Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs.

• Decision Date: 21 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011–1740.,2011–1740.
• Citation: 982 N.E.2d 636,134 Ohio St.3d 296
• Parties: LANG et al., Appellees, v. DIR., OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

134 Ohio St.3d 296

982 N.E.2d 636

LANG et al., Appellees,

v.DIR., OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellant.

No. 2011–1740.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 5, 2012.

Decided Nov. 21, 2012.

Jason E. Dawicke, Columbus; and Kenneth J. Kowalski, Employment Law Clinic, Cleveland–Marshall College of Law, for appellees.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Peter K. Glenn–Applegate, Deputy Solicitor, and Eric A. Baum, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

LANZINGER, J.

[Ohio St.3d 296]{¶ 1} In this case, we must determine whether appellant, Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (“ODJFS”), properly denied applications for federal wage subsidies filed by appellees, three former employees of American Standard who later were reemployed at a lower wage before they reached the age of 50. Because ODJFS offered a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language in the federal statute that established the wage subsidies, we conclude that ODJFS did not improperly deny the applications.

I. Facts

A. Statutory Background

{¶ 2} In 2002, Congress created a program called Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance for Older Workers (“ATAA”), which provided wage supplements for certain unemployed workers who became reemployed at lower wage rates. 19 U.S.C. 2318. As enacted in 2002 and relevant to this case, the statute provided:

A worker in the group that the Secretary has certified as eligible for the alternative trade adjustment assistance program may elect to receive benefits under the alternative trade adjustment assistance program if the worker—

(i) is covered by a certification under subchapter A of this chapter;

[Ohio St.3d 297](ii) obtains reemployment not more than 26 weeks after the date of separation from the adversely affected employment;

(iii) is at least 50 years of age;

(iv) earns not more than $50,000 a year in wages from reemployment;

(v) is employed on a full-time basis as defined by State law in the State in which the worker is employed; and

(vi) does not return to the employment from which the worker was separated.

Trade Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107–210, section 124, 116 Stat. 933, 945, amended byPub.L. No. 108–429, section 2004, 118 Stat. 2434, 2590.

{¶ 3} Ohio has entered into a contract with the United States Department of Labor to facilitate the distribution of ATAA funds in the state. Pursuant to this contract, Ohio has agreed to follow federal statutes, regulations, and program directives in expending the ATAA funds. One directive is Training and Guidance letter (“TEGL”) 2–03, issued by the United States Department of Labor Employmentand Training Administration, which provided interim operating instructions for implementing ATAA. 69 Fed.Reg. 60904. In the portion setting forth eligibility requirements, the letter provides:

To be eligible for ATAA, an individual must meet the following conditions at the time of reemployment:

1. Be at least age 50 at time of reemployment. The individual's age can be verified with a driver's license or other appropriate documentation.

Id. at 60907.

B. The Denial of ATAA Funds to the Applicants

{¶ 4} In December 2007, appellees, James Lang, Mark Laibe, and Teddy Sharp (“the applicants”), were dismissed from their jobs at American Standard. They eventually found new employment and applied for ATAA. Each application was denied by ODJFS because none of the applicants was at least 50 years old at the time of reemployment. The applicants filed requests for redetermination, which were also denied by ODJFS.

{¶ 5} Lang appealed, and the matter was transferred to the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, where a hearing officer reversed the determination and concluded that Lang's application for ATAA should be allowed because 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) does not require that an applicant be at least 50 years old on the date of reemployment. ODJFS requested review of the decision [Ohio St.3d 298]on Lang's application, and the Ohio Unemployment Review Commission reversed the hearing officer's decision and disallowed Lang's claim because he was not 50 years old when he became reemployed.

{¶ 6} Laibe and Sharp also appealed, but a hearing officer affirmed the determinations that the two were ineligible for ATAA. The Ohio Unemployment Review Commission then disallowed Laibe's and Sharp's requests for review of the hearing officer's decisions.

{¶ 7} The three applicants each appealed the commission's decisions denying their ATAA eligibility to the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, which consolidated the cases and reversed the commission's decisions. After recognizing that the statute is ambiguous because it did not address when an applicant must be at least 50 years of age—whether at the time of reemployment or at the time the application was filed—the trial court found that the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission was not compelled to follow TEGL 2–03. The trial court stated that the statute was intended to help workers and that awarding ATAA benefits to the applicants adhered to the clear intent of Congress in passing the act.

{¶ 8} On appeal, ODJFS argued that the trial court had erred by ignoring the United States Department of Labor's interpretation that the statute required those who apply for ATAA to be 50 years old at the time of their reemployment. Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 196 Ohio App.3d 80, 2011-Ohio-4327, 962 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 16. The Third District Court of Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 36. A majority of the court of appeals panel concluded that 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) is unambiguous, reasoning that the language providing that a worker “may elect to receive benefits” if the worker “is at least 50 years of age” indicates that an individual must be at least 50 years old at the time the individual elects to receive ATAA benefits. Id. at ¶ 25. The majority reasoned that the requirement set forth in TEGL 2–03 that the applicant be 50 years old at the time of reemployment is not only unnecessary to carry out the ATAA provisions, but is also manifestly contrary to the language of the statute. Id. at ¶ 28. The dissenting judge concluded that the overall language of the statute compels a conclusion that the statute requires a worker to be 50 years old at the time of reemployment. Id. at ¶ 39–41.

{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to address ODJFS's proposition of law: “An applicant cannot receive an ATAA wage subsidy unless he has reached 50 years of age at the time of reemployment.” See Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 131 Ohio St.3d 1410, 2012-Ohio-136, 959 N.E.2d 1056.

[Ohio St.3d 299]II. Analysis

{¶ 10} ODJFS argues that because of its contractual obligation to the United States Department of Labor, it was obligated to follow TEGL 2–03. ODJFS also argues that the letter reasonably interprets the ambiguity in the age requirement in the federal statute. Because of this ambiguity, the Department of Labor's expertise in the area, and the reasonableness of the Department of Labor's interpretation, ODJFS concludes that we should defer to the Department of Labor's interpretation. The applicants counter that the requirement in TEGL 2–03 that an applicant be 50 years old at the time of reemployment is unlawful and unreasonable and that neither the contractual obligations of ODJFS nor the principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations warrants reversal of the appellate court's decision.

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 11} R.C. 4141.282(H) sets forth the standard of review for a decision made by the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission: “If the court finds that the decision of the commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission. Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the commission.” This limited standard of review applies to all appellate courts. Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18, 482 N.E.2d 587 (1985). “[A] reviewing court may not reverse the commission's decision simply because ‘reasonable minds might reach different conclusions.’ ” Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶ 20, quoting Irvine at 18, 482 N.E.2d 587.

{¶ 12} The parties offer conflicting interpretations of 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B), and thus this case involves a question of statutory interpretation. A question of statutory construction presents an issue of law that we determine de novo on appeal. Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8, citing State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 8. We accordingly review the statute to determine whether its meaning is clear. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If the statute's meaning is unclear, our next task is to determine whether the agency's interpretation is entitled to deference. “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694.[Ohio St.3d 300]B. The Requirement of 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B) that Applicants Be “at least 50 years of age” Is Ambiguous

{¶ 13} The crux of the dispute between ODJFS and the applicants is whether the language of 19 U.S.C. 2318(a)(3)(B), which requires that those who apply for ATAA be at least 50 years of age, is ambiguous. ODJFS argues that the language is ambiguous and that the interpretation...