Alliance for Colorado's Families v. Gilbert, 05CA2137.

• Decision Date: 01 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05CA2137.,05CA2137.
• Citation: 172 P.3d 964
• Parties: ALLIANCE FOR COLORADO'S FAMILIES, a Colorado unincorporated non-profit association, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Leland GILBERT, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and Division of Administrative Hearings, Appellee, and Colorado Secretary of State, Intervenor-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

172 P.3d 964

ALLIANCE FOR COLORADO'S FAMILIES, a Colorado unincorporated non-profit association, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Leland GILBERT, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and Division of Administrative Hearings, Appellee, and Colorado Secretary of State, Intervenor-Appellee.

No. 05CA2137.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

November 1, 2007.

Issacson, Rosenbaum, P.C., Edward T. Ramey, Blain D. Myhre, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

Hackstaff Gessler, LLC, Scott E. Gessler, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.

Maurice G. Knaizer, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Intervenor-Appellee.

Opinion by Judge ROTHENBERG.

In this case involving Colorado's campaign finance law, petitioner, the Alliance for Colorado's Families (ACF), appeals from an order assessing a $36,000 penalty against it by an administrative law judge (ALJ) assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings (the Agency). The penalty was assessed because the ALJ determined that ACF became a "political committee" as a matter of law and violated the Campaign and Political Finance Amendment, Colo. Const. art. XXVIII (the Amendment), and section 1-45-108, C.R.S. 2007, when it conducted certain campaign activity during the 2004 election. Respondent, Leland Gilbert, cross-appeals the ALJ's method of calculating the penalty imposed on ACF. We vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

The facts before us are largely undisputed. ACF is an unincorporated nonprofit association and engages in political advocacy pertinent to candidate elections and related issues of public concern. Because ACF engages in "electioneering communications," as defined by section 2(7)(a) of the Amendment, it is required to file periodic reports with the Secretary of State of itemized contributions and spending on electioneering communications. According to those filings, ACF received and spent nearly $900,000 on such communications during the 2004 election cycle.

On October 29, 2004, a few days before the 2004 election, ACF spent approximately $18,000, which was about 2% of its total spending for that year, for the production of a single radio advertisement. The advertisement, which was aired several times, compared Colorado House of Representatives candidate Kent Lambert to the 1950s television character "Eddie Haskell." The text of the advertisement was as follows:

You know the smarmy little guy on Leave It to Beaver?

Now we've got our own Eddie Haskell right here in Colorado Springs, House candidate Kent Lambert.

And his latest little scheme is the kind of dirty trick only an Eddie Haskell could think of.

Kent Lambert and his dirty tricksters decided that twenty-four-hour surveillance of his opponent was a nifty idea. Just hire a private investigator and stake out the opponent's home — twenty-four, seven.

So why did he do it? Because he knows that twenty-two-year resident Mike Merrifield has been fighting for our community for a long time. Representative Merrifield has been fighting for affordable health care for all and good schools for our kids.

We saw right through Eddie Haskell when he said, "Gee, you look lovely tonight, Mrs. Cleaver." And we see through Kent Lambert's adolescent game of hide the ball.

This election is too important for childish tricks. We need mature leadership.

Don't let Eddie Haskell, er Kent Lambert, represent you in the State House.

Paid for by Alliance for Colorado's Families.

Following the airings of this radio advertisement, Gilbert filed a complaint with the Colorado Secretary of State pursuant to section 9(2)(a) of the Amendment, alleging that (1) the Eddie Haskell ad advocated Lambert's defeat in the 2004 election; (2) it therefore constituted "express advocacy"; (3) by engaging in such advocacy, ACF was converted by operation of law from an organization not subject to contribution limits to a "political committee" under section 2(12) of the Amendment; and (4) ACF was retroactively subject to contribution limits because it had received contributions exceeding the limits permitted for political committees and had failed to register and file reports required of such committees by section 1-45-108. The Secretary of State referred the complaint to the Agency to determine ACF's liability, if any, pursuant to section 9(2)(a).

The parties agreed the issue of liability could be resolved without a hearing based on stipulated facts. After considering the parties' submissions, the ALJ issued a written order finding, as relevant here, that ACF "became a `political committee' . . . on October 29, 2004 [when it] made the expenditure for production of the [radio] advertisement." The ALJ concluded ACF had violated the Amendment and granted summary judgment in favor of Gilbert on the liability issue.

The ALJ later conducted a hearing to determine the appropriate sanction under section 10(1) of the Amendment, which provides that the civil penalty sanctions should be "at least double and up to five times the amount contributed, received, or spent in violation of the applicable provision of [the Amendment]."

At the penalty hearing, ACF challenged the constitutionality of the Amendment facially and as applied. However, on appeal, ACF has based its constitutional challenge on the ALJ's imposition of a penalty on ACF for electioneering activities that could only be found to have violated constitutional spending limits based on a retroactive determination that, because of the size of the contributions ACF had received, it was converted into a political committee and was therefore subject to the penalties in section 10(1).

Gilbert's position at the penalty hearing was that once ACF became a political committee, it was subject to the $500 contribution limit in section 3(5) of the Amendment for the entire election cycle of the House of Representatives, and that this contribution limit should apply retroactively to all contributions received by ACF. Gilbert urged the ALJ to impose a penalty against ACF of $4,105, 508, which was five times the amount of all contributions over $500 that ACF had received during the election cycle.

The ALJ agreed with Gilbert that section 10(1) authorized such a penalty, but he concluded that amount was excessive. He assessed a penalty of $36,000, which was double the amount actually spent by ACF on the advertisement. In reaching his conclusion that penalties could be assessed retroactively, the ALJ reasoned that "once an organization becomes a political committee, it is subject to the $500 contribution limit in Section 3(5) for the entire House of Representatives election cycle," and that the "limit applies retroactively to contributions already received."

Because ACF is challenging the constitutionality of a state constitutional provision, the Secretary of State filed a motion in this court to intervene, which was granted.

II. Contentions

ACF contends that the ALJ erred in concluding it was transformed by operation of law into a political committee, and that the ALJ's application to ACF of the penalty section of the Amendment violates its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

In Gilbert's cross-appeal, he initially contended the penalty imposed on ACF was inadequate as a matter of law because it was not at least double the amount of unlawful contributions received by ACF during the election cycle. However, in an unusual turn of events, on appeal, both ACF and Gilbert have asserted in their reply briefs that the proper remedy in this case is a partial invalidation of the penalty portion of the Amendment because of its retroactive application. The Secretary of State has urged us to uphold the penalty portion of the Amendment by construing it narrowly. We conclude the case must be remanded for further proceedings and findings by the ALJ as set forth below.

A. Standard of Review

An agency decision will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to law. Coffman v. Colo. Common Cause, 102 P.3d 999 (Colo.2004); Rutt v. Poudre Educ. Ass'n, 151 P.3d 585 (Colo.App.2006) (cert granted Feb. 5, 2007); Nededog v. Colo. Dep't of Health Care Policy & Fin., 98 P.3d 960, 961 (Colo.App.2004). We examine the record in the light most favorable to the agency decision. Whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the agency decision is a question of law we review de novo. Martelon v. Colo. Dep't of Health Care Policy & Fin., 124 P.3d 914 (Colo.App.2005).

We also review de novo the legal and constitutional standards as applied in this case. League of Women Voters v. Davidson, 23 P.3d 1266, 1270 (Colo.App.2001).

In construing a constitutional provision, we are required to give effect to the intent of the electorate that adopted it. We look at the words used, reading them in context and according them their plain and ordinary meaning, and where ambiguities exist, we interpret the constitutional provision as a whole in an attempt to harmonize its parts. Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs, 129 P.3d 988 (Colo.2006); Harwood v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, 141 P.3d 962 (Colo. App.2006). We also consider the object to be accomplished and the mischief to be prevented by the provision. City of Aurora v. Acosta, 892 P.2d 264 (Colo.1995). An interpretation that creates an unreasonable or absurd result should be avoided. Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215 (Colo.1994).

The electorate, as well as the legislature, must be presumed to know the existing law at the time it amends or clarifies that law. See Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748, 754 (Colo.2000); Bickel, 885 P.2d at 228 n. 10 (the general rules of statutory construction apply when interpreting citizen-initiated measures); see also Cooper v. People, 973 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Co...