Alley v. State

• Decision Date: 02 May 1997
• Citation: 958 S.W.2d 138
• Parties: Sedley ALLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 138

958 S.W.2d 138

Sedley ALLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee,

at Jackson.

May 2, 1997.

Permission to Appeal Denied by

Supreme Court Sept. 29, 1997.

Arthur E. Quinn, Timothy R. Holton, Memphis, for Appellant.

Charles W. Burson, Attorney General and Reporter, Amy L. Tarkington, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, John W. Pierotti, District Attorney General, Henry P. Williams, John W. Campbell, Assistant District Attorneys General, Memphis, for Appellee.

OPINION

WADE, Judge.

The petitioner, Sedley Alley, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief and presents the following issues for our review:

(1) whether he was denied a fair trial due to the impartiality of the trial judge;

(2) whether a prospective juror was improperly dismissed;

(3) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal;

(4) whether the post-conviction court erroneously denied the petitioner expert services;

(5) whether the post-conviction court erroneously denied the petitioner the opportunity to make an offer of certain mitigating proof;

(6) whether the prosecutor committed reversible error during trial;

(7) whether the trial court committed reversible error during trial;

(8) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury at the guilt and penalty phases of the trial; and

(9) whether the Tennessee death penalty statute is unconstitutional.

We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner attacked the female victim while she was jogging near the Millington Naval Base, raped and killed her. At trial, the petitioner relied upon an insanity defense; through testimony, he attempted to prove that he was under the control of a separate personality at the time of the offense.

The petitioner was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, kidnapping, and aggravated rape; at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, he was sentenced to death on the murder conviction. The jury found two aggravating circumstances as grounds for this sentence: that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and that the murder was committed during the kidnapping and rape. The trial court imposed consecutive forty-year terms for the two other offenses. The supreme court affirmed each of the convictions on direct appeal. State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn.1989). Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, this court reversed, ordered the recusal of the trial judge, and remanded the case for a new hearing. Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). This court ruled that the trial court should have allowed the petitioner to make an offer of proof as to the expert testimony he intended to produce. Id. at 818. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the replacement judge denied the petitioner post-conviction relief.

The record of the post-conviction proceeding establishes that Deborah Richardson, a Mental Health Program Specialist with Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, assisted with the assimilation of the petitioner's records during his four-month evaluation period. The evaluation team included Ms. Richardson, Dr. Marshall, Becky Smith, Julie Maddox, Dr. Samuel Craddock, Dr. Zillur Athar, and two nurses. Ms. Richardson testified that birth records are not normally obtained for mental health examinations unless there is something about the patient's current functioning which would indicate congenital organic impairment; in her opinion, nothing about the petitioner's condition suggested a review of his birth records before his trial. When asked by the team of his medical background, the petitioner failed to mention anything of consequence. At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Richardson testified that she did review records indicating that the petitioner's mother suffered from edema during pregnancy. The petitioner's Apgar scores, which measure the infant's responsiveness after birth, declined over time; she also learned that the petitioner was born with a collapsed lung and spina bifida (a hole in the spinal cord). EEGs and CAT scans revealed nothing. Ms. Richardson confirmed that none of these conditions were explored by the evaluation team before the trial.

It was established that the petitioner also suffered from congenital kidney problems and an abnormal external genitalia. The petitioner had undergone several urethral strictures during his childhood, which entailed inserting a rod-like instrument into the urinary tract. He also had urethral surgery at age fifteen and suffered hemorrhaging of the penis shortly after the operation. The petitioner also had a history of febrile seizures before his surgery and had one afterwards. One of the reports pertaining to his urinary tract problem mentioned the term "neurosis," but this was not further investigated by the team. The petitioner also suffered a head injury during a diving accident; the team took this into account during their evaluation. At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Richardson acknowledged that the team did not consult a urologist or a geneticist with regard to any of these problems. She did testify that the team could find no connection between these physical problems and the alleged multiple personality disorder and concluded there was no need to research the problems any further. Ms. Richardson asserted that the team took extraordinary measures with the petitioner because of the nature of the alleged symptoms. She confirmed that records were also obtained subsequent to the trial indicating the petitioner was admitted to a hospital in Ohio for similar urinary tract problems; that was not investigated further.

The petitioner was diagnosed by the team as having a borderline personality disorder and continuous mixed substance abuse; he was classified as a malingerer. Ms. Richardson testified that the new medical records she had seen would not have changed her diagnosis of the petitioner. She stated that everything was consistent with substance abuse except for the borderline personality disorder symptoms. While acknowledging that the petitioner complained about nightmares and other personalities named "Billy" and "Death," and appeared nervous during evaluation meetings, Ms. Richardson testified that the petitioner acted normally around the Institute's general population and never showed any signs of behavioral changes. The team also monitored his sleeping and never observed signs of the alleged nightmares. She claimed that during the evaluation meetings, the petitioner would respond to certain cues the doctors would offer that were indicative of malingering.

Ms. Richardson recalled that the petitioner's trial attorneys traveled to the Institute to check on his status, which was rare for attorneys to do. In her view, the attorneys showed more interest than in any other case she could recall. She testified that the attorneys provided her team all of their records of medical history and the team, in turn, provided the trial attorneys with all of the findings they had made. She confirmed that everyone at the Institute testified at the competency hearing that the petitioner was able to stand trial.

Dr. Samuel Craddock, a clinical psychologist, also testified that the trial attorneys had visited him on about six occasions to discuss the petitioner's mental status; he described them as very thorough in their work. Dr. Craddock related that he had spent more time on this case than in any of the many others in which he had been involved; in his opinion, the trial attorneys could not have done anything differently to change his diagnosis of the petitioner. Dr. Craddock testified that the evaluation team considered the possibility of a multiple personality syndrome but concluded that the petitioner was not so afflicted.

Dr. Craddock also testified it was not customary to review birth records when attempting to determine either competency or sanity issues. Instead, the team looked for traumatic events in the petitioner's life that might have affected his mental status at the time of the offense. It was his opinion that neither the urethral surgery nor the diving injury would have had an effect on the diagnosis. Dr. Craddock explained that during interviews, the petitioner never described these events as being traumatic. He claimed that a medical report indicating that the petitioner suffered from a neurosis might not be legitimate because there was no other information pertaining to that diagnosis. It was his view that the dilation of the urinary tract was not necessarily traumatic for the petitioner, even though it was probably painful. He did conclude that the hemorrhaging that occurred after surgery could have qualified as trauma.

Dr. Craddock described the petitioner as appearing more impaired during the meetings with the team than during his association with other patients in the Institute. Dr. Craddock also mentioned that even though the petitioner complained of problems sleeping and about nightmares, no one ever observed anything out of the ordinary during round-the-clock observations. There was no evidence of any neurological problems. Dr. Craddock adhered to his belief that the personality disorder symptoms were a product of malingering.

Dr. Zillur Athar, one of the psychiatrists who examined the petitioner, testified that a cluster of physical anomalies can point to a syndrome with a genetic origin; he conceded, however, the team did not consult a geneticist in this case. Dr. Athar testified that genetic disorders can affect behavior, but not in every case. It was his view that persons who suffer from multiple personality disorders usually have experienced some form of sexual abuse trauma early in life. Dr. Athar stated that hemorrhaging after surgery and dilation procedures on the urinary tract could be traumatic if the person was not fully informed of these...