Amaral v. Cabral, 82-245-A
| Decision Date | 18 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-245-A,82-245-A |
| Citation | 494 A.2d 94 |
| Parties | Pong Sun AMARAL v. Mary CABRAL. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is a civil action for personal injuries sustained by Diadato Amaral as a result of a motor-vehicle accident. Diadato's wife, Pong Sun, the plaintiff herein, sued to recover for loss of consortium and compensation for expenses in caring for her spouse.
Prior to trial, defendant Mary Cabral moved to dismiss count 2 of the complaint dealing with Pong Sun's claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After a hearing, the trial justice granted defendant's motion to dismiss. He held that we do not recognize a claim for loss of consortium in this jurisdiction; and with respect to compensation for expenses, the trial justice found that Pong Sun's count of the complaint failed to state such a claim explicitly. The plaintiff appeals. 1
The facts can be briefly stated. The plaintiff's husband was injured on November 10, 1978 when the vehicle he was driving collided with a vehicle owned and operated by defendant. Thereafter, the husband and wife instituted an action to recover damages resulting from the motor-vehicle accident.
The plaintiff presents two issues for the court to consider: (1) whether a wife can be compensated for loss of sentimental consortium 2 and (2) whether the complaint sufficiently stated a claim for loss of her expenses in caring for her husband.
The plaintiff contends that this court, in light of the overwhelming trend in other jurisdictions, should recognize a spouse's right to sue for sentimental consortium.
In this jurisdiction, we have long held that a husband has a claim for consortium that is limited to compensation for services and expenses. Martin v. United Electric Railways Co., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945); Golden v. R.L. Greene Paper Co., 44 R.I. 231, 116 A. 579 (1922). In Golden, we held:
"With us the elements of a husband's damage resulting from his wife's injury due to the negligence of a defendant are restricted to compensation for the loss of his wife's services and to his expenses in caring for his wife and in attempting to cure or repair her injury." Id. at 235, 116 A. at 580.
The plaintiff contends that this court has recognized a wife's right to sue for damages for loss of conjugal society and consortium of her husband in the case of Mariani v. Nanni, 95 R.I. 153, 185 A.2d 119 (1962). However, this reliance is misplaced. In Mariani, a wife was seeking to recover for loss of her husband's consortium because her husband had become sterile and impotent as the result of an injury sustained by him while employed by the defendant therein. This court held that the wife could not recover because her claim was derivative of her husband's claim and he had no right of action against a master for the negligence of a fellow worker. Consequently, the court found it unnecessary to consider the consortium issue.
The plaintiff contends, however, that a spouse must have a right to claim damages for a loss of consortium that goes beyond "out-of-pocket expenses" and which recognizes a plaintiff's loss when she has been denied the care, protection, consideration, companionship, aid, and society of her husband.
We have held that the creation of new causes of action are customarily left to the Legislature. Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort Inc., 122 R.I. 429, 432, 408 A.2d 608, 609 (1979); Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 38, 188 A.2d 467, 469 (1963); Levasseur v. Knights of Columbus, 96 R.I. 22, 24, 188 A.2d 469, 471 (1963).
During the pendency of this action, the Legislature enacted a statute that provides for the recovery of damages for the loss of society and companionship by either spouse. 3 The act, however, applies only to cause of actions which accrue after the effective date of passage (May 2, 1984). Consequently, this action does not fall within the purview of the statute. We have stated many times that statutes should be applied prospectively unless a contrary impression plainly appears. City of Providence v. Solomon, --- R.I. ---, ---, 444 A.2d 870, 874 (1982); State v. Healy, 122 R.I. 602, 606, 410 A.2d 432, 434 (1980); Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 122 R.I. 13, 24-25, 404 A.2d 821, 828 (1979). The Legislature clearly provided within the act that the statute should apply only to those causes of action accruing after May 2, 1984, thereby barring this plaintiff from taking advantage of its provisions.
We therefore affirm the trial justice's findings that plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for the loss of sentimental consortium as a matter of law.
The plaintiff argues that the trial justice, in dismissing her claim for expenses as not sufficiently stated in the complaint, was in error.
The gravamen of this issue is whether count 2 of the complaint is sufficiently explicit to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In addressing this issue, we rely upon the principles enunciated in Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 102 R.I. 8, 12, 227 A.2d 582, 584 (1967):
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Fritz v. May Dept. Stores Co.
...and companionship, reversing prior Rhode Island case law that only allowed spouses to recover for loss of services. Amaral v. Cabral, 494 A.2d 94, 96 (R.I.1985). Rhode Island case law also suggests that loss of consortium/loss of society claims do not require physical injuries. Loss of cons......