Amari v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge

• Decision Date: 02 April 1986
• Citation: 21 Mass.App.Ct. 598,488 N.E.2d 1180
• Parties: Peter J. AMARI, trustee, v. RENT CONTROL BOARD OF CAMBRIDGE et al. 1
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 1180

488 N.E.2d 1180

21 Mass.App.Ct. 598

Peter J. AMARI, trustee, v. RENT CONTROL BOARD OF CAMBRIDGE et al. ¹

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued Oct. 18, 1985.

Decided Feb. 12, 1986.

Further Appellate Review Denied

April 2, 1986.

Michael J. O'Neill, Boston, for plaintiff.

Patricia A. Cantor, for Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge (Mark D. Stern, Cambridge, for Barnett Rubenstein, with her).

Before DREBEN, KAPLAN and WARNER, JJ.

WARNER, Justice.

This is an appeal by the owner from a judgment of the Superior Court which declared that unit 3 at 69 Harvey Street is a controlled rental unit subject to St.1976, c. 36, the Cambridge Rent Control Act (Act). ²

On February 12, 1982, Barnett Rubenstein (tenant) filed a tenant's complaint with the rent control board of Cambridge (board), alleging, in substance, that unit 3 was a controlled rental unit, that it had not been properly registered as such, and that as a result Rubenstein had paid substantially more than the legal maximum rent. The matter was heard by a board hearing examiner, and she concluded that the unit was rent controlled and recommended a legal maximum rent. The board adopted the findings and recommendations of the hearing examiner and ruled that the unit was rent controlled.

The owner of the premises sought judicial review in a District Court in accordance with § 10(a ) of the Act. ³ A District Court judge determined, after de novo review, that the unit was rent controlled. The owner appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 97, as amended by St.1977, c. 655, § 2. ⁴ On the board's motion for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge, without explanation, entered the judgment from which this appeal was taken.

1. The standard of review in the trial courts. At the threshold is the question of the proper scope of judicial review of the board's decision. The District Court judge took the position that de novo consideration was called for and conducted the hearing and made his findings accordingly. It is not clear from the record what standard the Superior Court judge applied. The board and the tenant argue that the trial courts' function in cases such as this is not to consider the case anew but only to examine the board's record to determine whether the decision is supported by evidence before the board and is legally justified. The owner's position is to the contrary. ⁵

"Neither in [the Act] nor in the Declaratory Judgment Act do we have express guidance as to the scope of judicial review, ⁶ and we are remitted, as in other cases, to a judgment based on an appraisal of the total process in its context." Sherman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 367 Mass. 1, 9, 323 N.E.2d 730 (1975). It is undisputed that regulations of the board, enacted pursuant to c. 36, § 5(e ), provided in detail for notice, hearing and adversary or trial-type proceedings on the tenant's complaint. See, id. at 7-8, 323 N.E.2d 730. In addition, the regulations required the hearing examiner to submit a written decision to the board containing a summary of the evidence, findings of fact and recommendations with reasons supporting them. See id. at 10-11, 323 N.E.2d 730. The parties were entitled to oral and written argument to the board. See id. at 8, 323 N.E.2d 730. The owner's argument that since the procedural protections were not provided in the enabling act the parties were not entitled to them is to no avail. The regulations enacted by the board pursuant to a legislative grant of power had the force of law and were binding on the board. Niles v. Boston Rent Control Admr., 6 Mass.App.Ct. 135, 150, 374 N.E.2d 296 (1978). Cf. Kenney v. Commissioner of Correction, 393 Mass. 28, 33, 468 N.E.2d 616 (1984), and cases cited.

We also think that the board has discretion in determining whether a rental unit is subject to rent control under the Act. The term "rental units" is defined broadly. ⁷ No guidance, other than by way of specific and limited exceptions, is given in the Act to assist in applying the definition to particular facts. It seems apparent, considering the context in which the Act and its predecessor were enacted and the purposes of both Acts, ⁸ that the Legislature intended to leave the case by case determination of the applicability of rent control in Cambridge to the existing and developing expertise, judgment and discretion of the board. While a determination whether a rental unit is residential in character may be routine in many instances, the facts of this case show that there are discretionary elements. See Sherman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 367 Mass. at 8, 323 N.E.2d 730. ⁹

We hold that the scope of judicial review of the board's decision in this case is limited. "[T]he coincidence of an insistence on procedural protections in proceedings before the board, and reliance on the board to exercise informed judgment and discretion in the ... [determination whether the unit in question was subject to rent control], points to the conclusion that the court's proper role is not to take evidence afresh and decide [the question] for itself ..., but is rather to decide whether the board's decision was supported by the facts before it and was legally justified." Id. at 10, 323 N.E.2d 730. Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 371 Mass. 632, 635, 359 N.E.2d 29 (1976). See Niles v. Boston Rent Control Admr., 6 Mass.App. at 140, 374 N.E.2d 296. ¹⁰

2. The decision that unit 3 was a controlled rental unit. The board adopted the findings and recommendations of the hearing examiner, and so we look to see if those findings are supported by the evidence and whether the decision was legally justified. The question before the examiner was whether unit 3 at 69 Harvey Street was a controlled rental unit under the Act. The resolution of that issue depended, in part, on whether the unit was used as a residence during the period prior to January 1, 1969, and up to August 10, 1979. ¹¹ It is undisputed that the evidence before the hearing examiner amply supported her finding that unit 3 had been used as a residence continuously (with perhaps hiatuses in early 1967 and in the summer of 1968) from late 1965 to the date of the hearing.

What is controverted by the owner is the examiner's finding that the primary or predominant use of unit 3 had been residential at all relevant times. A sketch of the examiner's uncontested findings will suffice. The unit consisted of one large open room with a single entrance when it was rented in 1965 to an architect who used it as his principal residence, as well as a place where he did some architectural work and woodworking at night. The architect was followed as a tenant by a reporter and free lance writer, then a sculptor, and, finally, Rubenstein, who was a full time art teacher and painter. All of them occupied the space as their principal residence ¹² and also did some professional work there during the hours when they were not employed elsewhere. The "vast majority" of the units in the sixteen-unit building (formerly used for a school and located in a predominantly residential area) were devoted to both work and residential uses. ¹³ Over the years the unit was partitioned so as to create two areas; in the smaller area renovations consistent with residential use were made. The examiner found that at the time of the hearings in 1982, Rubenstein had occupied unit 3 as his principal residence since February or March of 1975 and had continuously lived there "on a day-to-day basis." The examiner, who took a view, also found that the larger of the two areas (separated by a partition--with sliding glass doors installed by Rubenstein) was used as a painter's work studio, and the smaller was used as a residence.

The examiner concluded that the primary use of unit 3 was residential because of the day-to-day occupation by tenants who had no other residences. In effect, she determined that whatever professional or business use was made of the unit was incidental to the residential use. The board agreed with the examiner by adopting her findings and recommendations. We conclude that the board's decision that unit 3 was a controlled rental unit under the Act was supported by the evidence and legally justified.

In enacting the Act, the Legislature perceived "a serious public emergency ... with respect to the housing of a substantial number of the citizens in the City of Cambridge ... which has resulted in a substantial and increasing shortage of decent rental housing accommodations." St.1976, c. 36, § 1. See Flynn v. Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 157, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981). Administration of the Act was entrusted to the board. Id. § 5. The definition of "rental units" was broadly stated. See note 7 supra. In order that the board may carry out its responsibilities under the Act, "it is only appropriate that some degree of flexibility be accorded to the board in light of the purposes behind c. 36 and the inevitable uncertainty and difficulties that the board is bound to encounter within the rent control field." H.N. Gorin & Leeder Management Co. v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 18 Mass.App. 272, 275, 464 N.E.2d 1370 (1984). We are not, of course, bound by the board's conclusion. However, "[t]he importance of an administrative interpretation of a statute is 'never greater than where, as here, ... [the board] must interpret a legislative policy which is only broadly set out in the governing statute.' " Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Department of Pub. Health, 372 Mass. 844, 850, 364 N.E.2d 1202 (1977), quoting from School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 362 Mass. 417, 442, 287 N.E.2d 438 (1972). Cf. Boston Preservation Alliance Inc. v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs, 396 Mass. 489, 496, 487 N.E.2d 197 (1986). This is especially so where the underlying question involves, essentially, a factual determination to which the knowledge, experience and expertise of the board may be applied. Surely, the importance...