American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp

• Decision Date: 12 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. A040911,A040911
• Citation: 214 Cal.App.3d 831,263 Cal.Rptr. 46
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 58 USLW 2268 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. John K. VAN de KAMP as Attorney General et al., Defendants and Appellants. *

Page 46

263 Cal.Rptr. 46

214 Cal.App.3d 831, 58 USLW 2268

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. John K. VAN de KAMP as Attorney General et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. A040911. ^*

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 12, 1989.

Linda E. Shostak, Annette P. Carnegie, George C. Aguilar, Morrison & Foerster, Abigal English, Adolescent Health Care Project, National Center for Youth Law, Margaret C. Crosby, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., San Francisco, Carol Sobel, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and respondents.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard D. Martland, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Charlton G. Holland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Elisabeth C. Brandt, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for defendants and appellants.

Amici Curiae in support of plaintiffs and respondents:

Geraldine Jaffe, Arcadia, for Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, American Jewish Congress, Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights of California, Board of Church and Society of California and Nevada of the United Methodist Church, and B'nai B'rith Women, amici curiae.

Lorraine L. Loder, Pearl Lattaker, Susan Formaker, Mona Ehrenreich, Los Angeles, for Women Lawyers' Assn. of Los Angeles, amicus curiae.

Ann G. Daniels, Farella, Braun & Martel, San Francisco, for California Abortion Rights Action League--North, amicus curiae.

Amici Curiae in support of defendants and appellants:

Cyrus Zal, Priest Gaffaney & Teal, Sacramento, Clarke D. Forsythe, Kevin J. Todd, Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund, Chicago, Ill., Lynn D. Wardle, Orem, Utah, for California Physicians, Doctors, and Professionals, including Members and Fellows of the American Academy of Pediatrics, The American Medical Assn., The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the California Medical Assn., amici curiae.

James M. Braden, Samuel B. Casey, Sacramento, for The Rutherford Institute of California, amicus curiae.

Dennis Harvey, Oroville, Ann-Louise Lohr, Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund, Chicago, Ill., for Focus on The Family, Inc., Women's Lobby, California Pro-Life Council, Inc., American Family Assn. of California, and Christian Action Council Ministries, Inc., amici curiae.

STEIN, Associate Justice.

INTRODUCTION

The issue before this court today is not the morality or immorality of abortion. "The morality of abortion is not a legal or constitutional issue; it is a matter of philosophy, of ethics, and of theology. It is a subject upon which reasonable people can, and do, adhere to vastly divergent convictions and principles." (Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 284, 172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779.) Nor is the issue before this court today whether women have the right to procreative choice. That issue is settled. (People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954, 80 Cal.Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194; Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147.) The right to procreative choice in California is protected by article I, section 1 of our Constitution and extends to all women regardless of wealth (Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 262, 172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779) or age (Ballard v. Anderson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 873, 880-881, 95 Cal.Rptr. 1, 484 P.2d 1345). Nor are we required to decide today whether this right can be restricted where the pregnant woman is an unemancipated minor.

Today we decide the only issue before us: whether the superior court abused its discretion when it granted a preliminary injunction preventing the implementation of Assembly Bill Number 2274. We hold it did not and return the matter to that court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Prior to 1987, section 34.5 of the Civil Code allowed an unmarried minor to consent Plaintiffs, health-care providers who challenge the constitutionality of Assembly Bill Number 2274, obtained a preliminary injunction against its implementation until the issue could be determined on the merits. The Attorney General, on behalf of the State of California, appeals from the order issuing the preliminary injunction. In addition to the briefs of the parties, numerous briefs have been filed by amici curiae. We shall address the issues relevant to the trial court's order, whether they were raised by the parties or the amici.

                to the furnishing of care related to prevention or treatment of pregnancy.  The consent of the minor's parent was not necessary in order to authorize such care, and an abortion under the Therapeutic Abortion Act was held to be " 'care' of the prospective mother 'related to her pregnancy.' "  (Ballard v. Anderson, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 879, 95 Cal.Rptr. 1, 484 P.2d 1345.)   In 1987 the Legislature passed Assembly Bill Number 2274 (stats.1987, ch. 1237) which, in essence, prohibits therapeutic abortions on unemancipated minors unless they [214 Cal.App.3d 837] have obtained the consent of a parent, a guardian, or the juvenile court.  Under the new statute the juvenile court must determine if the minor is sufficiently mature to make the decision to undergo a therapeutic abortion.  If so, the court must give its consent.  If not, the court must consider whether performance of the abortion will be in the best interests of the minor and must give or withhold its consent upon that basis.  The bill makes it a misdemeanor for any person to knowingly perform an abortion on an unemancipated minor who has not obtained parental consent or undergone the outlined judicial process
                

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue presented is straightforward. It is not whether Assembly Bill Number 2274 is unconstitutional--that determination must await a trial on the merits--but whether the superior court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286, 219 Cal.Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840.) "A trial court will be found to have abused its discretion only when it has ' "exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence." ' [and] the burden rests with the party challenging the injunction to make a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69, 196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121.)

In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must review two interrelated factors: " 'The first is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued. [Citations.]' ... ' "[By] balancing the respective equities of the parties, [the trial court] concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed of him." ' [Citation.]" (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 286, 219 Cal.Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840.)

The Attorney General correctly contends that we must reverse the order granting the injunction if we determine that either of the two interrelated factors does not support the superior court's order. This contention appears to be in conflict with the language of King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, at page 1227, 240 Cal.Rptr. 829, 743 P.2d 889, to the effect that "a trial court's order with regard to a preliminary injunction may be affirmed if either the balance-of-hardships analysis or plaintiffs' likelihood of success considerations would alone support the ruling. [Citation.]" (Emphasis added.) As the Attorney General correctly notes, however, the order appealed from in King was an order denying a preliminary injunction. The correct rule is that an injunction should not issue where there is no possibility of success even though its issuance might prevent irreparable harm ("[T]here is no justification in delaying that harm where, although irreparable, it is also inevitable." (Jessen v. Keystone Savings & Loan Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 459, 191 Cal.Rptr. 104)). Where there is indeed no likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail, an injunction favoring the plaintiff serves no valid purpose and can only cause needless harm.

We do not find a "clear showing" that the superior court abused its discretion in determining either relevant consideration.

THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS

Both sides produced extensive evidence before the superior court on the nature "In determining the validity of the injunction, we look at the evidence presented to the trial court to determine if there was substantial support for the trial court's determination that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief granted. If there is, then the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Where the evidence is conflicting, we do not reweigh it ... In short, the scope of our review is the same as in the case of any other judgment or order. [Citations.]" (Monogram Industries, Inc. v. Sar Industries, Inc. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 692, 703, 134 Cal.Rptr. 714.) "Where the evidence with respect to the right to a preliminary injunction is conflicting, the reviewing court must 'interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulge in all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's order.' [Citation.]" (Gleaves v. Waters (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 413, 416-417, 220 Cal.Rptr. 621.)

and extent of harm they would suffer. Plaintiffs introduced evidence that the implementation of the law would cause irreparable harm. Evidence produced by the Attorney General indicated the harm that would result if the new law was not immediately implemented. The plaintiffs also offered evidence indicating that the harm suggested by the Attorney General's evidence either was unfounded, or would not be alleviated by the new law.

In the present case, the trial...