Altman v. Blake

• Decision Date: 25 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. C-5143,C-5143
• Citation: 712 S.W.2d 117
• Parties: Hazel ALTMAN et al., Petitioners, v. W.R. BLAKE, III et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 117

712 S.W.2d 117

Hazel ALTMAN et al., Petitioners, v. W.R. BLAKE, III et al., Respondents.

No. C-5143.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 25, 1986.

Huffaker, Green and Huffaker, Gerald Huffaker, Tahoka, for petitioners.

Carr, Evans, Fouts & Hunt, Donald M. Hunt, Lubbock, for respondents.

KILGARLIN, Justice.

Hazel Altman, Duncan B. Clark, and Ellen Dixon Clark present this court with one issue: whether a mineral interest conveyed in a deed by W.R. Blake, Jr. to his father is a one-sixteenth royalty interest or a one-sixteenth interest in the mineral fee. In a suit filed by Altman and the Clarks against the heirs of W.R. Blake, Sr., both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court construed the deed to convey a one-sixteenth non-participating royalty interest to Blake, Sr., and rendered judgment for his heirs. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court judgment. 703 S.W.2d 420. Finding that the deed conveyed to Blake, Sr. a one-sixteenth interest in the mineral fee, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

W.R. Blake, Jr. was the owner of the surface and the unsevered mineral estate of a 348-acre tract of land in Hockley County, Texas. On May 30, 1938, Blake, Jr. executed a mineral deed to his father, W.R. Blake, Sr. The granting clause of that lease provided:

W.R. Blake, Jr. ... does hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey, transfer, assign and deliver unto W.R. Blake, Sr., of Lubbock, Texas, hereinafter called Grantee (whether one or more) an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described land situated in Hockley County, State of Texas, to wit:

All of that certain tract or parcel of land being all of Labors 15 and 16, League 2, Jones County School Land, Hockley County, Texas.

But does not participate in any rentals or leases, containing 348 acres, more or less, together with the rights of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, operating and developing said lands for oil, gas and other minerals, and storing, handling, transporting and marketing the same therefrom, with the right to remove from said land all of Grantee's property and improvements.

On January 14, 1939, Blake, Jr. executed a warranty deed conveying the 348-acre tract to D.A. Clark. The warranty deed described the property conveyed as:

All that certain tract or parcel of land being all of Labors 15 and 16, League 2, Jones County School Land, Hockley County, Texas, consisting of 348 acres, more or less, save and except one-sixteenth ( 1/16) of the minerals, non-participating, which has previously been sold.

The 348-acre Hockley County tract of land is now under an oil and gas lease, and a producing well has been completed. The oil and gas lease reserves to the lessors a one-eighth royalty. At issue in this case is the apportionment of that royalty between the Blake, Sr. heirs and the Clark heirs.

The heirs of D.A. Clark: Altman, Duncan Clark, and Ellen Clark, filed suit against the heirs of W.R. Blake, Sr.: W.R. Blake, III and Jacqueline Blake Beatty, to determine the interest conveyed to Blake, Sr. under the 1938 deed. The Clark heirs alleged that Blake, Sr. received a one-sixteenth ownership interest in the severed mineral estate and was therefore entitled to one-sixteenth of the one-eighth reserved royalty. The Blake heirs contended Blake, Sr. received a one-sixteenth royalty interest under the deed and therefore was entitled to a one-sixteenth royalty, or one-half of the one-eighth reserved royalty.

Neither the Clark nor the Blake heirs assert that the 1938 Blake deed is ambiguous. The construction of the deed is thus a question of law for the court. Ulbricht v. Friedsam, 159 Tex. 607, 325 S.W.2d 669 (1959). The primary duty of the courts in interpreting a deed is to ascertain the intent of the parties. But it is the intent of the parties as expressed within the four corners of the instrument which controls. Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.1984); Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.1982). In seeking to ascertain the intention of the parties, the court must attempt to harmonize all parts of a deed, since the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement. Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d at 872.

The 1938 Blake deed first conveys "an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) interest in and to all the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from" the 348-acre tract in Hockley County. The deed then purports to limit the interest conveyed, stating that the grantee "does not participate in any rentals or leases." Finally, the deed conveys to the grantee "the rights of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring and developing said lands."

Obviously had the inserted language denying the grantee the rights to make leases and to receive delay rentals not been included in the deed, no one would dispute that the instrument conveyed only an undivided one-sixteenth interest in the mineral fee. The Blake heirs argue that precisely because this limiting language was included, the deed conveyed a royalty interest. They contend that the effect of the inserted language was to strip the estate first granted of its characteristics as a mineral fee and to leave only royalty.

There are five essential attributes of a severed mineral estate: (1) the right to develop (the right of ingress and egress), (2) the right to lease (the executive right), (3) the right to receive bonus payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals, (5) the right to receive royalty payments. R. Hemmingway, Law of Oil and Gas §§ 2.1-2.5 (...