Almeida v. Lucey

• Decision Date: 15 March 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 73-4189-T.
• Citation: 372 F. Supp. 109
• Parties: Arthur M. ALMEIDA, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. David J. LUCEY, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

372 F. Supp. 109

Arthur M. ALMEIDA, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. David J. LUCEY, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 73-4189-T.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Argued February 21, 1974.

Decided March 15, 1974.

Robert W. Hagopian, Wrentham, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Christopher H. Worthington, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, and CAFFREY and TAURO, District Judges.

OPINION

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge.

This action was brought under 42 U. S.C. § 1983 praying for an injunction barring the defendant Registrar of Motor Vehicles from enforcing the provisions of M.G.L. c. 90, § 24. Pursuant to plaintiff's request and the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2284, a three-judge court has been convened, and a hearing held on plaintiff's prayer for a preliminary injunction and on defendant's motion to dismiss. Also before the court is plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. As we are of the opinion that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, F.R.Civ.P. 12(b), we allow the defendant's motion to dismiss, having already denied the plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. We do not reach the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff's material allegations are as follows: He is a Massachusetts resident. He sues for others similarly situated. He was charged on November 21, 1973, in the District Court of Western Norfolk, Wrentham, Massachusetts, with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor,¹ an offense carrying a possible maximum sentence of two years imprisonment and "automatic one-year suspension of one's driver's license."² He moved the court for a jury trial, but was turned down. The Commonwealth put in its evidence, but plaintiff remained silent and presented no evidence. He was convicted and fined, and "appealed" for a trial de novo by jury pursuant to M.G.L. c. 278, § 18. Plaintiff further alleges that he is an indigent who depends upon his license for his livelihood and that its loss will cause him great damage and irreparable injury.

Plaintiff lists two alternative constitutional claims: (1) that suspension by the Registrar under the statute constitutes an unconstitutional penalty on the right to trial by jury because of the Massachusetts two-tier trial de novo system; and (2) the procedure violates due process by depriving plaintiff of his license to drive, a valuable property right, without a hearing prior to suspension.³

To discuss plaintiff's first point it is necessary to examine what plaintiff refers to as the two-tier Massachusetts court system. See generally K. B. Smith, 30 Massachusetts Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure (1970). In Massachusetts, a criminal defendant not charged with a major crime is first tried in a district or municipal court. The prosecution is initiated by a sworn complaint which is served upon the accused. In motor vehicle causes a defendant, upon timely motion, is entitled to a "show cause" hearing before issuance of any process based on the complaint. M.G.L. c. 90C, § 1. There is no jury and there is no regularly assigned court reporter; however, the defendant is entitled to a reporter at his own expense. M.G.L. c. 221, § 91B. Otherwise the proceeding is a full criminal trial, presided over and determined by a member of the judiciary. The defendant is afforded all the rights customarily associated with a criminal court proceeding, such as the right to remain silent, to be represented by counsel, to subpoena witnesses, and to confront and cross examine his accusers. The burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is on the Commonwealth. If the defendant is convicted, he may "appeal" to the Superior Court where he will be afforded a de novo jury trial. M.G.L. c. 278, §§ 2, 18. In Massachusetts, such a de novo jury trial may be obtained even on offenses which do not carry the penalty of imprisonment and might, in some jurisdictions, be considered so minor as not to require a jury trial. See Commonwealth v. Hesser, Mass.App., 307 N.E.2d 10 (1974).

Plaintiff's counsel contends that the Massachusetts two-tier system violates the federal constitution, citing Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n. 30, 181-182, n. 21, 194, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 522 (1968). He further argues that by tying the license removal to the allegedly improper "first" trial, a defendant is placed in an impossible position: to save his license he must give up his right to remain silent or, at least, not participate fully in the district court proceeding.

We think it by no means clear that the Massachusetts two-tier system is unconstitutional. Callan v. Wilson, supra, considered only a two-tier arrangement in the federal system. Its implications, if any, for the judiciary of a state are unclear. Cf. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, 114, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has in the past sustained the present system's constitutionality. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 341 (1857); Mann v. Commonwealth, 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 1027, 271 N.E.2d 331 (1971). Counsel advises us that the question will be presented once more to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in April.

However, we need not pass on the point, even assuming that principles of comity would allow us to do so at this time. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1970).⁴

Even if the Massachusetts court structure violates the Sixth Amendment, plaintiff may not obtain injunctive relief against the defendant Registrar. The question before us is simply whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state to revoke a driver's license after the driver —in a proceeding such as that furnished in the District Court of Western Norfolk —was found to have been driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The answer is plainly yes. Driving under the influence constitutes reasonable cause for revocation of a license. For a determination adequate to support revoking a license, a non-jury district court proceeding provides all the necessary elements of due process. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1973). A jury trial is not required. A license is, of course, a valuable right which cannot be revoked without cause and procedural fairness. But plaintiff does not contend that proof of driving while intoxicated is not a sufficient cause to revoke a driving license, nor does plaintiff contend that a license may not be administratively revoked for cause prior to exhaustion of criminal remedies nor without a jury trial. Due process, insofar as it applies to the revocation of a license, simply requires reasonable notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing before an impartial decision-maker. That and more is afforded by the Massachusetts district court proceeding. The possible invalidity of the two-tier system because of its alleged interference with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial has nothing whatever to do with the adequacy of the district court proceeding as a predicate for revocation of a driver's license. See Marston v. Oliver, 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973).

Our brother TAURO is of the opinion that a Registry administrative hearing would be preferable to a judicial hearing, even though the latter, because of the presumption of innocence and heavier burden of proof would seem to be more favorable to a defendant than a civil proceeding. While reasonable policy arguments may be advanced for one or the other, we are aware of nothing in the Constitution requiring the Massachusetts legislature to select one procedure in preference to the other. Plaintiff does not allege that his trial was unfairly conducted, that his procedural rights were ignored, or, indeed, that he was innocent of the charge. Both plaintiff and the dissenting member concede that a license may be revoked after a preliminary administrative hearing upon a finding of intoxication; we are unable to see what constitutionally significant opportunities such a hearing would afford which are presently denied. Nor are we able to find anything inherently unreasonable or arbitrary in the Registrar's reliance upon findings made by an independent body such as a court. Cf. Moran v. Bench, 353 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1965) (Aldrich, Chief Judge).

Plaintiff argues that tying the license revocation to the district court trial forces his hand at the trial, compelling him to disclose his defense in advance of his jury trial. This, he says, lessens the value of his Sixth Amendment right. However, the same result would occur if the Registry held a separate administrative hearing on the question of revocation. If the motorist failed to defend, he would in all probability lose his license. The Constitution does not guarantee the right to retain a license until all criminal charges stemming fron the use or abuse thereof have gone to a jury.

The Motion to Dismiss is allowed.

TAURO, District Judge (dissenting).

Plaintiff's complaint specifically challenges the constitutionality of Massachusetts two-tier trial de novo system. Alternatively, plaintiff asserts that the automatic revocation of a driver's license following "conviction" in the district court and pending "appeal" in the Superior Court is violative of due process.

In allowing defendant's motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), the majority has determined that plaintiff's complaint is clearly without any merit. 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.08, at 2271. I disagree and therefore must dissent.

For the reasons set out below, I would stay this case pending a forthcoming decision of the Supreme Judicial Court with respect to the...