American Emigrant Co. v. Fuller
| Decision Date | 22 October 1891 |
| Parties | AMERICAN EMIGRANT COMPANY, Appellant, v. VELANCEY E. FULLER, Appellee |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Calhoun District Court.--Hon. J. H. MACOMBER, Judge.
ACTION in equity to quiet the title to certain land situated in Calhoun county. Upon final hearing, the district court granted to the plaintiff the relief demanded as to a portion of the land in controversy, and denied it as to the remainder. Both parties appeal, the plaintiff being known as the appellant. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Charles A. Clark, for appellee.
The plaintiff claims to be the owner of the east half of the northwest quarter, the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter, the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter, and the northwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section 27 in township 89 north, of range 33 west. Its alleged title is derived from an act of congress approved September 28, 1850 entitled "An act to enable the state of Arkansas and other states to reclaim the swamp lands within their limits;" an act of the general assembly of the state of Iowa, which took effect February 2, 1853 entitled "An act to dispose of the swamp and overflowed lands within the state, and to pay the expenses of selecting and surveying the same;" an agreement made between it and the county of Calhoun, dated December 12, 1861; a deed made by the county to trustees on the fourteenth day of September, 1863; a deed made by the sole surviving trustee to the plaintiff on the twenty-ninth day of February, 1872; and a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Iowa.
The defendant claims title through the Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad Company, under a grant made by act of congress approved May 15, 1856, to aid in building a railroad from Dubuque to Sioux City, and for other purposes. It is agreed that the land in controversy is within the limits of the railroad grant named, and was earned by the building of a road under the grant, if subject thereto, and that the defendant holds whatever title or interest passed under the grant to the railroad company. He demands that his title be quieted as against the plaintiff. The court below rendered a decree in favor of the plaintiff for all the land in controversy, excepting the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 27, and in favor of defendant for that tract.
I. The appellee insists that the agreement made between the county and the plaintiff was void, because not duly ratified by a vote of the people; that the deed to trustees for the benefit of the plaintiff conveyed no title, because based on a void agreement; and that the deed is not shown to have been delivered, and was defective, and not effectual as a conveyance. The appellant denies the alleged defects, and insists that the decree of the federal court is an adjudication as to the validity of the agreement and deed, which is binding upon the parties to this action. The decree was rendered on the twentieth day of May, 1872, and is as follows:
The only land described in the decree is denominated "scrip land," and is in Kossuth county. The only part of the record proven was the decree. The appellee contends that the proof was insufficient under the pleadings to show a valid adjudication in favor of the plaintiff of the title to the lands in controversy, and numerous authorities are cited in support of the doctrine stated as follows: 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 511.
The petition alleges that, after the making of the contract and deed by the county, it brought suit in the district court of the county to obtain a decree setting them aside, and declaring them void, and to recover the land and interests thereby conveyed, including the land in controversy; that said suit was removed to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Iowa, and such proceedings had therein that on the date specified a final decree was rendered, declaring the contract and deed valid, and binding on the county, and establishing the title to the land and interests thereunder, including the land in suit, in the plaintiff, and decreeing that the county be estopped and forever restrained from making any claim adverse to the plaintiff and from in any manner impeaching the validity of the contract or deed. The answer to these averments is a general denial.
The common-law rule in regard to pleading judgments has been somewhat relaxed by statute. 12 American & English Encyclopedia of Law, 149e-g, and authorities therein cited. In this state it is not necessary in pleading a judgment to state the facts conferring jurisdiction, but it is sufficient to state that the judgment was duly rendered. Code, sec. 2714. If such statement is denied, it is not sufficient to do so by a general denial, but the facts relied on must be specifically stated. Code, sec. 2717. The judgment is that part of the record of a case which is of final importance. It is that for which the parties litigate, and that which determines their rights. It is that which gives them the relief to which they are entitled. The service of the original notice and the pleadings are but means to an end. A judgment for money is a lien upon the real estate of the judgment debtor in the county where rendered. Code, secs. 2882, 2883. It may be made a lien upon his land in other counties by filing therein attested copies of the judgment. Code, secs. 2884, 2885. When an execution is sent into another county than that in which the judgment was rendered, a transcript of the judgment should be filed in the county to which the execution is sent. Code, sec. 3031. When real property is the subject of an action brought and determined in another county, a transcript of the final order, judgment or decree should be filed in the county where such land is situated, to give constructive notice of the adjudication. Code, sec. 2629. These and other statutory provisions, which need not be specified, show that special force and effect are given to the judgment entries of courts in this state having general jurisdiction. In such cases, the judgments are presumed to have been duly rendered by a court having jurisdiction, not only of the subject-matter of the litigation, but of the litigants, so far as necessary to authorize the rendition of the judgment, until the contrary is shown. It is not necessary to inquire into the service of process until the question of service is properly made an issue.
Courts sometimes exceed their jurisdiction in granting relief not demanded or not authorized by the pleadings, but the presumption is that the relief granted is authorized, and the burden is upon him who attacks the judgment to show that it was not. Every act of a court of competent jurisdiction is presumed to have been rightly done until the contrary appears. Harvey v. Tyler, 69 U.S. 328, 2 Wall. 328, 17 L.Ed. 871; Kipp v. Collins, 33 Minn. 394; 23 N.W. 554. The competency of judgment entries, and even of entries in the judgment docket, without other parts of the record, has been frequently recognized by this court. Suiter v. Turner, 10 Iowa 517; Weider v. Overton, 47 Iowa 538; Rea v. Scully, 76 Iowa 343, 41 N.W. 36; Taylor v. Wendling, 66 Iowa 562, 24 N.W. 40; Moore v. McKinley, 60 Iowa 367, 14 N.W. 768. In our opinion, the record of the judgment was competent evidence, without proof of the service of process and the pleadings. Beck v. Henderson, 76 Ga. 360; Gardere v. Columbian Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 518; Baudin v. Roliff, 14 Am. Dec. 183.
II. The land in controversy is not described in the judgment, hence other evidence was necessary to identify it as being included in that contemplated by the decree. It would have been proper practice certainly to have introduced a duly authenticated copy of the pleadings. Fowler v. Doyle, 16 Iowa 534. Whether, if objection had been made, such proof would have been required as being the best obtainable, we need not determine, for the reason that other evidence to show the application of the decree was introduced without objection. That extrinsic evidence is competent to prove what was in fact adjudicated, when the record is not sufficiently clear for that purpose, is well settled, and not denied by the appellee. Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 24...
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