Almeida v. PLASTERS'LOC. 40 PENSION FUND

• Decision Date: 12 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-515-Appeal.,97-515-Appeal.
• Parties: Jose ALMEIDA v. PLASTERS' AND CEMENT MASONS' LOCAL 40 PENSION FUND.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

722 A.2d 257

Jose ALMEIDA v. PLASTERS' AND CEMENT MASONS' LOCAL 40 PENSION FUND.

No. 97-515-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

November 12, 1998.

Bruce D. Sawyer, Lincoln, for plaintiff.

Joseph Avanzato, Craig J. Coffey, Providence, for defendant.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This appeal challenges a Superior Court decision to enter a judgment dismissing a complaint without prejudice to the plaintiffs later refiling of the action, after he has exhausted whatever administrative remedies he may have. The defendant, Plasterers' and Cement Masons' Local 40 (union) Pension Fund (fund), appeals from a summary judgment dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff, Jose Almeida (Almeida), without prejudice.¹ The motion justice granted the fund's summary-judgment motion because Almeida failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. After ordering both parties to show cause why we should not decide this appeal summarily, we conclude that no cause has been shown and affirm the judgment below.

In 1994, Almeida inquired about his entitlement to pension benefits as a participating member of the union's pension plan. In a written response, the fund's manager explained that Almeida had not yet earned enough credits to qualify for a pension. The manager enclosed a copy of the summary-plan description, which contained information about the application and appeal process. In 1995, Almeida submitted a formal application to the fund for an early retirement pension, but the fund's board of trustees (board) denied his request. The board's 1996 determination letter set forth specific reasons for the denial, but the letter itself did not inform Almeida how he could appeal the board's decision.

Although the pension plan affords unsuccessful applicants sixty days to file an administrative appeal from an adverse determination, Almeida did not seek further review of the board's decision.² Instead, in 1996, plaintiff filed a Superior Court complaint against the fund seeking payment of his pension benefits. The defendant responded by filing a motion for summary judgment claiming that Almeida had failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies and therefore was precluded from seeking relief in Superior Court.

After several hearings, a motion justice granted defendant's motion on the sole ground that Almeida failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the plan. The court did not address whether Almeida was entitled to receive any pension benefits or whether any administrative remedies still, in fact, were available to Almeida. Accordingly, the motion justice dismissed the complaint without prejudice, thereby allowing plaintiff the opportunity to file a new action after attempting to exercise and exhaust whatever administrative remedies still may be open to him. The only issue presented on the fund's appeal from this judgment is whether the motion justice erred when he dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice rather than with prejudice.

A lower court's "decision to dismiss a case with or without prejudice is reviewed on appeal pursuant to an abuse of discretion and manifest error standard." Richardson v. O'Neal, 716 So.2d 26, 28-29 (La.Ct.App. 1998); Pope v. Ransdell, 251 Kan. 112, 833 P.2d 965, 971 (Kan.1992); see also Commonwealth v. Connelly, 418 Mass. 37, 634 N.E.2d 103, 104 (Mass.1994)

. Upon review, the decision of a trial justice made in the exercise of his or her "discretionary power should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been improperly exercised or that there has been an abuse thereof." Avarista v. Aloisio, 672 A.2d 887, 891 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Tate v. Schwartz, 511 A.2d 971, 974 (R.I.1986)). Applying this deferential standard to the facts and circumstances of the case at bar, we conclude that the motion justice did not abuse his discretion in dismissing plaintiffs complaint without prejudice.

The general rule is that a plaintiff first must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of an administrative decision. See Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 117 (R.I.1992)

; Chase v. Mousseau, 448 A.2d 1221, 1224 (R.I.1982); Jacob v. Burke, 110 R.I. 661, 673, 296 A.2d 456, 463 (1972); see also Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 846 F.2d 821, 825-26 (1st Cir.1988) (requiring claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing ERISA action to recover benefits in federal court). When a plaintiff has failed to do so, the trial court, in its discretion, may dismiss the plaintiffs claims with or without prejudice, depending upon the circumstances. See Chase, 448 A.2d at 1224; Jacob, 110 R.I. at 674,

296 A.2d at 463. When, as here, it is still possible for a plaintiff to seek administrative relief for the claims he or she is making, dismissal without prejudice is favored.

Requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies (1) "aids judicial review by allowing the parties and the agency to develop the facts of the case, and (2) `it promotes judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition of administrative and judicial factfinding, perhaps avoiding the necessity of any judicial involvement.'" Burns, 617 A.2d at 117 (quoting Schwartz, Administrative Law § 8.33 at 542 (1991)). Although we have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement—for example, when an appeal to an administrative review board would be futile or would destroy the effectiveness of the relief sought, see Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police Department, 639 A.2d 1379, 1382-83 (R.I.1994)

—such exceptions do not appear to apply here. See M.B.T. Construction Corp. v. Edwards, 528 A.2d 336, 337-38 (R.I.1...