fort Myers, Florida returned an Indictment (Cr.Doc. # 1) charging petitioner Orental J. Allen (petitioner or Allen) with two counts of distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base, crack cocaine, and one count of distribution of an unspecified amount of cocaine base, crack cocaine. Pursuant to a Plea Agreement (Cr.Doc. #21) petitioner pled guilty to all three counts. On September 23, 2004, the Court sentenced petitioner to concurrent 188 month terms of imprisonment on each count, to be followed by 48 months supervised release. (Cr.Doc. #34.) Judgment (Cr.Doc. # 35) was filed on September 24, 2004.
Petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal (Cr.Doc. # 36) on September 28, 2004. On October 26, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the government's motion to dismiss the appeal (Cr.Doc. # 51) based on petitioner's knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal his sentence contained in the Plea Agreement. Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court on February 21, 2006. Allen v. United States, 546 U.S. 1207, 126 S.Ct. 1416, 164 L.Ed.2d 114 (2006).
The United States asserts that petitioner's § 2255 motion is untimely and should therefore be dismissed. The government's belief that petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari is incorrect. As noted above, the petition was denied on February 21, 2006. The § 2255 motion is deemed filed on February 19, 2007, pursuant to the "mailbox rule" when petitioner placed it in the prison mailing system. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988); Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.2001). Since the petition was filed within one year of the denial of certiorari, it is timely. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003); Drury v. United States, 507 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir.2007). Therefore, the United States' request to dismiss the petition will be denied.
Petitioner asserts that the court erred in accepting his guilty plea and Plea Agreement because he suffers from a mental disability and memory loss from extreme drug usage which affected his ability to make a sound decision based on past information. Petitioner asserts that this caused him to sign a non-beneficial Plea Agreement, waive vital constitutional rights, and admit conduct that he did not necessarily remember. Petitioner also asserts that the guilty plea colloquy placed the magistrate judge on notice of this memory loss, which should have triggered a competency hearing as required by Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). (Cv. Docs. ##2, pp. 1-4; 9, pp. 1-2.)
Read liberally, petitioner raises issues related to both his competency and the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. The general legal principles are well settled as to each area.
(1)
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from trying or sentencing a defendant who is legally incompetent. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996); United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753, 759 (11th Cir.2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1090, 126 S.Ct. 1820, 164 L.Ed.2d 552 (2006). Competency issues can involve both substantive competency claims and procedural competency claims. Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir.2005). Petitioner seems to raise both types of competency claim in his petition.
To the extent petitioner claims he was incompetent to plead guilty or be sentenced, he raises a substantive competency claim. Battle, 419 F.3d at 1298. To be competent to stand trial or plead guilty, a defendant must have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); Rahim, 431 F.3d at 759. Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial or plead guilty. Battle, 419 F.3d at 1298. To show entitlement to a hearing on a substantive incompetency claim, petitioner must show clear and convincing evidence creating a real, substantial and legitimate doubt about his competence to plead guilty. Battle, 419 F.3d at 1298-99. This standard of proof is high, and the facts must positively, unequivocally, and clearly generate the legitimate doubt. Battle, 419 F.3d at 1299. A substantive competency claim cannot be waived. Battle, 419 F.3d at 1298. Additionally, a defendant who is not competent to participate in the proceedings cannot waive his constitutional rights. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400-401, 113 S.Ct. 2680.
As a procedural matter, a court has a due process obligation to conduct a competency hearing, even if not requested to do so, if there is reasonable cause to believe a defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. 836; 18 U.S.C. § 4241. In order to trigger the trial court's obligation to order a competency evaluation and hearing, the court must have had information raising a "bona fide doubt" as to the defendant's competency. Rahim, 431 F.3d at 759. Relevant information as to whether the court should have conducted a competency hearing includes evidence of defendant's irrational behavior, defendant's demeanor at trial or in hearings, and prior medical opinion regarding defendant's competence. Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 576 (11th Cir.1990). If this procedural competency claim is not raised on direct appeal, it is waived. Battle, 419 F.3d at 1298.
(2)
The United States Constitution requires that a guilty plea must be voluntary and defendant must make the related waivers knowingly, intelligently and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). To be voluntary and knowing, (1) the guilty plea must be free from coercion; (2) the defendant must understand the nature of the charges; and (3) the defendant must know and understand the consequences of his guilty plea. United States v. Brown, 526 F.3d 691 (11th Cir.2008); United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mosley, 173 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir.1999).
At the change of plea hearing the magistrate judge personally addressed petitioner in open court. (Doc. # 48, p. 2.) Petitioner was advised that the Court was required to find that his guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily and that there was a factual basis to support the guilty plea, and therefore he would be placed under oath and asked questions. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner was told that if he did not understand anything the Court said he should have the Court further explain; he was also advised that he could confer privately with his attorney at any time during the plea. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner was then placed under oath, and was advised of his obligation to tell the truth and that false statements could be prosecuted for perjury. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner said he understood. (Id.) Petitioner was also told that his testimony during the plea colloquy could be used against him in future proceedings. (Id. at 3.)
Petitioner stated he was expelled in the eleventh grade, but could read, write and understand English. (Id. at 3-4.) Petitioner stated that he had not been recently treated for any type of mental illness or addition to narcotic drugs, but had gone through a drug program during a prior incarceration in about 1997. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner stated he was not currently under the influence of any drugs, medication or alcohol. (Id.) When asked if he suffered from any type of mental or emotional disability, petitioner stated "memory loss, from what I know." (Id.) Petitioner stated that his memory loss was from hard drug use, but that he clearly understood where he was, what he was doing, and the purpose of the proceeding. (Id. at 4-5.)
Petitioner stated that he had received a copy of the Indictment, had read through it and had discussed it with his attorney. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner stated that his attorney had done everything petitioner asked her to do in regard to the case, and that he was satisfied with her services. (Id.)
When the magistrate judge referred to the Plea Agreement, petitioner stated "I have no idea...
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