State v. Harris

• Decision Date: 22 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. CV–13–0056–PR.,CV–13–0056–PR.
• Citation: 322 P.3d 160,234 Ariz. 343
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, ex rel. William G. MONTGOMERY, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner v. The Honorable Myra HARRIS, Commissioner of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Commissioner. Hrach Shilgevorkyan, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

234 Ariz. 343

322 P.3d 160

STATE of Arizona, ex rel. William G. MONTGOMERY, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner

v. The Honorable Myra HARRIS, Commissioner of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Commissioner.Hrach Shilgevorkyan, Real Party in Interest.

No. CV–13–0056–PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

April 22, 2014.

Appeal from the Arcadia Biltmore Justice Court. The Honorable David Fletcher, Judge Pro Tempore. No. TR 2011–100433. AFFIRMED.

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County. The Honorable Myra Harris, Commissioner, No. LC 2011–100433–001. AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One, 232 Ariz. 76, 301 P.3d 580 (2013). VACATED.

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Andrea L. Kever, Deputy County Attorney, Susan L. Luder, Deputy County Attorney (argued), Phoenix, for State of Arizona.

Clark L. Derrick, Rhonda E. Neff, Kimerer & Derrick, P.C., Phoenix; and Michael Alarid, III (argued), Law Offices of David Michael Cantor, P.C., Phoenix, for Hrach Shilgevorkyan.

Stephen Paul Barnard, Law Offices of Stephen Paul Barnard P.C., Tucson; Joe St. Louis, Nesci & St. Louis, PLLC, Tucson; and Lawrence S. Koplow, Ridenour Hienton & Lewis, PLLC, Phoenix, for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice.

Jon Eliason, Mesa City Prosecutor, Molly Lynch, Assistant City Prosecutor, Mesa, for Amicus Curiae Mesa City Prosecutor's Office.

Justice BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Arizona Revised Statutes § 28–1381(A)(3) makes it unlawful for a driver to be in actual physical control of a vehicle if there is “any drug defined in [A.R.S.] § 13–3401 or its metabolite in the person's body.” We are asked to determine whether the phrase “its metabolite” includes Carboxy–Tetrahydrocannabinol (“Carboxy–THC”), a non-impairing metabolite of Cannabis,¹ a proscribed drug listed in § 13–3401. We conclude that it does not.

I.

¶ 2 Police stopped a vehicle driven by Hrach Shilgevorkyan for speeding and making unsafe lane changes. Suspecting that he was impaired, officers administered field sobriety tests. After participating in the tests, Shilgevorkyan admitted that he had smoked some “weed” the night before and voluntarily submitted to a blood test that revealed Carboxy–THC in his blood.

¶ 3 The State charged Shilgevorkyan with two counts of driving under the influence. Count one alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 28–1381(A)(1) (“the (A)(1) charge”), which prohibits a person from driving a vehicle in Arizona “[w]hile under the influence of ... any drug ... if the person is impaired to the slightest degree.” Count two alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 28–1381(A)(3) (“the (A)(3) charge”), which prohibits driving a vehicle “[w]hile there is any drug defined in § 13–3401 or its metabolite in the person's body.”

¶ 4 Shilgevorkyan moved to dismiss the (A)(3) charge, arguing that the blood test revealed neither the presence of THC nor “its metabolite” Hydroxy–Tetrahydrocannabinol (“Hydroxy–THC”). At an evidentiary hearing, the State presented expert witness testimony that: (1) marijuana has “many, many metabolites,” (2) Hydroxy–THC and Carboxy–THC are the two major marijuana metabolites, (3) although it is possible to test for Hydroxy–THC in the blood, the Arizona Department of Public Safety chooses not to do so because Hydroxy–THC does not “exist in the blood for very long” and is quickly converted to Carboxy–THC, (4) Carboxy–THC is inactive and does not cause impairment, and (5) Carboxy–THC can remain in a person's body for as many as twenty-eight to thirty days after the ingestion of marijuana.

¶ 5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the justice court dismissed the (A)(3) charge, and the State voluntarily dismissed the (A)(1) charge. The State appealed to the superior court, which affirmed. That court reasoned that the word “metabolite” in § 28–1381(A)(3) is ambiguous because it is unclear whether it should be read as singular or plural. Although the court acknowledged that Carboxy–THC is a marijuana metabolite, it was unconvinced that the legislature intended to include all possible byproducts—particularly those that are inactive and cannot impair the driver.

¶ 6 The State then filed a petition for special action with the court of appeals, which accepted jurisdiction and granted relief. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 232 Ariz. 76, 301 P.3d 580 (App.2013). The court held that “ § 28–1381(A)(3)'s language prohibiting driving with a proscribed drug or ‘its metabolite’ includes the metabolite Carboxy–THC,” id. ¶ 14, based on the reasoning in State v. Hammonds, 192 Ariz. 528, 968 P.2d 601 (App.1998), and State v. Phillips, 178 Ariz. 368, 873 P.2d 706 (App.1994). The court in Hammonds held that the (A)(3) offense was not “irrationally overinclusive,” 192 Ariz. at 530, 968 P.2d at 603, and the court in Phillips determined that it was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, 178 Ariz. at 370, 873 P.2d at 708. The court of appeals noted that although neither case considered the meaning of “metabolite,” they demonstrated that A.R.S. § 28–1381(A)(3) “must be interpreted broadly to appropriately effectuate the legislative purpose and intent underpinning the statutory language.” Montgomery, 232 Ariz. at 79 ¶ 14, 301 P.3d at 583.

¶ 7 We granted review because whether § 28–1381(A)(3) applies to non-impairing metabolites presents a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.

II.

A.

¶ 8 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289 ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to “fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.” Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003). “[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute's construction.” Hansen, 215 Ariz. at 289 ¶ 7, 160 P.3d at 168.

¶ 9 The term “metabolite” is not defined by statute. When statutory terms are undefined, courts may reference dictionaries. State v. Wise, 137 Ariz. 468, 470 n. 3, 671 P.2d 909, 911 n. 3 (1983); see Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 231 Ariz. 379, 384 ¶ 15, 296 P.3d 42, 47 (2013). A standard medical dictionary defines metabolite as “[a]ny product of metabolism.” Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 1349 (20th ed.2005). It defines metabolism in pertinent part, as “the sum of all physical and chemical changes that take place within an organism.” Id. These definitions comport with the State's expert's testimony, which defined “metabolite” as “any chemical compound that is produced during the process of metabolism, the breakdown process of getting rid of a drug or substance.”

¶ 10 Shilgevorkyan argues that the meaning of “its metabolite” in § 28–1381(A)(3) is clear. He asserts that because the statute uses the possessive singular, it prohibits only Hydroxy–THC, the initial product of the metabolism of THC. Labeling Hydroxy–THC the “primary” metabolite, he contends the statute does not include the products of the further breakdown of Hydroxy–THC into subsequent or “secondary” metabolites such as Carboxy–THC. He further argues that interpreting “metabolite” in the plural expands the statutory definition to include a “secondary non-psychoactive metabolite ... [that] does not cause impairment,” which is inconsistent with the legislature's intent to criminalize driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance. The State, on the other hand, argues we should construe “metabolite” in the plural in accordance with A.R.S. § 1–214(B), which generally provides that statutory “[w]ords in the singular ... include the plural....”

¶ 11 There is more than one plausible meaning for the phrase “its metabolite,” whether read as singular or plural. The argument that “its metabolite,” although phrased in the singular, includes all of a proscribed drug's byproducts is reasonable based on § 1–214(B). Conversely, the argument that the statutory language reflects the legislature's intent to only penalize drivers with primary or impairment-causing metabolites in their system is equally reasonable. Additionally, even if read in the plural, “metabolites” could reasonably mean multiple primary metabolites for drugs having more than one rather than both primary and secondary metabolites.

¶ 12 Because the term “its metabolite” is reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations, the statute is ambiguous and we cannot determine from the term alone whether the legislature intended to penalize the presence of any byproduct, including Carboxy–THC, in a driver's blood. See Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Com'n v. Brain, CV–13–0341–PR, 234 Ariz. 322, 325 ¶ 13, 322 P.3d 139, 2014 WL 1307659, at *4 ¶ 13 (Ariz. Apr. 2, 2014); see also Joshua C. Snow, The Unconstitutional Prosecution of Controlled Substance Metabolites Under Utah Code § 41–6A–517, 2013 Utah L.Rev. OnLaw 195, 198 (2013) (“Although [per se DUI] statutes are purportedly designed to make prosecution simpler and more effective by removing the necessity to prove impairment or quantifiable levels of drugs in the system, the statutes are rife with ambiguity and complexity, which weaken their legitimacy and validity.”). Accordingly, we look to secondary rules of statutory construction to determine § 28–1381(A)(3)'s meaning.

B.

¶ 13 Statutes should be construed sensibly to avoid reaching an absurd conclusion. Mendelsohn v. Super. Ct. in and for Maricopa Cnty., 76 Ariz. 163, 169, 261 P.2d 983, 987–88 (1953). When a statute's meaning cannot be discerned from its language alone, “we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statute as a whole, and consider ‘the statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.’ ” Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496,...