Allstate Ins. Co. v. A. D. H., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-16,80-16
• Citation: 397 So.2d 928
• Parties: ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Babcock Co. Builders, Babcock Industries, Inc. and Babcock Co., Appellants, v. A. D. H., INC., Unigard Insurance Co., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 928

397 So.2d 928

ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Babcock Co. Builders, Babcock Industries, Inc. and Babcock Co., Appellants, v. A. D. H., INC., Unigard Insurance Co., et al., Appellees.

No. 80-16.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 17, 1981.

Rehearing Denied May 20, 1981.

Adams & Ward and Robert C. Ward and James W. Kaufman and Steven Kent Hunter, Miami, for appellants.

Magill & Reid and Kevin P. O'Connor, Underwood, Gillis, Karcher, Reinert & Valle and Thomas R. Trompeter, Miami, for appellees.

Before NESBITT, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

The collapse of a scaffold causing the death of one Williams gave rise to a suit by his widow, resulting in a jury finding Babcock Industries, Inc. and A.D.H., Inc. negligent and assessing damages of $1,000,000. ¹ Babcock and A.D.H. instituted appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict, but when Babcock ² satisfied the judgment for $725,000, the appeals became moot and were dismissed.

Babcock then sued A.D.H. and Garber Construction Co. for indemnity. Babcock contended it was entitled to be indemnified upon the theory that Babcock was faultless in respect to Williams' death and that the liability imposed on it by the jury was vicarious (otherwise stated, constructive, derivative or technical), that is, exclusively predicated on the negligence of A.D.H. or Garber. A.D.H. and Garber asserted the defense of estoppel by judgment: (1) under Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So.2d 490 (Fla.1978), only a party shown to be totally without fault has a right of indemnification; (2) the jury's undifferentiated general verdict finding Babcock "negligent" could mean that it found some fault in Babcock; and (3) therefore, Babcock has no right to indemnification. Accepting this analysis, the trial court entered summary judgment for A.D.H. and Garber. Babcock appealed. We reverse.

It is well settled that a party asserting the defense of estoppel by judgment has the burden of proving that the fact which it contends cannot be relitigated has been previously determined. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Industrial Contracting Co., 260 So.2d 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Corn v. Hoffman, 230 So.2d 188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Wacaster v. Wacaster, 220 So.2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); Hohweiler v. Hohweiler, 167 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Stone v. Stone, 111 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959).

It is true, as A.D.H. contends, that Babcock cannot show from the jury's general verdict of negligence that Babcock was found to be faultless. ³ But it is not up to Babcock, to show that it is not estopped by the jury's verdict; rather, it is up to A.D.H., the party asserting this defense and seeking a summary judgment thereon, to show conclusively that the jury found Babcock at fault. ⁴ That showing is simply not made by the jury's general verdict of "negligence." ⁵

This case is not unlike Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Industrial Contracting Co., supra. There the railroad contracted with Industrial to build a bridge; Industrial agreed to indemnify the railroad for any injuries to railroad employees at the construction site caused by the negligent acts or omissions of Industrial or through any other than the sole negligence of the railroad or its employees. A railroad employee was injured and the railroad paid him $10,000. The employee, guided and financed by the railroad, sued Industrial, with the railroad to be repaid its $10,000 from any recovery. Industrial defended on the basis, inter alia, that it was not negligent, but, if it was, the railroad's employee was contributorily negligent. The jury returned a general verdict "in favor of the defendant, Industrial Contracting Company, Inc." Subsequently, the railroad, asserting that Industrial was negligent, sued Industrial to indemnify it under their contract for the $10,000 paid to the employee. Industrial moved for summary judgment, contending that Industrial's absence of negligence had been determined in the employee's prior suit against Industrial. ⁶ The Fourth District Court of Appeal, holding that Industrial's absence of negligence had not been clearly determined so as to entitle Industrial to summary judgment on its estoppel by judgment defense, said:

"The former cause found 'in favor of the defendant Industrial Contracting Company, Inc.'. Such a finding could have been premised upon the jury believing that Industrial was not negligent or that Industrial was negligent but that (the employee) was guilty of contributory negligence. Absent a special verdict on the issue of negligence or contributory negligence it is impossible to ascertain with any reasonable degree of certainty as to what issue was adjudicated in the former suit except to say that the jury found in favor of Industrial. Such uncertainty as to the effect of the prior adjudication renders the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable to the case sub judice. (citations omitted)." 260 So.2d at 865.

Even as Industrial's absence of negligence had not been clearly determined by the verdict relied on in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Industrial Contracting Co., so the fault of Babcock was not determined by the equivocal jury verdict relied on by A.D.H. in the present case.

We therefore set aside the summary judgment and order taxing costs entered against the plaintiffs and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 Babcock was the owner and general contractor of...