Amalgamated Transit Union v. Toledo Area Reg'l Transit Auth.

Decision Date11 December 2020
Docket NumberNo. L-19-1197,L-19-1197
Citation164 N.E.3d 569
Parties AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 697, Appellee v. TOLEDO AREA REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Joseph S. Pass, for appellee.

Joseph C. Devine and Ryan A. Cates, Columbus, for appellant.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

OSOWIK, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in favor of appellee after a bench trial. For the reasons set forth below, this court reverses the judgment of the trial court.

{¶ 2} This is the ninth year of litigation of this matter and the third appeal to emanate from that litigation. On November 14, 2011, plaintiff-appellee Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 697 ("ATU") filed an "Application/Petition to Compel Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement" against defendant-appellant Toledo Area Regional Transit Authority ("TARTA") after the 2009 collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the parties expired, and they could not agree on a successor CBA. In the first appeal, this court reversed the trial court's order dismissing ATU's petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 697 v. Toledo Area Regional Transit Auth. , 2013-Ohio-4412, 2 N.E.3d 289 (6th Dist.). In the second appeal, this court vacated the trial court's July 31, 2017 bench trial judgment granting ATU's petition and remanded for separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 697 v. Toledo Area Regional Transit Auth. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1217, 2018-Ohio-2867, 2018 WL 3492777. This third appeal responds to the trial court's August 9, 2019 journalized "Opinion and Judgment Entry on Remand Bench Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," again granting ATU's petition.1

{¶ 3} TARTA timely filed this notice of appeal setting forth three assignments of error.

I. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting judgment in favor of ATU and ordering the parties to binding interest arbitration over the terms and conditions of a successor, public-sector collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), because the parties did not agree to submit the terms and conditions of a successor CBA to binding interest arbitration.
II. The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that Ohio courts favor binding interest arbitration to resolve an impasse in negotiations for a successor, public-sector CBA between a public employer and a union.
III. The trial court erred because its August 8, 2019 Opinion and Judgment Entry is contrary to the law of the case and against the manifest weight of the evidence.
I. Ohio Arbitration Public Policy

{¶ 4} We will address TARTA's second assignment of error first.

{¶ 5} TARTA argues for its second assignment of error that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that Ohio courts favor binding interest arbitration, rather than fact-finding, to resolve an impasse for a successor, public-sector CBA. TARTA further argues Ohio's public policy stated in R.C. 4117.14 favors fact-finding for an impasse for a successor CBA between a public employer and a non-safety forces union. One exception is where there is a clear and unambiguous mutually agreed upon dispute settlement procedure (a "MAD"), and TARTA argues the limited-purpose protective arrangements agreement under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended ("UMTA"), sometimes called a "Section 13(c) Agreement," is not a MAD.

{¶ 6} In response, ATU argues its petition to compel arbitration against TARTA was brought pursuant to R.C. 2711.03. ATU argues R.C. 2711.01(A) is clear that when the parties agree to settle a controversy between them by arbitration, that agreement is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." ATU argues the Section 13(c) Agreement with TARTA is a valid, irrevocable and enforceable agreement to arbitrate the impasse between the parties for a successor, public-sector CBA.

{¶ 7} "R.C. Chapter 2711 is Ohio's Arbitration Act [enacted in 1953]. The act predates enactment [in 1984] of the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act (R.C. Chapter 4117)." Toledo Police Command Officers' Assn. v. Toledo , 2014-Ohio-4119, 20 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.). According to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio Arbitration Act tracks the language of the Federal Arbitration Act, enacted in 1925, in expressing a strong public policy favoring arbitration. Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. , 130 Ohio St.3d 411, 2011-Ohio-5262, 958 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 18. However, such public policy favoring arbitration is not absolute because parties are not required to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so. Id. at ¶ 19. "Accordingly, when deciding motions to compel arbitration, the proper focus is whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the issue, i.e., the scope of the arbitration clause, not the general policies of the arbitration statutes." Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶ 8} In its August 9, 2019 journalized judgment entry, the trial court stated it was "guided by the prevalent legal principle in Ohio that courts favor arbitration," citing to four state court cases from Ohio, but none involved an expired CBA between a public employer and an exclusive representative and their impasse to negotiating a successor CBA pursuant to R.C. 4117.14.

A. R.C. 2711.01 and 4117.14

{¶ 9} We next review the state statutes raised by the parties in this appeal. "A question of statutory construction presents an issue of law that we determine de novo on appeal." Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 134 Ohio St.3d 296, 2012-Ohio-5366, 982 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 12.

{¶ 10} R.C. 2711.01(A) states:

A provision in any written contract, except as provided in division (B) of this section, to settle by arbitration a controversy that subsequently arises out of the contract, or out of the refusal to perform the whole or any part of the contract, or any agreement in writing between two or more persons to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit, or arising after the agreement to submit, from a relationship then existing between them or that they simultaneously create, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

{¶ 11} It is undisputed that the exceptions found in R.C. 2711.01(B) do not apply in this matter.

{¶ 12} The MAD authorization referenced by the parties is found at R.C. 4117.14(C), and the relevant portions of R.C. 4117.14, for context, state:

(A) The procedures contained in this section govern the settlement of disputes between an exclusive representative and a public employer concerning the * * * negotiation of a successor agreement * * *.
* * *
(C) In the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement, they may submit, at any time prior to forty-five days before the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement, the issues in dispute to any mutually agreed upon dispute settlement procedure which supersedes the procedures contained in this section.
(1) The procedures may include:
(a) Conventional arbitration of all unsettled issues;
(b) Arbitration confined to a choice between the last offer of each party to the agreement as a single package;
(c) Arbitration confined to a choice of the last offer of each party to the agreement on each issue submitted;
(d) The procedures described in division (C)(1)(a), (b), or (c) of this section and including among the choices for the arbitrator, the recommendations of the fact finder, if there are recommendations, either as a single package or on each issue submitted;
(e) Settlement by a citizens' conciliation council composed of three residents within the jurisdiction of the public employer. * * *.
(f) Any other dispute settlement procedure mutually agreed to by the parties.
(2) If, fifty days before the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties are unable to reach an agreement, any party may request the state employment relations board to intervene. * * * If an impasse exists or forty-five days before the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement if one exists, the board shall appoint a mediator to assist the parties in the collective bargaining process.
(3) Any time after the appointment of a mediator, either party may request the appointment of a fact-finding panel. * * *.
(4) The following guidelines apply to fact-finding: * * *.
(5) The fact-finding panel, acting by a majority of its members, shall transmit its findings of fact and recommendations on the unresolved issues to the public employer and employee organization involved and to the board no later than fourteen days after the appointment of the fact-finding panel, unless the parties mutually agree to an extension. The parties shall share the cost of the fact-finding panel in a manner agreed to by the parties.
(6)(a) * * * if neither rejects the recommendations, the recommendations shall be deemed agreed upon as the final resolution of the issues submitted and a collective bargaining agreement shall be executed between the parties, including the fact-finding panel's recommendations, except as otherwise modified by the parties by mutual agreement. If either the legislative body or the public employee organization rejects the recommendations, the board shall publicize the findings of fact and recommendations of the fact-finding panel. The board shall adopt rules governing the procedures and methods for public employees to vote on the recommendations of the fact-finding panel.
* * *
(E) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the parties, at any time, from voluntarily agreeing to submit any or all of the issues in dispute to any other alternative dispute settlement procedure. An agreement or statutory requirement to arbitrate or to settle a dispute pursuant to a final
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