Allman v. Com.
Decision Date | 25 May 2004 |
Docket Number | Record No. 0664-03-2. |
Citation | 43 Va. App. 104,596 S.E.2d 531 |
Parties | Brian ALLMAN, s/k/a Brian P. Allman v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Brian P. Allman, pro se.
John H. McLees, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: ELDER, FRANK and HUMPHREYS, JJ.
Brian P. Allman (appellant) appeals from his bench trial conviction for making an obscene telephone call with an intent to coerce, intimidate or harass in violation of Code § 18.2-427. On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to prove his language was obscene or that he acted with the requisite intent.1 We hold the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was insufficient to prove his language was obscene. Thus, we reverse and dismiss his conviction without considering whether he acted with an intent to harass.
At the time of the events upon which the instant charges are based, appellant operated a small trash company in Fairfax County. One of appellant's competitors was a company called Triple A Trash, operated by Republic Services Incorporated (Republic). As part of appellant's advertising, he "target[ed] [Republic] as [a] competitor" and described Republic's fees as a "rip off."
Appellant filed a civil action against Republic in the Fairfax County Circuit Court. Republic was represented in that action by Richmond attorney Douglas Nabhan. Nabhan filed a demurrer on Republic's behalf. Appellant contacted Nabhan seeking Nabhan's agreement to allow appellant to amend his motion for judgment to correct the defect challenged by the demurrer. By letter faxed to appellant on October 15, 2002, Nabhan refused to agree to appellant's request, indicating his client preferred to allow the court to rule on the demurrer.
On October 25, an associate from the Fairfax office of Nabhan's law firm appeared in court to argue the demurrer. Appellant had "expect[ed] Mr. Nabhan to come argue the motion as to the demurrer." The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and appellant noted an appeal to the Supreme Court that same day.
On October 28, 2002, appellant telephoned Nabhan at his office and left a message on Nabhan's voice mail. The message contained numerous unflattering characterizations of Nabhan, referring to him as "a pussy" or "puss" twenty times, and lasted approximately six minutes. Appellant's repeated use of the word, "pussy," included references to female excretory functions. Appellant indicated his belief that Nabhan must be "squatting to pee" in "the ladies room" of his law firm "[be]cause [appellant believed Nabhan] is such a pussy." Appellant indicated he would send Nabhan's copy of his notice of appeal to the attention of the ladies' room at Nabhan's firm because "I know that's where you hang out all the time, because you are such a big pussy." Appellant said Nabhan should become more masculine and courageous by "grow[ing] a set of balls" and said that, even if Nabhan "[grew] a set of balls," left the ladies' room, and "start[ed] lifting weights," Nabhan would still need twelve to twenty other attorneys to accompany him to oral argument before the Supreme Court.
Appellant was charged and tried for the instant offense. Testifying in his own behalf, appellant claimed his intent in calling Nabhan was merely "to notify [Nabhan] that [appellant] had filed [his] appeal with the Supreme Court of Virginia." He admitted leaving the message he did was "an error in... judgment" and that he "probably should have been a little more gentlemanly." Appellant said he chose the words that he did because he Appellant conceded that he could have informed Nabhan he had noted an appeal of the dismissal of the suit in seven or fewer sentences in a message lasting ten to twenty seconds.
The court convicted appellant of the charged offense, reasoning in relevant part as follows: "I don't know whether [the language] is obscene, vulgar; profane, or lewd, but I believe the use of the words in conjunction with the male anatomy along with the references to the bathroom, and all the context that it's used in certainly fits within the definition of those terms."
Appellant noted this appeal.
Code § 18.2-427 provides in relevant part as follows:
Code § 18.1-238 was the predecessor to Code § 18.2-427. Code § 18.1-238 provided that "If any person shall curse or abuse anyone, or use vulgar, profane, threatening or indecent language over any telephone in this state, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." In Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.1975), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held Code § 18.1-238 was facially overbroad. Thereafter, the legislature amended the statute to include its present language. See 1976 Va. Acts ch. 312 (recodifying statute at § 18.2-427)] see also 1984 Va. Acts ch. 592 ( ).
In Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 7, 14-15, 402 S.E.2d 229, 233-34 (1991), we considered a claim that the amended statute, codified at § 18.2-427, was unconstitutionally overbroad. In order to avoid such a finding, we interpreted "the phrase, `with the intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass' as applying to the use of `obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent language."' Id. at 14, 402 S.E.2d at 233. We also concluded, "[i]n view of the legislature's amendments to the statute following the decision in Walker, that the legislature [both (1) intended to address harassing conduct as the evil to be proscribed and [ (2) ] intended to narrow the scope of the speech phrases to that which is obscene."2 Id.; see also Walker, 523 F.2d at 5-6
(. )
Neither Code § 18.2-427 nor the chapter or article in which it appears—Chapter 8, Article 5, of Title 18.2—contains a definition of the word "obscene." However, in interpreting a statute, " "[t]he Code of Virginia constitutes a single body of law, and other sections can be looked to where the same phraseology is employed."` " Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 8, 35, 531 S.E.2d 580, 593 (2000) (en banc) (quoting Hart v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 77, 79, 441 S.E.2d 706, 707 (1994) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 708, 710, 347 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1986))).
On appeal, we "must make an independent determination of the constitutional issue of obscenity, which is a mixed question of law and fact." Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 118, 189 S.E.2d 324, 328 (1972), vacated on other grounds and remanded by 413 U.S. 912, 93 S.Ct. 3049, 37 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1973); see also Price, 214 Va. at 491,
201 S.E.2d at 799 ( ); State v. Harrold, 256 Neb. 829, 593 N.W.2d 299, 310 (1999) ( ).
The first two prongs of the Miller obscenity test, as codified by Code § 18.2-372—whether the material, (1) "considered as ' a whole, has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to the prurient interest in sex, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,...
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