Drury v. U.S.
Decision Date | 13 November 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 07-12130 Non-Argument Calendar.,07-12130 Non-Argument Calendar. |
Citation | 507 F.3d 1295 |
Parties | Carl M. DRURY, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Benjamin Thomas Larkin, Donald W. Stewart, P.C., Bessemer, AL, for Drury.
Amy Lee Copeland, Edmund A. Booth, Jr., Acting U.S. Atty., Savannah, GA, for U.S.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.
Before CARNES, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
Carl M. Drury, Jr., a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his motion to vacate, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). We granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the statute of limitations began to run when the Supreme Court denied Drury's petition for certiorari or when it denied his petition for rehearing of the denial of certiorari.
The Supreme Court denied Drury's petition for certiorari on October 3, 2005. Drury v. United States, 546 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 336, 163 L.Ed.2d 48 (2005). If the statute of limitations began then, Drury had until October 3, 2006 to file his § 2255 motion. The Supreme Court denied his petition for rehearing on November 28, 2005. Drury v. United States, 546 U.S. 1055, 126 S.Ct. 716, 163 L.Ed.2d 613 (2005). Drury, through counsel, filed this § 2255 motion to vacate on November 27, 2006, which was more than one year after the denial of the petition for certiorari, but less than one year after the denial of his petition for rehearing.
We review de novo the district court's determination that a § 2255 motion to vacate is time-barred. Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir.2002). The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing a § 2255 motion to vacate, which begins to run following one of four events, the relevant trigger in this case being "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Supreme Court has held that "[f]inality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires." Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003). Likewise, we have held that a conviction becomes final the day the Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari or issues a decision on the merits. Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1300-01 (11th Cir.2001).
While neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed the impact of the filing of a petition for rehearing on the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Supreme Court Rule 16.3, entitled "Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari," provides:
Whenever the Court denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Clerk will prepare, sign, and enter an order to that effect and will notify forthwith counsel of record and the court whose judgment was sought to be reviewed. The order of denial will not be suspended pending disposition of a petition for rehearing except by order of the Court or a Justice.
Sup.Ct. R. 16.3 (emphasis added). Thus, by its unequivocal language, Rule 16.3 states that a petition for certiorari review is resolved when the Court denies review, unless the Supreme Court or a Justice intervenes, neither of which occurred at any point in the process in Drury's case.
This conclusion is consistent with the decisions of six of our sister courts to have considered the issue. See In re Smith, 436 F.3d 9, 10 (1st Cir.) (, )cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 284, 166 L.Ed.2d 217 (2006); Robinson v. United States, 416 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.2005) ( ); cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1176, 126 S.Ct. 1343, 164 L.Ed. 2d 57 (2006); Campa-Fabela v. United States, 339 F.3d 993, 993 (8th Cir.2003) ( ); Giesberg v. Cockrell, 288 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir.2002) (same); United States v. Segers, 271 F.3d...
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...for purposes of finality under the federal habeas statute, 28 USC § 2255. Means, supra at § 9A:16; see also Drury v. United States , 507 F.3d 1295, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) ("We now join our sister circuits and, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Clay , hold that finality attaches......
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