Johnson v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 08 May 1942
• Docket Number: 15406.
• Parties: JOHNSON et al. v. PRATT et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

20 S.E.2d 865

200 S.C. 315

JOHNSON et al. v. PRATT et al.

No. 15406.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 8, 1942

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Thomas H. Pope, Jr., W. M. Capers, Robert G. Horine, and Elliott McLain, Wardlaw & Elliott, all of Columbia, for appellants.

John W. Crews, of Columbia, and Isadore Katz and David Jaffe, both of New York City, for respondents.

BONHAM Chief Justice.

This case comes before the Court under the provisions of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law, enacted by the General Assembly of this State and approved on the 6th day of June, 1936 (Acts, S. C., 1936, 39 St. at Large, page 1716), as amended by the General Assembly by an Act approved on the 30th day of June, 1939 (Acts, S. C., 1939, 41 St. at Large, page 487), with particular reference to Section 5(d) (1) and (2). We quote from the Act of 1939 at pages 490 and 492:

"Section 5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits: ***

"(d) For any week with respect to which the commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is directly due to a labor dispute in active progress in the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed; Provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that:

"(1) He is not participating in or financing, or directly interested in such labor dispute; and

"(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before he became unemployed by reason of such dispute, there were members employed at the premises at which the dispute exists, any of whom are participating in or directly interested in such dispute.

"Provided, Further, That if in any case separate branches of work, which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises, are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall for the purpose of this subsection be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment or other premises."

Section 6(i) of the Act of 1939 (page 495), provides for review by the Courts of decisions of the Act as to the payment of benefits to unemployed individuals, and the case comes to this Court under the provisions on this subsection.

The respondents, group test claimants representing employees of the Pacific Mills, Hampton Division, Columbia, South Carolina, other than employees of the Capital City plant and doffers of the Hampton Division brought this action against the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission and Pacific Mills, Hampton Division. The object of the action was to determine whether the Commission erred in denying unemployment compensation benefits to the employees in question for a period of unemployment beginning on or about September 16, 1940. Claims filed therefor were disallowed as to these employees by the Commission in its initial determination, dated November 9, 1940, because they were found to be unemployed directly because of an active labor dispute on the premises where they were employed in which members of a grade or class of employees to whom they belonged were participating and directly interested. The initial determination was appealed to the appeal tribunal by the claimants. The Commission in its appellate capacity removed the appeal unto itself. Subsequently arguments of counsel for the claimants and for the company were heard. The company contended that the initial determination was erroneous only as to the employees of the Capital City plant. Thereafter, the Commission's decision was issued, in and by which the initial determination was affirmed in all respects.

On or about the 20th day of December, 1940, the claimants filed a petition for a judicial review of that part of the decision of the Commission denying unemployment compensation benefits to the employees of the Olympia, Granby, and Richland Plants. The claimants, in appealing to the Court of Common Pleas, took issue with the decision of the Commission and denied, first, that their unemployment was directly due to a labor dispute in active progress in each of the plants where they work, and denied, second, that they belonged to a grade or class of workers members of which participated in or were directly interested in such labor dispute. The claimants further alleged that in some thirteen particulars the Commission erred in its findings of fact upon the evidence, and that it erred in not properly defining, interpreting, and applying the pertinent sections of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law, which sections we have already quoted in this opinion.

The Commission duly filed its answer, and, as required by law, certified to and filed with the Court all documents, papers, and testimony taken in the action.

The Commission, by its answer, denied the thirteen allegations of error contained in the complaint. For a second defense, the Commission alleged that it had found, as a matter of fact, that claimants were not entitled to benefits under the foregoing provisions of the Act; that it had found, as a matter of fact, that a labor dispute was in existence in each of the three mills at which claimants and the workers whom they represent were employed; that it had found, as a matter of fact, that claimants and the workers whom they represent were unemployed as a direct result of such labor dispute; and that the plaintiffs and the workers whom they represent had failed to show to the satisfaction of the Commission that they were not members of a grade or class of workers members of which were employed at the premises at which the dispute existed and who were participating in or directly interested in such labor dispute. For a third defense, the Commission alleged that all findings of fact by the Commission were supported by the evidence, and that such findings of fact were conclusive; and that the defendants had properly interpreted the pertinent provisions of the Act, and that the claimants were not entitled to benefits thereunder.

The case came on for hearing before the Honorable William H. Grimball, Presiding Judge, on May 5, 1941, at which time arguments of counsel were heard. By his decree, dated June 27, 1941, his Honor ordered that the final determination of the Commission be set aside, and that the Commission pay to the claimants, and those whom they represent, unemployment compensation benefits. From this decree the defendants, in due time, gave notice of intention to appeal, and the case comes before this Court on their twelve exceptions, which resolve themselves, in our opinion, and in the statements of "questions involved" in the briefs of all parties herein, into three questions for our determination:

"1. Was the finding by the Commission that a labor dispute existed at the Hampton Division, Pacific Mills, Columbia, South Carolina, a finding of fact by the Commission that could not be disturbed by the Court on appeal?

"2. Was there a labor dispute existing within the meaning of Section 5(d) of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act at the Hampton Division, Pacific Mills, Columbia, South Carolina, and were the claimants and those whom they represent unemployed directly as a result thereof?

"3. Did the claimants and those whom they represent belong to a grade or class of workers of which there were members employed at the premises at which the dispute existed any of whom participated in or were directly interested in said dispute?"

It is uncontradicted that the Pacific Mills has a division known as the Hampton Division, in Columbia, South Carolina; that this operation consists of four plants, namely, Olympia, Granby Richland, and Capital City, employing more than two thousand workers; that prior to Monday, September 16, 1940, the Pacific Manufacturing Company rearranged the work load in the above named four plants, which rearrangement was to take effect on Monday, September 16, 1940; that the change had the effect of increasing the work load of a majority of the processing employees in the four plants; that the management, prior to the effective date, discussed this rearrangement with the shop committee and representatives of the Textile Workers Union of America, the collective bargaining agent for the employees; that Local Number 254 of the Textile Workers Union of America held a special meeting on Sunday, September 15, 1940, discussed the new work load, and voted to try it, with the understanding that the division of conciliation of the United States Department of Labor would have present, as soon as possible thereafter, a technical expert to observe the work load requirements; that following the meeting of the Union on Sunday, September 15, 1940, the doffers held a meeting and decided not to abide by the vote of the majority at the union meeting, and not to report for work on the next morning; that on the following day, the spinning doffers did not report for work on the first, second and third shifts at the Olympia plant, nor did the spinning doffers at the Richland plant report for work on any of the three shifts; that the battery fillers at the Richland plant walked out of the weave room on Tuesday, September 17, at nine o'clock in the morning, these workers being employed on the first shift; that the second and third shift battery fillers did not report for work at the Richland plant on September 17; that at the Granby plant, the fly frame hands on the second shift, who had worked on Monday, walked out of the plant on Tuesday afternoon, September 17; that the fly frame hands on the third shift did not report for work on Tuesday, and neither did the fly frame hands on the first shift report for work on Wednesday, September 18. At the Granby plant, the bobbin cleaning hand did not report for work on the second and...