Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse
Decision Date | 15 January 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 89366,89366 |
Citation | 707 So.2d 1110 |
Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly S30 ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Myrda MANASSE, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Michele I. Nelson of Paxton, Crow, Bragg, Smith & Nelson, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Petitioner.
James P. Cooksey of Cooksey & Cooksey, P.A., Riviera Beach, and K. Jack Breiden, Naples, for Respondent.
Roy D. Wasson and Barbara Green, Coral Gables, for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae.
We have for review a decision addressing the following questions certified to be of great public importance:
WHERE A JURY FINDS THAT A PLAINTIFF HAS SUSTAINED A PERMANENT INJURY AND AWARDS FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES, BUT AWARDS NO FUTURE INTANGIBLE DAMAGES, IS THE VERDICT INADEQUATE AS A MATTER OF LAW?
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 681 So.2d 779, 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Myrda Manasse was injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured tortfeasor and sued Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), her uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier, to recover damages. The jury found that Manasse suffered a permanent injury and awarded her $10,000 over a forty-year period for future medical expenses, $2,000 for past noneconomic damages, and zero for future noneconomic damages. In her motion for a new trial, Manasse claimed that the verdict was inconsistent, inadequate, and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, inasmuch as the jury found that she sustained a permanent injury and awarded her damages for future medical treatment. The trial court denied her motion. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial on damages, concluding that the zero verdict for future noneconomic damages was inadequate as a matter of law in light of the jury's findings of permanent injury and substantial future medical expense. Manasse, 681 So.2d at 784. The district court certified the above referenced questions to this Court.
Manasse argues that the district court was correct in reversing the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial. We disagree. The judicial determination on a motion for a new trial is a discretionary act of the trial court:
When a motion for new trial is made it is directed to the sound, broad discretion of the trial judge, who because of his contact with the trial and his observation of the behavior of those upon whose testimony the finding of fact must be based is better positioned than any other one person fully to comprehend the processes by which the ultimate decision of the triers of fact, the jurors, is reached.
Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669, 673 (Fla.1959) (citations omitted). We reiterated the rule recently in State v. Spaziano, 692 So.2d 174 (Fla.1997), wherein we stated:
A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and the presumption is that [it] exercised that discretion properly. And the general rule is that unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed by the appellate court.
Id. at 177 (quoting Henderson v. State, 135 Fla. 548, 562, 185 So. 625, 630 (1938) (Brown, J., concurring specially)). The appellate court should apply the reasonableness test to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion, to wit, "discretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla.1990).
In the instant case, the trial court denied Manasse's motion for a new trial, reasoning that The record evidence supports the trial court's finding. Manasse presented one witness, her chiropractor, to testify as to the necessity of future medical care. He recommended continuing conservative therapy, and the jury awarded funds to cover three to four visits per year at her chiropractor's rate. Allstate presented evidence disputing that Manasse sustained a permanent injury; that she would need future chiropractic care; and that her condition would necessarily cause pain. Allstate's evidence further suggested that any continued complaints of pain could be for reasons unrelated to the August 1992 accident, such as Manasse's excessive weight, strenuous sporting and weightlifting activities, or a subsequent accident. 1
Our review of the lower court's ruling reveals no abuse of discretion, for we are unable to say, after reviewing the evidence as a whole, that no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's ruling. Our conclusion is...
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