Amanda Whitfield Herbert Hadley v. Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hartford

Decision Date22 April 1907
Docket NumberNo. 258,258
Citation27 S.Ct. 578,51 L.Ed. 895,205 U.S. 489
PartiesAMANDA S. WHITFIELD and the State of Missouri at the Relation of HERBERT S. HADLEY, Attorney General, Petitioners, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, Connecticut
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

This is a suit upon an accident policy of insurance issued November 3d, 1900, by the AEtna Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, upon the life of James Whitfield, a resident of Missouri. The policy specifies various kinds of injuries; also, the amount that will be paid by the company on account of such injuries respectively It provides: 'If death results solely from such injuries within ninety days, the said company will pay the principal sum of $5,000 to Amanda M. S. Whitfield, his wife, if living; and, in event of the death of said beneficiary before the death of the insured, to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the insured.' The policy recites that it was issued and accepted by the assured, James Whitfield, subject to certain conditions, among which are these: '. . . 5. In event of death, loss of limb or sight, or disability due to injuries inten- tionally inflicted upon the insured by any other person (except assaults committed for the sole purpose of burglary or robbery), whether such other person be sane or insane, or under the influence of intoxicants or not; or due to injuries received while fighting or in a riot; or due to injuries intentionally inflicted upon the insured by himself; or due to suicide, sane or insane; or due to the taking of poison, voluntarily or involuntarily, or the inhaling of any gas or vapor; or due to injuries received while under the influence of intoxicants or narcotics,—then, in all such cases referred to in this paragraph, the limit of this company's liability shall be one tenth the amount otherwise payable under this policy, anything to the contrary in this policy notwithstanding. . . . 8. The maximum liability of the company hereunder in any policy year shall not exceed the principal sum hereby insured, and in no event will claim for weekly indemnity be valid if claim is also made for any of the stated amounts herein provided for specified injuries, based upon the same accident and resulting injuries.'

The insured died April 7th, 1902, the plaintiff, his widow and the beneficiary of the policy, alleging in her petition that he died 'from bodily injuries, effected through external, violent, and accidental means, and by a pistol shot.' The petition also states that the company, after receiving proofs as to the death of the insured, offered to pay $500 as the full amount due by § 5 of the policy, but refused to pay more. The plaintiff asked a judgment for $5,000 with interest from the date of the death of the insured.

The company, in its answer, denied liability for the whole principal sum, and averred, among other things, that, by the terms of the policy, 'in the event death is caused by intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person, whether such person be sane or insane, or while fighting or in a riot, or by suicide, sane or insane, or by poison, or by inhaling gas or vapor, or while under the influence of intoxicants or narcotics, then the amount to be paid shall be one tenth of the principal sum, or $500; . . . that said James Whitfield died from bodily injuries caused by a pistol shot intentionally fired by himself for the purpose thereby of taking his own life; that the cause of the death of said Whitfield was suicide.' It was not averred in the answer that the insured contemplated suicide when applying for a policy.

The plaintiff demurred to the answer. The demurrer was overruled, and the plaintiff filed a reply, admitting that the insured 'died from bodily injuries caused by a pistol shot fired by himself, and the cause of his death was suicide,' but averring that the shot was fired and the suicide committed at a time when the insured was 'incapable of realizing or knowing, and when he did not realize or know, what he was doing or the consequences of his act.'

The case—a jury having been waived in writing—was tried by the court upon an agreed statement of facts, one of which was that the insured died 'from bodily injuries caused by a pistol shot intentionally fired by himself, for the purpose of thereby taking his own life; that the cause of the death of said Whitfield was suicide.'

The circuit court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover $5,000, but only $500, and judgment for the latter amount was entered. 125 Fed. 269. That judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, 75 C. C. A. 358, 144 Fed. 356, and the case is here upon writ of certiorari.

Messrs. Frank Hagerman and Herbert S. Hadley for petitioners.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 491-493 intentionally omitted] Messrs. James C. Jones, J. J. Darlington, Jones, Jones, & Hocker, and Boyle, Guthrie, & Smith for respondent.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

When the policy in suit was issued, and also when the insured committed suicide, it was provided by the statutes of Missouri that 'in all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void.' Mo. Rev. Stat. 1879, § 5982; Id. 1889, § 5855; Id. 1899, § 7896.

Assuming—as upon the record we must do—that, within the true meaning of both the statute and the policy, the insured committed suicide, without having contemplated self-destruction at the time he made application for insurance, the question arises whether the contract of insurance limiting the recovery to one tenth of the principal sum specified was valid and enforceable.

1. That the statute is a legitimate exertion of power by the state cannot be successfully disputed. Indeed, the contrary is not asserted in this case, although it is suggested that the statute 'seemingly encourages suicide, and offers a bounty therefor, payable, not out of the public funds of the state, but out of the funds of insurance companies.' There is some foundation for this suggestion in a former decision of this court, in which it was held that public policy, even in the absence of a prohibitory statute, forbade a recovery upon a life policy, silent as to suicide, where the insured, when in sound mind, wilfully and deliberately took his own life. Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 154, 42 L. ed. 693, 698, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300. But the determination of the present case depends upon other considerations than those involved in the Ritter Case. An insurance company is not bound to make a contract which is attended by the results indicated by the statute in question. If it does business at all in the state, it must do so subject to such valid regulations as the state may choose to adopt. Even if the statute in question could be fairly regarded by the court as inconsistent with public policy or sound morality, it cannot, for that reason alone, be disregarded; for it is the province of the state, by its legislature, to adopt such a policy as it deems best, provided it does not, in so doing, come into conflict with the Constitution of the state or the Constitution of the United States. There is no such conflict here. The legislative will, within the limits stated, must be respected, if all that can be said is that, in the opinion of the court, the statute expressing that will is unwise from the standpoint of the public interests. See Northwestern Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 51 L, ed. 168, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126.

2. Did the courts below err in adjudging that the policy in suit was not forbidden by the statute? Can an insurance company and the insured lawfully stipulate that, in the event of suicide, not contemplated by the insured when applying for a policy, the company shall not be bound to pay the principal sum insured, but only a given part thereof? Will the statute, in ...

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