Almada v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act

Decision Date02 January 1951
Citation77 A.2d 765,137 Conn. 380
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesALMADA et al. v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT, et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Robert Ewing, West Hartford, for appellant General Ice Cream corp.

William S. Gordon, Jr., Hartford, Stephen M. Riley, Hartford, for appellees.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

INGLIS, Judge.

The question involved in this case is whether the plaintiffs, whose unemployment resulted from a labor dispute in which they were participants, come within the provision in our Unemployment Compensation Act which allows benefits if the unemployment is caused by a lockout.

The finding of the unemployment commissioners, which was added to by the Superior Court and in which no further corrections may be made, discloses the following facts: General Ice Cream Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the company, was engaged in the business of processing and distributing milk and milk products. It operated in Hartford through two divisions known as Bryant & Champman and R. G. Miller & Sons, respectively. The plaintiffs were employed by the company and assigned to those divisions either as wholesale or retail drivers or as plant employees. They were members of a union which represented them as the bargaining unit with the company.

On June 12, 1947, the union and the company entered into an agreement relative to wages and working conditions which was effective as of February 1, 1947, for the term of one year, with the proviso that it should be automatically renewed unless either party gave notice of termination before January 1, 1948. It further provided that, if either party wished to change any provisions of the agreement at its renewal, that party should submit its proposals to the other on or before January 1, 1948, and that if the parties, in negotiating a renewal did not agree as to hours or rates of pay until after the expiration date, the agreement, when ultimately reached, would be retroactive to that date.

On November 28, 1947, the company gave notice to the union that it proposed nineteen changes in the agreement and stated in that notice: 'If no agreement can be reached by that date, we consider that our present contract is terminated as of January 31, 1948.' The union wrote the company on December 26 that it desired to make seventeen changes in the agreement. There ensued a considerable number of conferences, but by the end of February, 1948, no agreement had been reached.

On February 25 the union voted to authorize a strike to be called at the discretion of its executive board, and the company was notified of that action. Thereupon the company brought to Hartford from its other divisions about two hundred and fifty of its employees. It posted a notice on February 29 stating that it would do everything in its power to insure continuous deliveries of milk and on March 1 sent out most of its imported employees on the delivery trucks with its regular employees so that the former might become familiar with the routes. It also advised the union that in accordance with the notification which it had given the union on November 28, no agreement having been reached, it would not be bound by the previous contract, and it posted a notice in its plants to the same effect. The notice also stated that it was not the intention of the company to change rates of pay or working conditions but that it would feel free to hire such help as might be necessary to fill vacancies and in the future would make no deductions from wages for union dues, initiation fees, etc.

On the evening of March 1, the members of the union decided that they would strike rather than continue to take the company's imported employees out on the trucks with them. On the morning of March 2, members of the executive board of the union went to the company's premises and observed activity which led them to the conclusion that it was the intention of the company to continue on that day to send out the imported employees with the regular drivers. At 5 o'clock in the morning, the executive board threw picket lines around the company's premises, and the members of the union, including the plaintiffs, ceased to report for work. The picket lines were maintained until early in November, 1948.

The company issued to each of the plaintiffs a separation slip dated March 2 upon which was checked as the reason for the separation the statement 'Left Work Voluntarily.' On the morning of March 3, the company advertised in a local newspaper that it wanted help, stating that the openings were for steady, permanent, yearround jobs in the milk business.

On March 5, representatives of the company and of the union met with the state board of mediation and arbitration. At that time the union offered to submit the dispute to arbitration and to call off the strike immediately if the men could return to work. Just what it was the union offered to arbitrate, that is, whether it was the question of a claimed breach of the original contract or whether it was the question what should be the terms upon which the strike should be settled is not stated in the finding. In any event, the company refused the arbitration on the ground that there was no effective agreement existing at the time which required it to arbitrate. It refused to take all of the men back to work because it had hired others to replace those who had walked off the job. From that time on, conditions did not change in any particular essential to the determination of this case until November 4, 1948, when the company and the union settled their dispute. The plaintiffs sought benefits for the period of unemployment commencing March 2 and ending November 4.

Upon the foregoing facts, the commissioners concluded that the plaintiffs' unemployment resulted from a labor dispute in which they were participants but that it was caused by a lockout from March 1, 1948, in that the company on that day, by refusing to be further bound by the contract, effected a material and sweeping change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs' employment. They further concluded that the lockout was one which under our statute, required the payment of unemployment benefits to the employees who had been locked out and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to unemployment benefits for the period in question. They made no finding that the terms of continued employment imposed by the company were such that the employees could not reasonably have been expected to accept them and that the unemployment which resulted was, therefore, in actuality involuntary on the part of the employees. It appears that the commissioners' conclusion was based on the premise that a lockout, as that term is used in our statute, exists whenever an employer seeks to impose upon his employees as a condition of future employment any material and substantial change which deprives the employees of some advantage they theretofore possessed and the employees leave their work rather than accept that change.

The statute which controls the decision in this case is General Statutes, § 7508. The provisions of that section which are germane are printed in the footnote. 1 The gist of those provisions is that an employee shall be ineligible for unemployment benefits during any week in which his unemployment is due to the existence of a labor dispute in which he is a participant as defined in the statute, except that he shall not be disqualified from receiving benefits if his unemployment is due to a lockout 'unless the lockout results from demands of the employees, as distinguished from an effort on the part of the employer to deprive employees of some advantage they already possess'.

Most of the unemployment compensation laws adopted in the various states deny, like ours, benefits when the unemployment or stoppage of work is the result of a labor dispute. This is because it is the purpose of the law to tide persons over periods of their involuntary unemployment but not to provide support for them when they are on strike. Baldassaris v. Egan, 135 Conn. 695, 701, 68 A.2d 120; Homer Langhlin China Co. v. Hix, 128 W.Va. 613, 625, 37 S.E.2d 649. Accordingly, under the statutes generally, it makes no difference what the merits of the labor dispute are. If the unemployment is the result of a labor dispute, the employees are disqualified for benefits, whether it is the employer or the employees who are at fault. It is not competent for the commissioners or the courts to decide that the employees are not at fault and for that reason award benefits. Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 333, 20 S.E.2d 865. Benefits are not to be allowed in the nature of a penalty against the employer for making unreasonable demands upon his employees. As a matter of fact, the allowance of benefits does not penalize the employer except indirectly by having a bearing on his merit rating. They are paid out of a fund accumulated at the expense of the consuming public. That fund should be disbursed only in strict accord with the terms of the law pursuant to which it is accumulated.

The original Unemployment Compensation Act passed in this state in 1936, in the section relating to disqualification for benefits when the unemployment was caused by a labor dispute, made no exception in cases of lockout. General Statutes, Sup. 1937, § 808d(b)(3). The present provisions on the subject of lockouts were inserted by the General Assembly in 1941. General Statutes, Sup. 1941, § 718f(b)(3). Incidentally, there are, so far as search discloses, only six other states, Arkansas, Kentucky, Minnesota,...

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