Altamirano v. Industrial Commission, 1
Decision Date | 07 November 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 1,CA-IC,1 |
Citation | 22 Ariz.App. 379,527 P.2d 1096 |
Parties | David F. ALTAMIRANO, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Magma Copper Company, Superior Division, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier. 1097. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
The petitioner, David Altamirano, instituted this action by Writ of Certiorari challenging an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona which granted his 1972 Petition to Reopen for New, Additional, or Previously Undiscovered Disability (A.R.S. § 23--1061(H)), after which a hearing was held to determine the amount of benefits payable to Altamirano for temporary partial disability suffered between May 18, 1972, and January 31, 1973. (The original accident upon which the Petition to Reopen was based occurred in 1966.) In computing the amount of benefits to which Altamirano was entitled for the period of temporary partial disability, the Industrial Commission did not allow for the effects of inflation and changes in industry-wide wage levels between 1966 and 1972. The result of this method of computation was to deny petitioner any recovery because the dollar amount of his wages in 1972, even though he was partially disabled, was a higher amount because of inflation than he had been earning at the time of his injury in 1966, and thus the Industrial Commission concluded Altamirano had suffered no diminished earning capacity. Altamirano presented testimony establishing that the wages in the job he was able to hold while temporarily partially disabled were now much higher than they had been for a job of that classification at the time he was first injured in 1966:
Prior-to-Injury Post-Injury Job Job 1966 $3.29 hr. $2.50-$2.87 hr ---- (would have paid) 1972 $4.69 hr. $4.00-$4.25 hr ----
(he in fact earned)
The sole issue before this court is whether petitioner's recovery was properly computed, or whether recovery should have been based on real wages, with the effects of inflation and changes in industry-wide wage levels removed from the computation.
Section 23--1044(A), A.R.S., sets forth the formula by which the amount of recovery for a temporary partial disability is computed. Section 23--1044(C), A.R.S., sets forth a somewhat comparable formula for the computation of recovery for a permanent partial disability. Subsection C has received a judicial construction which petitioner herein urges this court now to give Subsection A. We agree that a similar construction for the two sections should obtain, and therefore set aside the award.
The purpose of industrial compensation is to compensate an employee for lost earning capacity. Maness v. Industrial Commission, 102 Ariz. 557, 434 P.2d 643 (1967), Whyte v. Industrial Commission, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230 (1951). For example, if an employee's earning capacity is reduced by 50 per cent, and the amount of his post-injury wage is fixed as of the time immediately following injury, before wage levels generally have risen, his recovery will be based on the full 50 per cent loss of capacity. But if the post-injury wage is given several years to rise, and that higher wage is used as his post-injury wage, then his amount of recovery will be reduced, despite the fact that his percentage earning capacity was nonetheless reduced by 50 per cent. 1
All the reasons stated in Whyte v. Industrial Commission, supra, and Arizona Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 16 Ariz.App. 274, 492 P.2d 1212 (1972) to support removal of inflationary factors from computation of recoveries for permanent partial disabilities apply equally to temporary partial cases.
The Arizona Supreme Court stated in Whyte v. Industrial Commission, supra:
71 Ariz. at 344, 227 P.2d at 233.
This language was quoted with approval in Arizona Public Service v. Industrial Commission, supra.
The court, in Whyte, supra, went on to say:
71 Ariz. at 345, 227 P.2d at 234.
The language in Whyte, supra, upon which the hearing officer relied, and upon which respondents base their argument that inflationary factors cannot be removed from temporary partial recoveries, is the following:
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