Alverson v. Albany Cnty.
| Decision Date | 20 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | 530759 |
| Parties | In the Matter of James H. ALVERSON, Petitioner, v. ALBANY COUNTY et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 () to review a determination of respondent Albany County Sheriff denying petitioner benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–c.
Petitioner, a deputy sheriff with respondent Albany County Sheriff's Office, was in a work-related motor vehicle accident in June 2011 and, while on leave for his injuries, received benefits under General Municipal Law § 207–c. On May 1, 2017, respondent Albany County received a work abilities checklist from William Montgomery, an orthopedic surgeon, indicating that petitioner was capable of returning to work in a modified work position. As a result, the Sheriff's Office notified petitioner that it was terminating his General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits on May 2, 2017 and offered petitioner a light-duty assignment. Petitioner declined the offer and, as provided for in the governing collective bargaining agreement, requested a hearing.
Following a hearing, at which the "stipulated issue" was whether Albany County had properly terminated petitioner's General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits on May 2, 2017, a Hearing Officer issued a report and recommendation finding that petitioner's benefits had been improperly terminated and recommending that they be reinstated retroactively. Without any explanation or factual findings, respondent Albany County Sheriff rejected the Hearing Officer's report and recommendation. Petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to, among other things, annul the determination. The matter was transferred to this Court, and we found that the Sheriff's "failure to make any findings or otherwise specify any basis for" his determinations deprived us of the ability to conduct meaningful judicial review ( Matter of Alverson v. Albany County, 173 A.D.3d 1415, 1416, 105 N.Y.S.3d 566 [2019] ). Consequently, we annulled the determination and remitted the matter to the Sheriff "to address the procedural issues and develop appropriate factual findings" ( id. ).
Upon remittal, the Sheriff found that petitioner was capable of performing light-duty work and that petitioner's benefits had been properly terminated in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the Sheriff's determination. After respondents answered, Supreme Court transferred the matter to this Court (see CPLR 7804[g] ).
"Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing at which evidence is taken pursuant to direction of law is limited to a consideration of whether that determination was supported by substantial evidence upon the whole record" ( Matter of Campo v. City of Mount Vernon, 156 A.D.3d 694, 694, 67 N.Y.S.3d 277 [2017] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Chase v. County of Albany, 127 A.D.3d 1446, 1447, 7 N.Y.S.3d 666 [2015] ). "Substantial evidence consists of ‘such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact’ " ( Matter of Garvey v. Sullivan, 129 A.D.3d 1078, 1082, 13 N.Y.S.3d 159 [2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 916, 2016 WL 116377[2016], quoting 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 [1978] ). "[W]here the medical evidence [is] in conflict, it [is] for the administrative agency to choose between the conflicting opinions, and the courts are not free to reject the choice made by the administrative agency where room for choice exists" ( Matter of Redmond v. Town of Haverstraw, 174 A.D.3d 719, 720, 107 N.Y.S.3d 42 [2019] ; see Matter of Barkor v. City of Buffalo, 148 A.D.3d 1655, 1656, 51 N.Y.S.3d 743 [2017] ).
Here, conflicting medical evidence was presented on the issue of whether petitioner was capable or incapable of performing light-duty work. Evidence from Jose David, petitioner's primary care physician, supported the conclusion that petitioner's work-related injuries rendered him wholly incapable of returning to work in any capacity. Paul Walter, a physician assistant working under David, testified that petitioner would be capable of performing the specific tasks that he would be assigned as part of his light-duty assignment only if petitioner were permitted to take his prescribed pain medications. In contrast, the testimony and independent medical examination report of Steven Weinstein, as well as the work abilities checklist completed by Montgomery, supported the conclusion that petitioner was capable of returning to work in a modified or light-duty capacity.1 The Sheriff expressly credited the work abilities checklist completed by Montgomery and the medical opinion given by Weinstein over the medical evidence presented by petitioner and, based upon that credibility determination, found that petitioner was capable of returning to work in a light-duty capacity. Inasmuch as the Sheriff's resolution of the conflicting medical evidence was rational, fact-based and supported by the record, substantial evidence supports the determination to terminate petitioner's benefits under General Municipal Law § 207–c, notwithstanding the existence of evidence that could support a contrary conclusion (see Matter of Redmond v. Town of Haverstraw, 174 A.D.3d at 720, 107 N.Y.S.3d 42 ; Matter of Mankowski v. Nassau County, 160 A.D.3d 739, 742, 76 N.Y.S.3d 58 [2018] ; Matter of Chase v. County of Albany, 127 A.D.3d at 1447, 7 N.Y.S.3d 666 ). Accordingly, we confirm the Sheriff's determination.
As the majority notes, petitioner adduced credible medical evidence – namely, the testimony of his primary care physician and a registered physician assistant – in support of his contention that he was incapable of even light-duty work at the time that respondent Albany County Sheriff terminated his General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits. Because, in my view, the Sheriff's determination is not supported by substantial evidence, I would annul.
The so-called "substantial" evidence upon which the majority relies hangs by two threads, one of which, upon analysis, dissolves into mere gossamer, while the other has no probative value at all. The...
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