E. Amanti & Sons, Inc. v. R.C. Griffin, Inc.
Decision Date | 21 November 2001 |
Docket Number | 98p855 |
Citation | 53 Mass. App. Ct. 245 |
Parties | E. AMANTI & SONS, INC. vs. R.C. GRIFFIN, INC., & another(FN1); TOWN OF DANVERS, third-party defendant. 98-Massachusetts Court of Appeals |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
County: Essex.
Present: Jacobs, Gillerman, & Beck, JJ.
Contract, Public works, Bidding for contract, Subcontract, Specifications, Damages, Indemnity. Public Works, Bidding procedure, General contractor, Specifications, Attorney's fees. Damages, Loss of profits, Attorney's fees, Public works contract.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 18, 1995.
The case was heard by Christine M. McEvoy, J., on motions for summary judgment, and a hearing on an assessment of damages was had before Nancy Merrick, J.
Brad A. Gordon for town of Danvers.
John J. Spignesi for the plaintiff.
Peter W. Waltonen for R.C. Griffin, Inc., & another.
This dispute concerns the specifications for the emergency vehicle exhaust system for a fire station in the town of Danvers. The plaintiff, E. Amanti and Sons, Inc. (Amanti), the successful heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) subbidder, claims that the town's interpretation of the specifications violated key provisions of G. L. c. 30, § 39M(b). Having no privity with the town, Amanti brought suit against R.C. Griffin, Inc., the general contractor, and its surety, Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (general contractor). Amanti's complaint sought payment from the general contractor for excess costs Amanti incurred when the general contractor, at the insistence of the town, required Amanti to supply a specific emergency vehicle exhaust system that was more costly than the one Amanti had bid. The general contractor then filed a third-party action against the town for any damages Amanti might recover from it. A Superior Court judge allowed summary judgment for Amanti against the general contractor and for the general contractor against the town. The town appeals. The general contractor also appeals, claiming it is entitled to recover the attorney's fees and costs it incurred in this litigation. We affirm the order on assessment of damages and the judgment which were entered on November 21, 1997.
1. Procedural and factual background. The specifications at issue here were set out in a five and one-half page addendum to the invitation for bids for construction of the town's new fire station. (There is nothing in the record concerning the specifications the addendum "replace[d].") The specifications required the emergency vehicle exhaust system to be "the standard product of a U.S. exhaust system manufacturer" and consisted of eighteen detailed paragraphs. Paragraph 18 reads as follows:"Emergency Vehicle Exhaust System shall be as specified and manufactured by PlymoVent, or approved equal by the Fire Department."
Amanti, a Massachusetts corporation experienced in the relevant subtrade as well as in public sector work, submitted a subbid for the HVAC system. See G. L. c. 149, § 44F. After the town awarded the contract to the general contractor, which had carried Amanti as its HVAC subbidder, Amanti sought approval for a proposed emergency vehicle exhaust system manufactured by Carmon. Initially, the town's architect agreed.
Shortly thereafter, however, the architect notified the general contractor that Amanti's proposed exhaust system did not meet the "performance requirement" in the addendum. The letter set out specific failings of Amanti's proposed system, required Amanti to "resubmit a revised vehicle exhaust system" meeting the town's specifications, and noted:
Amanti responded by reminding the general contractor that the project was bid under G. L. c. 30, § 39M, that for a competitive bid the statute required the awarding authority to provide three named brands or a description that can be met by a minimum of three manufacturers, and that "[w]ithout such provision a specification for a product becomes proprietary." Amanti asserted that the town had failed to follow the steps necessary to "limit the acceptable [v]ehicle [e]xhaust system to a single supplier." Amanti therefore requested that it "be furnished the name[s] and specific model number(s) of two additional manufacturers which are equivalent and therefore will be accepted in order that we may solicit competitive quotations."
In response, the architect insisted that it had "provide[d] a performance type of specification . . . [and] the name of one manufacturer that . . . meets the performance requirements [while indicating it] would accept other manufacturers who [could] meet [those] criteria." The architect's letter directed the general contractor to submit shop drawings within two weeks and stated that failure to do so would constitute a default. Four days later, presumably in response to Amanti's request, the architect wrote another letter to the general contractor which stated, "I have the names of suppliers of vehicle exhaust systems such as Tycon, Monoxivent and N.S.G.V. but I don't know where they are located, I can't get any technical materials and I don't know if their standard package includes the [three] essential safety features we specified." Amanti then notified the general contractor that it would furnish the PlymoVent system, but under protest, and would seek full compensation for additional costs. Eight months later, apparently after completing the project, Amanti filed this action.
There being no privity between the subcontractor and the town, see Grande & Son v. School Hous. Comm. of N. Reading, 334 Mass. 252, 255-256 (1956), Amanti brought suit against the general contractor under G. L. c. 149, § 29. Asserting that the town's demands violated G. L. c. 30, § 39M(b), Amanti claimed it was entitled to recover the additional costs of the PlymoVent system ($18,588.11), plus interest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. The general contractor answered, denying liability, and filed a third-party complaint against the town seeking "the full amount ultimately adjudged due Amanti plus interest, costs and attorneys fees." Upon motions for summary judgment -- Amanti against the general contractor, the general contractor against the town, and the town against the general contractor -- a Superior Court judge allowed the motions of Amanti and the general contractor and denied the town's motion. A different judge held a damages hearing and awarded damages to Amanti and to the general contractor to the extent that it was liable to Amanti. The town and the general contractor appeal, the latter claiming entitlement to attorney's fees and costs it incurred in litigating Amanti's claim.
2. The applicable law. At the time of the events in this case, G. L. c. 30, § 39M(b), St. 1967, c. 535, § 5, provided:
We discuss the statute in more detail below.
3. Standard of review, prior proceedings, and issues on appeal. Annese Elec. Servs., Inc. v. Newton, 431 Mass. 763, 764 n.2 (2000) (citation omitted).
The Superior Court judge ruled in relevant part that, despite the town's insistence to the contrary, "[the town's] exhaust system specification [was] not a performance [i.e. competitive] specification because . . . [it was not] able to be satisfied by any manufacturer other than PlymoVent." She concluded that the town "had a duty to disclose to bidders that PlymoVent was [a] sole source" and that having failed in that duty, the town was liable for Amanti's lost profits.
On appeal, the town contends that its "bid specifications were compliant [with] the terms of c. 30, § 39M(b)." According to the town, "the plain language of the statute does not prohibit project specifications from occupying a middle ground between the two ends of...
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