Almeida v. U.S. Rubber Co.

• Decision Date: 04 August 1954
• Docket Number: No. 2255,2255
• Parties: ALMEIDA v. UNITED STATES RUBBER CO. Eq.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 330

107 A.2d 330

82 R.I. 264

ALMEIDA v. UNITED STATES RUBBER CO.

Eq. No. 2255.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 4, 1954.

Michaelson & Stanzler, Julius C. Michaelson, Providence, for petitioner.

Ambrose W. Carroll, Providence, for respondent.

FLYNN, Chief Justice.

This is an original petition for ordinary and specific workmen's compensation and for medical expenses under general laws 1938, chapter 300. After an extensive hearing in the superior court a decree was entered denying and dismissing the petition on the ground that the employee's personal injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The case is before us on his appeal from that decree.

In general it appears that prior to April 1951 petitioner was employed as a 'floorman' in the lead press department of respondent's manufacturing plant; that, in accordance with the provisions of a collective bargaining contract between respondent and a labor union, petitioner then requested and was transferred to the position of 'vulcanizer helper'; that the duties of a vulcanizer helper were entirely different from and did not include the operation of a lead stripping machine, which was under another department; and that petitioner knew and understood at all times that the operation of a lead stripping machine was not within the scope or course of his regular employment as a vulcanizer helper and was not connected with or referable to such employment or the conditions under which it was required to be performed. Despite this knowledge, on March 5, 1952 when working on a night shift he took it upon himself to go to the other department where he started a lead stripping machine which was then idle and unattended. While he was operating the machine a leaded cable broke and in attempting to fix it his fingers were caught and injured, requiring amputation of two phalanges of his left index finger.

At the time when petitioner started this machine and during his operation of it the regular operator was not present, as he had gone to another room to smoke. The latter never requested petitioner to start it and did not know, until after the accident, that he had been operating it. Likewise none of the supervisors or foremen were present. The petitioner had never requested from anybody permission to operate the machine, and nobody in authority had expressly requested, ordered, or permitted him to operate it. He admitted he was operating the machine solely for his own purpose to obtain experience in the hope of ultimately improving his ability to earn more pay as a machine operator.

In addition to these undisputed facts, further testimony by and for petitioner was introduced in an effort to establish that he and other named employees, who were not machine operators, had previously operated such machines many times; that respondent had notice thereof and through at least one supervisor had acquiesced in such practice or course of conduct; and the petitioner had never been expressly ordered not to operate such machine, although he recognized it was not included within the duties of or conditions incident or referable to his employment as a vulcanizer helper. On the other hand, respondent summoned every available employee who had been named, as well as its foremen and supervisors, to refute the inference or claim that there was such conduct by vulcanizer helpers or acquiescence therein by the employer. Such a practice, according to respondent, would have violated the terms of the collective bargaining contract with the union.

Under his reasons of appeal petitioner's principal contention is that the words 'arising out of and in the course of his employment' should be given a liberal construction because the statute is remedial; that the evidence is uncontradicted and the legal effect thereof requires as a matter of law the conclusion that petitioner's injury comes within such a liberal construction; and that certain cases in this state and some in other jurisdictions justify such contention and application.

We do not agree with this fundamental contention. The controlling issue here is whether petitioner has established that he sustained a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, connected therewith and referable thereto. G.L.1938, chapter 300, art. I, § 1, as amended by P.L.1949, chapter 2282, § 1. In determining this question it is true that a liberal interpretation of the provisions of the statute should be given to effectuate its particular purposes. Condon v. First National Stores, Inc., 65 R.I. 129, 13 A.2d 684. But that does not mean that by construction we should completely nullify a clearly-expressed basic provision of the workmen's compensation act. A petitioner, as here, still has the burden of establishing that he suffered a personal injury 'arising out of and in the course of his employment, connected therewith and referable thereto.'

The test to be applied in determining whether petitioner suffered such an injury has been stated in several cases. In Di Libero v. Middlesex Construction Co., 63 R.I. 509, 517, 9 A.2d 848, 851, we adopted the test that an injury which occurs in the course of the employment may be said to arise out of the employment when such injury is the result 'of a risk involved in the employment or incident to it or to the conditions under which it is required to be performed.' That test was expressly reaffirmed in Nowicki v. Byrne, 73 R.I. 89, 92, 54 A.2d 7, 9, where this court also pointed out: 'But in every case there must be apparent some causal connection between the injury and the employment or the conditions under which it is required to be performed, before the injury can be found to arise out of the employment.'

This interpretation is not only in conformity with the weight of pertinent authority but also has been consistently applied by this court to the particular facts appearing in other cases. See Corry v. Commissioner...