Amanini v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, N.C. Special Care Center, 927SC500

• Decision Date: 17 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 927SC500,927SC500
• Citation: 114 N.C.App. 668,443 S.E.2d 114
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Armando Louis AMANINI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, N.C. SPECIAL CARE CENTER, Respondent-Appellee.

Page 114

443 S.E.2d 114

114 N.C.App. 668

Armando Louis AMANINI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, N.C. SPECIAL CARE CENTER, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 927SC500.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 17, 1994.

Eastern Carolina Legal Services, Inc. by Wesley Abney, Wilson, for petitioner-appellant.

Atty. Gen. Lacy H. Thornburg by Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen. John R. Corne, Raleigh, for respondent-appellee.

JOHN, Judge.

Petitioner Armando Louis Amanini (petitioner) appeals the superior court's order affirming the decision and order of the State Personnel Commission which upheld his termination from employment with respondent N.C. Special Care Center (the Center).

Relevant background information includes the following: in 1984, respondent Department of Human Resources (DHR) hired petitioner to work as a registered nurse at the Center. The Center is a licensed "skilled" and "intermediate" nursing care facility, with beds accommodating 208 patients, each of whom has mental and physical disabilities and requires around-the-clock care. Petitioner was employed at the Center continuously from 28 July 1984 until 23 March 1989.

The events of the evening of 23 March 1989, ultimately resulting in petitioner's dismissal, are essentially uncontroverted. On that date, petitioner held the position of "lead nurse" or "charge nurse" for the facility's fifth floor during the second shift (3:00 p.m. until 11:30 p.m.). In that capacity, he was responsible for the welfare of forty-seven patients and directly supervised the health care technicians (HCTs) assigned to that floor.

Around 6:00 p.m., petitioner began his allocated thirty-minute meal break. Shortly thereafter, without notifying any other personnel or signing out in the lobby of the building on the sheet for his assigned floor, he went outside the facility to meet his fiancee, Edna Crespo, who was waiting there for him in her automobile. An argument ensued between the two, and petitioner got into the passenger seat of her car to continue the discussion. As the couple drove around the grounds, Crespo accelerated suddenly. At that point, petitioner's hand forcefully struck the passenger side door which consequently swung open. Petitioner fell from the vehicle onto the paved driveway, and Crespo drove away from the scene. Petitioner, later discovered to have suffered vertebral fractures from the fall, then crawled toward a nearby trailer park for assistance. His supervisor Ann Boykin was apprised of his predicament by telephone at about 6:40 p.m. In the interim, a family member of one of the fifth floor patients had come to the facility to speak with the charge nurse on duty. An HCT, unable to locate petitioner, had informed Boykin of his absence.

On 10 April 1989, petitioner was notified of his dismissal from employment by the Center in a letter sent him by Director of Nursing Dale Hilburn. The letter indicated petitioner's dismissal was due to "misconduct, which is a personal conduct issue" arising out of the 23 March incident, primarily: 1) vacating his fifth floor nurses' station without notifying his supervisor or signing out, thereby abandoning his patients and violating Center policy; and 2) departing the grounds.

After his dismissal was upheld by DHR in a letter dated 26 July 1989, petitioner sought a contested case hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings. Following a 23 April 1990 hearing, the administrative law judge assigned to the case issued a decision recommending that petitioner's dismissal be "upheld on the basis of just cause." The full State Personnel Commission adopted in toto the recommended decision of the administrative law judge by order entered 11 February 1991.

Pertinent findings of fact adopted by the Commission are as follows:

9. The Respondent enacted a written policy effective February 1984 concerning meal breaks. The policy states, in part, that "[e]mployees have thirty minutes for meals including travel time" and "employees leaving the facility at meal break shall sign-out and sign-in upon return."

10. The Respondent enacted a written policy effective April 1986 concerning sign in--sign out procedures. The policy states, in part, that "[w]hen leaving the facility, for any reason, each individual will be expected to 'sign out', upon return, the individual is to 'sign in' on the same sheet" and "each employee is to sign in or out on the clipboard sheet provided for each area to which assigned."

....

18. The Petitioner did not sign out of the Respondent facility when he left the building during his meal break to enter Crespo's vehicle.

19. The Petitioner did not inform anyone, including the Respondent's evening supervisor Anne Boykin, that he was leaving the fifth floor of the building.

20. A lead nurse has the responsibility to inform Boykin that he or she is leaving the grounds of the Respondent during a meal break. A lead nurse has the responsibility to inform a health care technician that he or she is leaving the assigned floor.

21. As a lead nurse, the Petitioner had the authority to leave the Respondent's building in order to eat on the picnic grounds without informing Boykin.

....

23. The Petitioner was required to sign in and to sign out whenever he left the Respondent's grounds during his work shift.

24. The Petitioner did not intent [sic] to leave the Respondent's grounds when he entered Crespo's vehicle.

....

35. The Respondent's enacted policies pertaining to meal breaks and to sign in--sign out procedures were generally followed, but not strictly enforced.

....

41. The dismissal letter, signed by Hilburn, stated that the Petitioner's employment was terminated due to personal misconduct. The letter stated that the Petitioner's misconduct consisted of leaving his fifth floor nurses' station without notifying his supervisor or signing out ... and leaving the facility grounds, thereby leaving the fifth floor patients without a licensed nurse for coverage ... and disobeying the signing out policy.

In addition, the order of the administrative law judge contained the following conclusions of law:

3. The Petitioner violated the Respondent's policy governing absence from a floor unit by failing to inform anyone that he, as lead nurse, was leaving his assigned fifth floor area.

4. The Petitioner violated the Respondent's policy governing absence from the facility during the meal break by failing to sign out from the facility upon his departure from the building with Crespo during his dinner meal break.

5. The Petitioner violated the Respondent's policy governing sign in--sign out procedure by failing to sign out on the clipboard sheet for his assigned area upon his departure from the facility with Crespo.

6. The Petitioner did not violate the Respondent's policy governing departure from the Respondent's grounds.... Such an exigent circumstance in leaving the Respondent's grounds does not constitute a violation of the Respondent's policy that a lead nurse must not leave the grounds during a meal break without first informing the supervisor.

....

8. The Petitioner's violations of the Respondent's policies governing absence from a floor unit, absence from the facility and sign in--sign out procedure constitute just cause for the termination of his employment by the Respondent....

Petitioner thereafter sought judicial review pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 150B-45 (1991) and 150B-46 (1991) by means of a petition filed 11 March 1991 in Wilson County Superior Court. Included among his listed exceptions to the final agency decision was the following:

Conclusion of Law No. 8 is also erroneous in that, even if petitioner did violate any policies of respondent, such violations are in the nature of job performance, not personal conduct. Petitioner lacks sufficient prior warnings in his record for one instance of improper job performance to constitute just cause for dismissal, under G.S. 126-35 and the rules and regulations of the Office of State Personnel.

Following a hearing held 12 August 1991 and by order filed 11 February 1992, the superior court affirmed the Commission's decision to terminate petitioner, stating:

[I]t is found and concluded that the Decision and Order for the Full [State Personnel] Commission is supported by substantial evidence in view of the official record as a whole, and that Petitioner was properly dismissed for personal misconduct as provided by G.S. § 126-35.

I.

The North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA), codified at Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, governs trial and appellate court review of administrative agency decisions. Henderson v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 91 N.C.App. 527, 530, 372 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1988). Following the statutory provisions establishing judicial review, see G.S. § 150B-45 ("person seeking review must file a petition in the ... superior court...."), and stating review by the superior court shall be conducted without a jury, see N.C.G.S. § 150B-50 (1991), the APA sets forth the permissible dispositions upon judicial review of a final agency decision:

[T]he court reviewing a final decision may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. It may also reverse or modify the agency's decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the entire record as submitted; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious.

N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b) (1991).

Although the statute lists the grounds upon which the superior court may reverse or modify a final agency decision, the proper manner of review depends upon the particular issues presented on...