Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for the Cnty. of L.A.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. B229687.,B229687. |
| Citation | 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 91,199 Cal.App.4th 1367,2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15366 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Respondent; Jin Hyeong Lee, Real Party in Interest. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mayer Brown, Donald M. Falk, Palo Alto; Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Anthony E. Sonnett and Sharon E. Sonnett, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
McCune Wright, Redlands; Richard D. McCune, Kristy M. Arevalo; Law Offices of Choi & Associates, Edward W. Choi; Diversity Law Group, Daniel H. Chang, Larry W. Lee; Panish Shea & Boyle, Los Angeles, and Brian J. Panish for Real Party in Interest.
In this mandate proceeding, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., (Honda) challenges the trial court's order certifying a class of individuals who purchased or leased Acura cars with a defective third gear. Because the trial court relied upon an erroneous legal assumption when it made its ruling and there is insufficient community of interest here to sustain the class that was certified, we conclude the trial court's certification order was an abuse of discretion, for which mandate is an appropriate remedy.
Plaintiff Jin Hyeong Lee bought a new Acura RSX with a six-speed manual transmission on October 13, 2006. The car came with a standard manufacturer's four-year, 50,000 mile warranty, which certified that “Acura will repair or replace any part that is defective in material or workmanship under normal use.” Lee began to experience problems with the transmission within the warranty period when the car would “pop out” of third gear while it was running. Lee took the car to be serviced on this issue four times within 15 months, but was told by Honda technicians that the car was operating as designed and that there was no nonconformity or defect.
In January 2007, Honda issued a service update to its dealers:
Honda also issued a technical service bulletin (TSB) on April 19, 2008. The TSB addressed the following symptoms: “transmission grinds when shifting into 3rd gear, pops out of 3rd gear, or is hard to shift into 3rd gear.” The TSB applied to certain 2002 to 2008 Acura models with manual transmissions. 1 The TSB noted that these symptoms can be “intermittent and sometimes more noticeable in colder climates.” The “probable cause” of the issue could be attributed to a “faulty 3rd gear synchronizer or 3–4 shift sleeve.” The TSB advised Honda technicians to However, “[i]t is not uncommon for there to be some resistance or notchiness when shifting into third gear.”
Lee brought suit against Honda on January 8, 2008, and, in a second amended complaint filed February 9, 2009, converted his individual action to a class action alleging a violation of the Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act under Civil Code section 1790, a breach of warranty under Civil Code sections 1791.2 and 1794, a breach of warranty under Commercial Code section 2103, and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200(UCL). On October 1, 2009, Lee sought to certify a class of “[a]ll individuals in California who purchased or leased [the 2002 to 2008 Acura models described in the TSB], who have not had the re-designed third gear set installed.” The trial court granted Lee's motion on October 27, 2010. Honda filed this petition for writ of mandate on December 27, 2010, and sought an immediate stay of the entire case pending determination of the writ proceedings. We stayed the proceedings below and directed the parties to file opposition and reply briefs.
We first consider whether mandate is an appropriate remedy in this case. ( Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 381, 387, fn. 4, 134 Cal.Rptr. 393, 556 P.2d 755.) Lee contends it is not because Honda may move to decertify at any time or file an appeal after judgment. Moreover, Honda will not suffer irreparable harm if its petition is denied. We disagree.
“Generally, a writ [of mandate] will lie when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy; the respondent has a duty to perform; and the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance.” ( Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 925, 132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565.) It is the petitioner's burden to establish there is no adequate alternative remedy or irreparable harm will result if the petition is denied. ( Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1274, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66.) Contrary to Lee's assertions, we find Honda has no adequate alternative remedy and would suffer irreparable harm if its petition were denied. As discussed below, the trial court relied on an incorrect statement of breach of warranty law. If we delayed review until final judgment, Lee would be relieved from proving an essential element of his breach of warranty claim on behalf of 19,000 class members. The parties and the court, not only Honda, would be irreparably harmed as a result.
Our analysis begins with a review of the requirements to certify a class action. Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes a class action when “the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.” The burden is on the moving party to establish both an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among the class members. ( Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 913, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 320, 15 P.3d 1071.) “The community of interest requirement [for class certification] embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” ( Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23.) As the Supreme Court has previously explained, this means “each member must not be required to individually litigate numerous and substantial questions to determine his [or her] right to recover following the class judgment; and the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, must be sufficiently numerous and substantial to make the class action advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.” ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701.) In order to determine whether common questions predominate, the trial court must examine the issues framed by the pleadings and the law applicable to the causes of action alleged. ( Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 810–811, 94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964.)
“Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying certification.” ( Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179, 2 P.3d 27.) Nevertheless, “we must examine the trial court's reasons for [granting] class certification.” ( Id. at p. 436, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179, 2 P.3d 27; see also Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 914, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 320, 15 P.3d 1071.) In particular, we must consider whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding, as a certification ruling not supported by substantial evidence cannot stand. ( Linder, supra, at pp. 435–436, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179, 2 P.3d 27; see also Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23.) A certification order may also be reversed if it is based on improper criteria or erroneous legal assumptions. ( Linder, supra, at p. 435, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179, 2 P.3d 27.) The certification question is “essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is legally or factually meritorious.” ( Id. at pp. 439–440, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179, 2 P.3d 27.)
The trial court relied almost exclusively on a Ninth Circuit opinion, Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC (9th Cir.2010) 617 F.3d 1168( Wolin ), when it granted Lee's motion for certification. In Wolin, the plaintiffs sued Land Rover for an alleged alignment geometry defect that caused tires to wear prematurely in Land Rover's LR3 vehicles. Land Rover issued a technical service bulletin indicating that the tires on certain vehicles may wear prematurely due to the vehicles' steering alignment geometry. ( Id. at pp. 1170–1171.) The plaintiffs sought to certify two classes of LR3 owners, one in Michigan and one in Florida. They alleged claims for breach of warranty under the Michigan Consumer...
To continue reading
Request your trial