Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz. v. Ariz. Dep't of Child Safety

• Decision Date: 25 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. CV-20-0030-PR,CV-20-0030-PR
• Citation: 51 Arizona Cases Digest 56,493 P.3d 885
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court
• Parties: AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant.

51 Arizona Cases Digest 56

493 P.3d 885

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant.

No. CV-20-0030-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed August 25, 2021

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Tom Jose (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Mesa, Attorneys for Arizona Department of Child Safety

D. Andrew Gaona (argued), Keith Beauchamp, Roopali H. Desai, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona

Jonathan Riches, Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater Institute, Phoenix; Daniel J. Adelman, Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, Phoenix; Rose Daly-Rooney, Arizona Center for Disability Law, Tucson, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, Goldwater Institute, and Arizona Center for Disability Law

Daniel C. Barr, Karl J. Worsham, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae First Amendment Coalition of Arizona

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICE BOLICK^* joined.^**

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 Under A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B), a trial court may award attorney fees and legal costs to a party seeking public records if the court determines the party has "substantially prevailed" in the litigation. We are asked to determine what constitutes "substantially prevailed." We hold that a party has "substantially prevailed" if it was more successful than not in obtaining records or other relief that was contested by the opposing party before litigation commenced.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona ("ACLU-AZ") sent the first of three public records requests to the Department of Child Safety ("DCS")¹ seeking records about child welfare services. This first request consisted of thirty items with multiple subparts. DCS responded to six of ACLU-AZ's requests by producing documents within three months of the initial request, but then stopped communicating with ACLU-AZ.

¶3 In January 2014, ACLU-AZ submitted a second and third request for public records from DCS. DCS neither acknowledged nor answered these requests.

¶4 After several months of no communication from DCS, ACLU-AZ sent a final demand letter about its outstanding public-records requests. DCS responded by acknowledging the delay and stated it was "actively pursuing a review of the remainder of [ACLU-AZ's] data requests to determine what data can still be produced without creating an undue burden." ACLU-AZ then filed a special action and requested attorney fees and costs. See § 39-121.02(A), (B). Within two months, DCS produced approximately 500 pages of documents responsive to some of the requests ("post-litigation documents") and indicated that it objected to the remaining requests; DCS said the rejected requests were not for existing public records but rather, they required creating new documents using data contained in the Children's Information Library and Data Source ("CHILDS") case management system.

¶5 The trial court rejected ACLU-AZ's request that it compel DCS to create and produce records responsive to the outstanding requests but did not decide if the CHILDS database itself was a public record. Ultimately, the court denied ACLU-AZ's request for attorney fees and costs because it found that ACLU-AZ did not "substantially prevail." ACLU-AZ appealed.

¶6 In American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona v. Department of Child Safety ( ACLU-AZ I ), the court of appeals agreed with DCS that ACLU-AZ's request could not require DCS to "tally and compile information in CHILDS" into new documents and then produce them. 240 Ariz. 142, 151 ¶ 27, 377 P.3d 339, 348 (App. 2016). But the court agreed with ACLU-AZ that the CHILDS database was a public record. Id . at 146 ¶ 8, 377 P.3d at 343. It therefore remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether DCS promptly provided the post-litigation documents stored in CHILDS to ACLU-AZ, and, if not, whether DCS's failure constituted a denial of records as defined under § 39-121.01(E) (if a party does not receive a prompt response to a public record request, "[a]ccess to a public record is deemed denied"). Id . at 153 ¶¶ 36–37, 377 P.3d at 350. The court of appeals also reversed the denial of attorney fees for ACLU-AZ and directed the court to reconsider whether ACLU-AZ substantially prevailed in the case. Id. ¶ 37.

¶7 On remand, ACLU-AZ argued that because the court of appeals found that the electronic records and data maintained by DCS in CHILDS made it a public record, ACLU-AZ substantially prevailed and should be awarded attorney fees and costs. DCS asserted that ACLU-AZ did not substantially prevail because DCS never argued that CHILDS was not a public record, but rather that it was not required to create new documents using that database.

¶8 The trial court agreed with ACLU-AZ and held that the "crux of the case" was whether CHILDS was a public record. The court also determined that DCS failed to promptly furnish post-litigation documents to ACLU-AZ. Because it successfully litigated these two issues, the trial court reasoned that ACLU-AZ "substantially prevailed" as required by § 39-121.02(B). ACLU-AZ was awarded $239,842.21 in attorney fees and costs, and DCS appealed.

¶9 In American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona v. Department of Child Safety ( ACLU-AZ II ), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling regarding DCS's failure to promptly furnish post-litigation documents to ACLU-AZ. 248 Ariz. 26, 29–31 ¶¶ 11–19, 455 P.3d 725, 728–30 (App. 2020). It, however, reversed the trial court on the issue of whether ACLU-AZ had "substantially prevailed," id . at 34–35 ¶¶ 32–34, 455 P.3d at 733–34, finding that the trial court erred by relying on ACLU-AZ I ’s holding that CHILDS is a public record as its basis for determining that ACLU-AZ "substantially prevailed," id . at 32 ¶ 22, 455 P.3d at 731. The court of appeals reasoned that the trial court should have considered the scope of the relief sought and the scope of the documents produced to determine whether ACLU-AZ "substantially prevailed." Id . at 35 ¶ 33, 455 P.3d at 734. The court of appeals remanded to the trial court to determine whether ACLU-AZ should be awarded attorney fees based on the opinion. Id. ¶ 34.

¶10 We accepted review to clarify what a trial court should consider when determining if a party has "substantially prevailed" under § 39-121.02(B), which is a matter of statewide concern. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶11 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Johnson Utils., L.L.C. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 249 Ariz. 215, 219 ¶ 11, 468 P.3d 1176, 1180 (2020). In interpreting a statutory provision, we give words "their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended." Arizona ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd. , 243 Ariz. 539, 541 ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 803, 805 (2018) (quoting State v. Miller , 100 Ariz. 288, 296, 413 P.2d 757 (1966) ). We review a trial court's award or denial of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Democratic Party of Pima Cnty. v. Ford , 228 Ariz. 545, 547 ¶ 6, 269 P.3d 721, 723 (App. 2012). If a plaintiff is found to have substantially prevailed in an action seeking to enforce a public records request, the trial court has broad discretion under § 39-121.02(B) to award or deny attorney fees and costs. Id . at 548 ¶ 9, 269 P.3d at 724. "We will not disturb the trial court's discretionary award of fees if there is any reasonable basis for it." Hale v. Amphitheater Sch. Dist. No. 10 , 192 Ariz. 111, 117 ¶ 20, 961 P.2d 1059, 1065 (App. 1998).

I.

¶12 Section 39-121.02(B) states that "[t]he court may award attorney fees and other legal costs that are reasonably incurred in any action under this article if the person seeking public records has substantially prevailed." ACLU-AZ argues that the court of appeals erred by restricting the trial court's authority to award attorney fees and costs so that a party may only "substantially prevail" based on the records they receive. ACLU-AZ contends that this restrictive interpretation has no basis in the statute's text. We agree.

¶13 In ACLU-AZ II , the court of appeals correctly observed that " ‘[s]ubstantially prevailed’ is not specifically defined in A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B)." 248 Ariz. at 32 ¶ 23, 455 P.3d at 731. In the absence of a statutory definition, courts may reference dictionaries. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris , 234 Ariz. 343, 344 ¶ 9, 322 P.3d 160, 161 (2014).

¶14 The word "substantial" is defined as "[i]mportant, essential, and material; of real worth and importance." Substantial , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). And "prevail" is defined as "[t]o obtain the relief sought in an action." Prevail , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Combining these definitions within the context of § 39-121.02(B), we conclude that a party has "substantially prevailed" if, after a comprehensive examination by the trial court, it was more successful than not in obtaining the requested records, defeating the government's denial of access to public records, or securing other relief concerning issues that were contested before litigation was initiated. See Ocean W. Contractors, Inc. v. Halec Constr. Co., Inc. , 123 Ariz. 470, 473, 600 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1979) ("The fact that a party did not recover the full measure of relief requested does not mean that he is not the successful party."). This is consistent with Ford ’s directive that the term "substantially prevailed" is "broad and flexible so as to provide the court with wide latitude in making its determination." 228 Ariz. at 548 ¶ 9, 269 P.3d at 724.

¶15 In ACLU-AZ II , however, the court of appeals concluded that "the statute's plain language ... tells us that a party may only ...