Buffi v. Ferri

• Decision Date: 12 December 1969
• Docket Number: No. 628-M,628-M
• Parties: , 35 A.L.R.3d 852 Angela BUFFI v. John G. FERRI. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 847

259 A.2d 847

106 R.I. 349, 35 A.L.R.3d 852

Angela BUFFI v. John G. FERRI.

No. 628-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 12, 1969.

Reargument Denied Feb. 12, 1970.

Herbert F. DeSimone, Atty. Gen., Charles G. Edwards, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights

Milton Stanzler, Philip Weinstein, Richard W. Zacks, Providence, for amicus curiae, Rhode Island Affiliate of American Civil Liberties Union.

H. Seymour Wiley, Providence, for amicus curiae, Equal Opportunities Group, Chandler W. Johnson, John R. Kellam, Frederick M. Clark, Jr., Rev. E. McKinnon White.

Vincent A. Ragosta, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

Angela Buffi complained to the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (then known as the Commission Against Discrimination) that her landlord had evicted her because she was associating with a Negro. The landlord denied the charge. The Commission believed the complainant, decided that her rights under the Fair Housing Practices Act (G.L.1956, chap. 37 of title 34) had been violated, and issued a cease and desist order. The landlord appealed, and the Superior Court reversed, holding that the eviction of a tenant because of association with a Negro was not proscribed by the Act. We granted the Commission leave to file a petition for certiorari, and requested the parties to argue, inter alia, the question of standing. R.I., 248 A.2d 784. We find that the Commission had standing and that the landlord did not violate the Act.

Review of Superior Court judgments in matters of this kind is regulated by the pertinent section of the Administrative Procedures Act. (G.L. 1956, § 42-35-16, as amended by P.L.1966, chap. 213, sec. 1). It provides that a party in interest, if aggrieved by a final Superior Court judgment, may petition this Court for a writ of certiorari to review questions of law. Under this statute, as well as under others providing for a judicial review of administrative agency determinations, '* * * aggrievement results when the order, decision, or decree adversely affects in a substantial manner some personal or property right of the party or imposes upon it some burden or obligation.' New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Fascio, R.I., 254 A.2d 758 at 761-762. This interpretation of what constitutes 'aggrievement,' like most rules of general application, has its exceptions. One permits an agency itself to seek review, even though not technically aggrieved, if the public has an interest in the issue which reaches out beyond that of the immediate parties. Board of Police Com'rs of City of Warwick v. Reynolds, 86 R.I. 172, 178, 133 A.2d 737, 741; Tedford v. Reynolds, 87 R.I. 335, 341, 141 A.2d 264, 267; DeCesare v. Board of Elections, R.I., 242 A.2d 421, 426. (Joslin and Kelleher, JJ., dissenting)

In this case, quite clearly no personal or property right of the Commission has been adversely affected, nor has any burden or obligation been imposed upon it. Just as clear, however, is the public's vital concern that no person be denied housing accommodations because of his race or color, or because of his religion or country of ancestral origin. This public interest in the removal of the hateful barriers of discriminatory practices based upon race, color, religion or ancestry is substantial and very real; it transcends and reaches out beyond the interest of the individuals involved. In order to protect that interest the Commission, representing the people and acting for the general public, acquired standing to seek review of a Superior Court judgment which otherwise might have gone unreviewed.

Turning from the procedural to the substantive issue, we make clear initially that we do not condone the landlord's conduct. To discriminate against a person because of the race or color of those with whom he associates is, in our judgment, no less racism and no less despicable than is discrimination against a person because of his race or color. Both are evils which any fair and decent sense of morality rejects. Our concern, however, is not with conduct which we consider reprehensible, but with scrutinizing the work of the legislature in order to ascertain whether the practice complained of in this case is prohibited, and whether the Act makes relief available to one who has been denied housing accommodations because of association with a black.

Civil rights legislation is purposed upon obliterating 'the effect of a distressing chapter of our history.' Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 315, 85 S.Ct. 384, 390, 13 L.Ed.2d 300, 307. Undoubtedly this consideration, at least in part, motivated the enactment of this State's fair housing legislation whose general purpose is '* * * to assure to all individuals regardless of race, or color, religion or country of ancestral origin equal opportunity to live in decent, safe, sanitary and healthful accommodations anywhere within the State * * *.' ( § 34-37-1.) In furtherance of that purpose the Act designates certain housing practices as unlawful. Among them is the one which the parties agree is relevant here. It provides that:

'No owner, lessee, sublessee, assignee, manging agent, or other person having the right to sell, rent, lease, or manage a housing accommodation * * * shall refuse to sell, rent, lease, let or otherwise deny to or withhold from any individual such housing accommodation because of the race or color, religion or country of ancestral origin of such individual * * *.' (emphasis supplied) ( § 34-37-4.)

There is no question about the literal meaning of the language. It is precise, plain and clear. In unambiguous terms it makes the race, color, religion or ancestry of a tenant or purchaser the test of a violation and it says that housing accommodations shall not be denied to or withheld from any individual because of his race color, religion or country of ancestral origin.

That literal reading presumptively...