American Exp. Co. v. Fox

• Decision Date: 03 June 1916
• Citation: 187 S.W. 1117,135 Tenn. 489
• Parties: AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. FOX.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

187 S.W. 1117

135 Tenn. 489

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. FOX.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 3, 1916

On Petition to Rehear, August 15, 1916.

Certiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.

Bill by the American Express Company against Sam Fox. From a decree for complainant, defendant appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the decree, and he prays certiorari. Writ granted, and decree reversed.

Burch & Minor and C. H. McKay, all of Memphis, for complainant.

W. G Cavett and H. S. Buchanan, both of Memphis, for defendant.

GREEN J.

Sam Fox, a citizen of Shelby county, Tenn., brought a suit for $20,000 damages for personal injuries in a circuit court of that county, against the American Express Company, a New York corporation or joint stock company, having an office and place of business in Shelby county, Tenn. The accident happened in Shelby county. This suit was removed to the district court of the United States at Memphis on petition of the American Express Company. Before trial in the federal court, Fox took a nonsuit.

Three months later, Fox began a new action on account of the same matters in the circuit court of De Soto county, Miss., for $3,000 damages.

This bill was filed by the American Express Company in the chancery court of Shelby county to enjoin the prosecution by Fox of his said damage suit in the circuit court of De Soto county, Miss. A demurrer was interposed by Fox, which was overruled by the chancellor and the injunction was granted as prayed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the chancellor's decree, and the case is before us on petition for certiorari, which has been granted.

Notwithstanding a dictum to the contrary in Lockwood & Co. v. Nye, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 515, 58 Am. Dec. 73, we think there is no doubt that the courts of one state have the power in a proper case to restrain a citizen of that state from prosecuting a suit against another citizen of the same state in the courts of another state. This jurisdiction rests on the theory that the injunction operates in personam and is not an interference with the proceedings of the courts of a sister state. High on Injunctions (4th Ed.) §§ 103-107; Story's Eq. Jurisp. §§ 899, 900; Pomeroy's Eq. Remedies, § 670.

Two of the leading cases in America announcing this rule are Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen (Mass.) 545, and Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 S.Ct. 269, 35 L.Ed. 538. In the last case it was held that such proceedings were not in derogation of section 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the United States providing that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the judgments of another state.

This question has received elaborate consideration in recent years and the cases on the subject are collected and classified in notes in 10 Ann. Cas. 26, 21 L. R. A. 71, and 25 L. R. A. (N S.) 267. Two recent cases are Jones v. Hughes, 156 Iowa, 684, 137 N.W. 1023, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502; Freick v. Hinkly, 122 Minn. 24, 141 N.W. 1096, 46 L. R. A. (N S.) 695. It appears, from an examination of the authorities referred to, that injunctions have been granted against suits in the courts of another state to prevent embarrassment, oppression, or fraud, to prevent evasion of domiciliary laws, where insolvency proceedings are pending, where the local court had prior jurisdiction, and perhaps other cases.

The decisions do not appear to be altogether agreed as to what circumstances justify such relief. It would be perhaps impossible to state a rule to which all the cases would conform. We are impressed with the idea that such injunctions have in some of the cases been improvidently granted.

We indulge ourselves in quotations from the opinions of three eminent judges who have had occasion to consider this jurisdiction of courts of equity.

Chancellor Pitney, of New Jersey, observed:

"But on general principles, equity will not interfere with the right of any person to bring an action for the redress of grievance--the right preservative of all rights--except for grave reasons, and on grounds of comity the power of one state to interfere with a litigant who is in due course pursuing his rights and remedies in the courts of another state ought to be sparingly exercised. * * * They must be very special circumstances that will justify this court in restraining the prosecution of an equitable action already pending in a court of ample jurisdiction.

I speak not of any limitation upon the power of this court, but upon the propriety of its exercise in the particular case. Its exercise is not to be properly based upon any theory that this court knows better how to do justice than the court of last resort of that commonwealth; that it can weigh evidence better or more justly apply to the facts any general principle of law or equity, nor upon the ground that this court recognizes different rules of law or of equity from those which obtain in the commonwealth." Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 74 N. J. Equity, 457, 71 A. 153.

Chief Justice McClain of Iowa said:

"But, beyond the prevention of some threatened evasion of the specific laws of the state intended to regulate the relations of its citizens to each other in some definite manner, courts have been reluctant to interfere with the exercise of the undeniable right of a resident to go into the courts of another state to secure such relief as may there be available to him, and have not felt justified in scrutinizing his motive in doing so." Jones v. Hughes, 156 Iowa, 684, 137 N.W. 1023, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502.

Judge Brewer, while on the Supreme Court of Kansas, used this language:

"The question is: Under what circumstances will a court of equity restrain a party from invoking the aid of the courts and processes of another state? It certainly will not do that, simply to compel him to carry on his litigations at home. It will not act upon the basis of any distrust of the courts of a sister state." Cole v. Young, 24 Kan. 435.

Tested by the rules expressed in the above quotations from these three learned jurists, we think that the bill of complaint does not state a case which entitles it to the relief here sought.

It is said for the complainant that it will be unable to compel the attendance of any of its witnesses in the Mississippi court and unable to procure the attendance of some of them; that Fox's contributory negligence will only mitigate his damages in Mississippi and will not bar his recovery there as it would in Tennessee; that in Mississippi all questions of negligence and contributory negligence must go to the jury while in Tennessee a defendant is entitled to peremptory instructions as to these matters, under certain circumstances. Other reasons...