Alverson v. Allen
Decision Date | 23 August 2012 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09cv780-TFM |
Parties | RODNEY ALVERSON, AIS #132431, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD ALLEN, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
(WO)
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Rodney Alverson ("Alverson"), a state prisoner, challenges the constitutionality of actions taken against him at the Easterling Correctional Facility ("Easterling"). Alverson names Richard Allen, former Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"); Louis Boyd, Warden III; Carter Davenport, Warden II; Kenneth Sconyers, Jeffery Knox, Phelix Woods, Ibeth Jones, and Marvin Scaife, correctional officers; Kathy Holt, Director of ADOC Central Records; Sherry Seals, Classification Specialist Supervisor; and Tyrone Barrow, Classification Specialist as defendants in this cause of action. Specifically, Alverson asserts the following claims:
Alverson seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages.
The defendants filed a Special Report and relevant supporting evidentiary materials addressing Alverson's claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems it appropriate to construe these reports as a motion for summary judgment. Order of September 30, 2009 - Doc. No. 13. Thus, this case is now pending on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendants. Upon consideration of this motion, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and Alverson's Response to the Motion, the court concludes that the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be denied with respect to the excessive force claim against Officer Knox and granted with respect to the remainingclaims.
"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ( ); FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a) ().1 The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at322-324.
When the moving parties meet their evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)(3) () A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants' properly supported motion for summary judgment, Alverson is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claim(s) for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merelycolorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-250. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) ( ); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) ( ); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc.,814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) ( ).
For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment isproper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 ( ); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 ( ).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of...
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