Alley v. State
| Decision Date | 07 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | W2019-02046-CCA-R3-PC |
| Citation | 648 S.W.3d 201 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Sedley ALLEY v. STATE of Tennessee |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Stephen Ross Johnson, Knoxville, Tennessee; Josie S. Holland and William D. Massey, Memphis, Tennessee; Andra J. Hedrick, Nashville, Tennessee; Paul D. Clement, George W. Hicks, Jr., Megan M. Wold, and Sara S. Tatum, Washington, D.C.; and Barry C. Scheck and Vanessa Potkin, Innocence Project, New York, New York, for the appellant, Estate of Sedley of Alley.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein ; Solicitor General; Andrew C. Coulam, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Stephen P. Jones, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The Appellant, the Estate of Sedley Alley ("the Estate"), appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court's dismissal of its petition for post-conviction DNA analysis.
The 2019 petition sought DNA testing of items from the Defendant's trial despite the fact that the Defendant, who had received the death penalty, was executed in 2006. The Estate argued that the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act ("the DNA Act") permitted the Estate to petition for DNA testing because the civil right of survivorship statute applied. The Estate additionally argued that United States and Tennessee Constitutions require that the Estate be allowed to petition for DNA testing under the DNA Act, citing to principles of due process and a "reputational guarantee." Following our review of the applicable authorities, we hold that the Estate is not a "person" within the purview of the DNA Act and that neither due process nor any reputational guarantee require a remedy under these facts. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
In July 1985, nineteen-year-old Marine Lance Corporal Suzanne Collins’ life was ended after being beaten, raped, and impaled with a thirty-one-inch long tree branch. See State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 508-09 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 758, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990). Thereafter, a Shelby County grand jury charged the Defendant as the assailant.
At trial, the State produced evidence establishing the following facts. The almost thirty-year-old Defendant, Sedley Alley, was a civilian married to a member of the military, and they lived on the Millington Naval Base in Millington, Tennessee. Alley, 776 S.W.2d at 508. The victim lived on the same base. Id. During the late evening hours of July 11, 1985, the Defendant abducted the victim while she was jogging on the base. Id. Two marines jogging near where the victim was abducted heard the victim scream and ran toward the sound. Id. at 509. However, before they reached the scene, they saw the Defendant's car drive off. Id. They reported to base security and accompanied officers on a tour of the base, unsuccessfully looking for the car they had seen; they returned to their barracks. Id. Soon after returning to their quarters, however, the marines were called back to the security office, where they identified the Defendant's car, which had been stopped by officers. Id. The Defendant and his wife gave statements to the base security personnel accounting for their whereabouts. Id. The security personnel were satisfied with the Defendant's story, and the Defendant and his wife returned to their on-base housing. Id. A few hours later the next morning on July 12, 1985, the victim's body was found in a nearby park. Id. at 508. The Defendant was immediately arrested by military police. Id. at 509. He gave a "lengthy statement of his activities that resulted in the death of Suzanne Collins to officers of the Naval Investigating Service on the morning of 12 July 1985." Id. at 508. After completing the statement, the Defendant voluntarily accompanied officers "over the route he had taken the night before and to the location of the murder and accurately identified various things, including the tree where he had left the body and where it was found by others and from which the limb he used had been broken." Id. at 509.
The Defendant relied upon an insanity defense at trial. Alley, 776 S.W.2d at 510. The Defendant presented the testimony of two psychologists who diagnosed the Defendant as suffering from a multiple personality
disorder. Id. However, neither doctor could verify whether an alternate personality was in control at the time of the offense. Id. The State's psychologist also examined the Defendant and determined that psychological tests administered to the Defendant in May 1986 suggested that he was exaggerating or malingering. Id. at 510-11. The State's psychologist further noted that Defendant had no history of mental health treatment prior to the murder and that it was "improbable that a condition of insanity had taken control of his actions on the evening of the murder." Id. at 511. In sum, the State's psychologist, while diagnosing a borderline personality disorder
with a chronic history of drug and alcohol abuse, found no evidence of multiple personality disorder or psychosis. Id.
A Shelby County jury rejected the Defendant's insanity defense and found the Defendant guilty of the kidnapping, aggravated rape, and premeditated first-degree murder of the victim. Alley, 776 S.W.2d at 508. In addition, the jury found two aggravating circumstances, i.e., the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and the murder was committed during a kidnapping and rape, and sentenced the Defendant to death. Id. "He was sentenced to [forty] years on each of the other offenses, all sentences consecutive." Id.
This case was the subject of extensive appellate review prior to the Defendant's June 28, 2006 execution.1 After the guilty verdict, the Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Alley, 776 S.W.2d at 519. Thereafter, the Defendant sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court. See Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). On appeal, this court reversed the trial court's denial, ordered the recusal of the trial judge, and remanded the case for a new hearing. Id. at 818-23. Upon remand, the Defendant was again denied relief. See Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 1997). This time on appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. Id. at 156. In 1998, the Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The district court denied the petition. See Alley v. Bell, 101 F. Supp. 2d 588, 601-73 (W.D. Tenn. 2000). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief. See Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 839, 124 S.Ct. 99, 157 L.Ed.2d 72 (2003), reh'g denied, 540 U.S. 1086, 124 S.Ct. 952, 157 L.Ed.2d 765 (2003).
Relative to the Defendant's previous requests for DNA testing, on May 4, 2004, which was a month before his scheduled execution date at the time, the Defendant filed a petition in the Shelby County Criminal Court seeking DNA analysis pursuant to the DNA Act. See Sedley Alley v. State, No. W2004-01204-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1196095, at *1 , perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 950, 125 S.Ct. 1695, 161 L.Ed.2d 528 (2005) (" Alley I"); see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-304, -305. In his petition, the Defendant requested the production of eleven biological samples for DNA testing: (1) vaginal swabs from the victim; (2) a swab taken from the victim's right inner thigh; (3) a swab taken from the victim's left inner thigh; (4) nasopharyngeal swabs from the victim; (5) oral swabs from the victim; (6) rectal swabs from the victim; (7) head hairs from an African-American individual found on the victim's socks; (8) a Caucasian body hair found on the victim's waistband; (9) a Caucasian pubic hair found on the victim's left shoe; (10) a hair on a stick found in the victim; and (11) the victim's blood and hair samples. Id. at *3.
The Defendant argued that the samples contained biological evidence that would have established the identity of the person or persons who committed the sexual assault and murder of the victim. Alley I, 2004 WL 1196095, at *3. In essence, the Defendant asserted that he was not the perpetrator of these offenses despite his prior confession. Id. He contended that "certain evidence tend[ed] to implicate one of the victim's romantic partners." Id. Additionally, the Defendant maintained that certain trial evidence should be disregarded as unreliable because (1) the Defendant's confession was coerced; (2) recently discovered documents from the medical examiner revealed that the victim's time of death was later than originally thought; (3) the description of the perpetrator provided by a witness did not match the Defendant's description; (4) the description of the vehicle provided by witnesses did not match that of the Defendant's vehicle; (5) tire tracks at the abduction scene did not match the Defendant's vehicle; (6) fingerprints on a beer bottle recovered near the victim's body were not identical to the Defendant's; and (7) shoe prints at the abduction scene did not match the shoes the Defendant was wearing on the night in question. Id.
Following a hearing, the trial court, on May 17, 2004, denied the Defendant's petition for DNA testing, finding that the Defendant had "failed to demonstrate that a reasonable probability exist[ed] that ... he would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA analysis of the requested samples." Alley I, 2004 WL 1196095, at *1....
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