Alt v. Groff

• Decision Date: 19 June 1896
• Parties: ALT v GROFF ET AL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

65 Minn. 191

68 N.W. 9

ALTvGROFF ET AL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 19, 1896.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. A minor is not estopped to set up his infancy as a defense to a mortgage by the fact that at the time of its execution he represented that he was of age. Conrad v. Lane, 4 N. W. 695, 26 Minn. 389, followed.

2. Held, also, that upon the evidence the court was justified, within the rule of Johnson v. Insurance Co., 57 N. W. 934,59 N. W. 992, and 56 Minn. 365, in declaring the mortgage void.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Charles B. Elliott, Judge.

Action by Joseph Alt against John Groff and others. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, John Groff appeals. Affirmed.

Armstrong Taylor, for appellant.

Simon Meyers, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

The complaint is in the ordinary form in the statutory action to determineadverse claims to real estate. In his answer the defendant asserts as his claim to the property a lien under a mortgage executed by the plaintiff. The reply admits the execution of the mortgage, but alleges that it was without consideration; also that plaintiff was a minor when he executed the mortgage, and that for that reason it was void. The point is made by the defendant that this was not the proper form of action; that plaintiff ought to have alleged in his complaint the facts which he has alleged in his reply, and asked that the mortgage be adjudged void. This is not in accordance with the decisions of this court. The object of an action under the statute to determine an adverse claim to real estate was stated in Walton v. Perkins, 28 Minn. 413, 10 N. W. 424, to be to force one claiming an adverse claim or lien to establish or abandon his claim; that with respect to the claim of the defendant the position of the parties is the reverse of that occupied by the parties to an ordinary action; that the defendant becomes practically plaintiff, and takes the affirmative in pleading and proof, while the plaintiff becomes practically the defendant, and defends against the claim. And in Walton v. Perkins, 33 Minn. 357, 23 N. W. 527, it was held that any interest in or lien upon land may be determined in such an action. This is in accordance with all the decisions of this court, as well as the uniform practice in this state from the earliest date. State v. Bachelder, 5 Minn. 223 (Gil. 178); Barber v. Evans, 27 Minn. 92, 6 N. W. 445;School Dist. No. 73 v. Wrabeck, 31 Minn. 77, 16 N. W. 493;Donohue v. Ladd, 31 Minn. 244, 17 N. W. 381;Bausman v. Faue, 45 Minn. 412, 48 N. W. 13;Stuart v. Lowry, 49 Minn. 91, 51 N. W. 662;Scofield v. Quinn, 54 Minn. 9, 55 N. W. 745. On the trial the contest centered entirely on the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to have the mortgage adjudged void on the ground of his minority at the time of its execution. The evidence was ample to justify the findings that he was a minor when he executed the mortgage, and that he seasonably disaffirmed it after he attained his majority. The material facts bearing on the other questions in the case were as follows: Plaintiff owned a small farm of 25 acres, which he had inherited from his mother. The farm was occupied and cultivated by his father, and not by the plaintiff, although he lived on it with his father. In 1892 the plaintiff, who was a dealer in horses, sold a span of horses to the father on credit, and as security for the purchase money took from him a chattel mortgage for $120 on the horses and what few farming implements he had, consisting of an old wagon, an old buggy, some harness, and an old harvester. In 1893, after this mortgage fell due, the defendant, having “camped” in the neighborhood with some horses which he was taking north, sent word to the father, requesting payment. The father having failed to pay, the defendant sent the sheriff to take the property on the mortgage. This being resisted by both father and son, the defendant brought an action in replevin, and took possession of the mortgaged property. Thereupon both father and son came to town to see the defendant about a settlement of the matter. The parties disagree in their testimony as to whether they came in of their own accord or at the instance of an employé of the defendant, named Carpenter, sent out by him for that purpose. The plaintiff and his father came in on July 26th, and by the 28th the following result was reached: Defendant retained all the mortgaged property already in his possession (apparently of no great value), discharged the debt against the father, sold and delivered to plaintiff a span of mares, and obtained from him a mortgage on plaintiff's 25 acres for $500, payable in three years, with 8 per cent. interest, and entered into an agreement with plaintiff that he (plaintiff) was to take care of and raise for one year a pair of sucking colts that were with the mares, and that at the end of the year each party should own an undivided half of them, and that whichever took them should pay the other $150. The plaintiff immediately sold both mares and colts to one Brady for $2 cash and his note for $398, payable in a year. It conclusively appears that Brady was wholly irresponsible, and that plaintiff had never seen or heard of him before. It will be seen that the upshot of the whole matter was that when plaintiff came in on the 26th he owned his farm of 25 acres and owed nothing, and that by the 28th he had a mortgage for $500 on his land, and besides that owned defendant $150 on account of the colts, and had nothing to show for all this indebtedness except a worthless note against Brady for $398. It clearly appears from the record that plaintiff, although approaching the age of 20...