Almli v. Updegraff
| Decision Date | 04 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,CA-CIV,2 |
| Citation | 447 P.2d 586,8 Ariz.App. 494 |
| Parties | George ALMLI and May Olive Almli, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Edgar R. UPDEGRAFF, Appellee. 509. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Manuel H. Garcia, Tucson, for appellants.
Spaid, Fish, Briney & Duffield, by Richard C. Briney, Tucson, for appellee. KRUCKER, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Pima County granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.
Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant, a physician, alleging that defendant negligently and incorrectly diagnosed her condition, and that the defendant negligently failed to use the care ordinarily used by doctors in his treatment of plaintiff.
Shortly before the trial, defendant moved for summary judgment, and the matter was submitted to the trial court on the depositions of four physicians, including the defendant, who were acquainted with the plaintiff's medical problem. Both parties have relied on these depositions as being dispositive of the matter, and have not indicated in any manner that all possible evidence was not before the court. The trial court, having taken the matter under advisement, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
In an appeal from the granting of summary judgment, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion therefor. Peterson v. Valley National Bank, 90 Ariz. 361, 368 P.2d 317 (1962). Taking this view of the record, the granting of a motion for summary judgment is proper only in case the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Biondo v. General Motors Corp., 5 Ariz.App. 286, 425 P.2d 856 (1967).
The record shows that plaintiff was suffering from severe abdominal pain, and that she contacted defendant for treatment. X-rays were taken, and it was determined that plaintiff's right kidney had dropped and that her ureter had a kink. After a consultation with two other doctors, defendant determined that by raising the kidney and securing it in its normal position the kink in the ureter would be removed. This operation was performed, and in his deposition defendant testified that as part of this operation the upper one/half of the ureter was freed from the surrounding blood vessels and tissue which might have contributed to the obstruction. Defendant testified that in this operation he found the ureter to be unusually relaxed, and that it was his opinion that the raising of the kidney would remove the kink and the obstruction in the ureter. An x-ray taken approximately two weeks after the operation showed that the kink was still present, but defendant attributed this to the fact that improvement in such cases is not usually noted such a short time after surgery.
Following the surgery, plaintiff continued to experience pain in her abdominal area, and she contacted a second physician, Dr. Shultz, for treatment. It was determined by Dr. Shultz that the original kink in the upper ureter was still present. Five months after the operation performed by the defendant, Dr. Shultz operated on the lower portion of plaintiff's ureter, removing somem minor constrictions, but this second operation did not appear to affect the kink in the upper portion of the ureter. In this operation Dr. Shultz did not observe the area in which the defendant had operated, and he assumed that the defendant, in raising the kidney, had cleared all obstructions to the upper portion of the ureter. Plaintiff received some relief after the second operation, but the discomfort returned.
Some fourteen months after the defendant had first operated on plaintiff, a third operation was performed on her by Dr. Shultz in the area involving the upper portion of the ureter. At this time it was...
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Faris v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.
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...that a layman can recognize it." Faris, 501 P.3d at 445 (citing Kleinman v. Armour, 470 P.2d 703 (Ariz. App. 1970); Almli v. Updegraff, 447 P.2d 586 (Ariz. App. 1969); and see also Annot. 81 A.L.R.2d 597, § 2 and § 3, Necessity of Expert Evidence to Support an Action for Malpractice against......
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