Allstate Leasing Corp. v. Smith
| Decision Date | 15 November 1965 |
| Citation | 47 Cal.Rptr. 636,238 Cal.App.2d 128 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ALLSTATE LEASING CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Fred L. SMITH, Jean Ann Smith, Bessie S. Smith, Fred H. Ferguson and Georgia A. Ferguson, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 28604. |
Edward Raiden, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Michael B. Montgomery, San Marino, for respondents.
Appeal by Allstate Leasing Corporation from an order of the Superior Court vacating an earlier judgment in its favor.
Allstate leased furniture and appliances to Fred, Jean, and Bessie Smith, which were used to furnish several apartment houses. The Smiths sold the apartment houses--and the leased furniture and appliances--to Fred and Georgia Ferguson and gave the Fergusons a bill of sale for Allstate's property signed by third persons. Thirteen months later Allstate filed a complaint in Superior Court against the Smiths and the Fergusons. Allstate pleaded two causes of action: one against the Smiths for breach of contract, and one against the Fergusons for the value of the property and its use. The Smiths defaulted, but the Fergusons went to trial. Judgment was entered against the Smiths for the principal amount of $3417 and for attorney's fees of $241 [rounded amounts], and against the Fergusons for $2800. No appeal was taken. Five months later the Fergusons moved to vacate the judgment on the ground that the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Allstate's complaint sought less than the minimum jurisdictional amount of $5000. The court agreed, the judgment was vacated, and the action was transferred to the Municipal Court.
On appeal from the order vacating the judgment, Allstate contends the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction, because the amount actually in issue was over $5000, because the trial court's determination of jurisdiction had become res judicata, and because the Fergusons were estopped to deny jurisdiction.
We accept the view of Allstate that it had pleaded causes of action involving more than the jurisdictional minimum of $5000 and therefore do not consider the thorny subjects of res judicata and estoppel.
The decisive factor in determining the amount of money at issue for jurisdictional purposes is the demand of the pleadings, not the amount of a subsequent judgment. (Code Civ.Proc. § 396; Sellery v. Ward, 21 Cal.2d 300, 304, 131 P.2d 550.) If several causes of action are properly joined in a complaint, the court has jurisdiction if any one of them demands the minimum amount, even though the others involve lesser amounts. (Aldrich v. Transcontinental Land, etc. Co., 131 Cal.App.2d 788, 796, 281 P.2d 362; St. James Church v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.2d 352, 358, 287 P.2d 387.) The amount of the demand is usually shown by the prayer in the complaint, but the entire cause may be considered in determining the amount actually involved. (St. James Church v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.2d 352, 356, 287 P.2d 387.)
In the case at bench the prayer asked for judgment against the Smiths for $3417, plus reasonable attorney's fees, and for judgment against the Fergusons for $3417. Respondents argue that neither cause of action set forth a demand for over $5000, and, therefore, the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Allstate contends that the complaint against the Fergusons sought to recover the value of the funiture ($3417) plus damages for loss of use ($2613) and that the total of these two items ($6030) exceeded the minimum jurisdictional amount.
On this record and at this stage of the litigation we find the jurisdictional amount pleaded under each count.
1. The first cause of action was against the Smiths for $3417, the amount owed under the lease, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Attorney's fees are included in calculating the amount in controversy where specific provision is made for their payment under the contract. (Holm v. Davis, 8 Cal.App.2d 328, 330, 47 P.2d 537.) A demand for attorney's fees must be added to the principal demand in order to determine the jurisdictional amount. (Taylor v. Datig, 123 Cal.App.Supp. 782, 783, 11 P.2d 98; Garcia v. Ebeling Motor Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 688, 694-695, 201 P.2d 854.) In the present case no exact figure was specified in the pleadings as a reasonable amount of attorney's fees. How much then do we add to the principal amount? In our view at this stage of the litigation we are justified in assuming a figure which will support the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. Respondents, having lost a final judgment on the merits without raising the jurisdictional issue, cannot be heard to complain when a court later interprets a demand for reasonable attorney's fees as a demand for an amount sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of the court which granted the judgment.
In De Jarnatt v. Marquez, 132 Cal. 700, 64 P. 1090, at a time when the minimum jurisdiction of the Superior Court was $300, plaintiff brought suit in the justice's court on a note for $250 and asked for $100 attorney's fees under an agreement in the note to pay a reasonable attorney's fee. The case was tried on the merits in the justice's court, the plaintiff won, and an appeal was taken to the Superior Court. The action was tried anew in the Superior Court, and plaintiff again won. Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the justice's court had no jurisdiction over the suit and the Superior Court had acquired none by the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court did have jurisdiction over the suit, because the complaint on its face showed a demand for an amount within its original jurisdiction. Defendant, having gone to trial in the Superior Court on the merits without contesting jurisdiction, was precluded from subsequently attacking the jurisdiction of that court.
In the present case we have a comparable contract and a comparable attempt by respondents to attack the judgment collaterally after...
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